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This book aims to inform international students about the definition of the concept of foreign policy and foreign policy analysis. We can define foreign policy as a target, movement style and methods used by a state to realize its national interests outside of its borders. On the other hand, foreign policy includes both the domestic policy process and the international policy process. Therefore as an international relations scholars and students in order to understand the developments in the international politics and the responses of the nation states to these developments, we need to know the foreign policy analysis and theoretical approaches. Individual, internal and external factors in the context of understanding and explaining foreign policy are vital points. The decision making mechanism, which is the most important part of foreign policy formation.

Our book consists of eight chapters. Our authors in this book have dealt with the from the definition of the concept of foreign policy to foreign policy instruments of states. In this framework, the first chapter of the book emphasizes the definition of the concept of foreign policy. The first chapter also covered the understand and explain the structure-agency debate in international relations. This chapter also discuss the foreign policy objectives of states. Key concepts in foreign policy are also introduced to students in this chapter. The second chapter focuses on the foreign policy analysis and theoretical approaches. In this framework the chapter evaluate the analysis levels and research methods used in foreign policy analysis. This chapter also compare the various theoretical approaches to foreign policy. The third chapter of the book deals with the decision making processes in foreign policy. In this part of the book, foreign policy decision making processes are defined and evaluated. In this chapter, the author discusses the contexts, pressures and constraints that foreign policy makers have to address. The chapter also define the models of foreign policy decision making. Factors influencing foreign policy decision making has been another subject dealt with. The fourth chapter related with the factors determining foreign policy. In this context, the factors that determine foreign policy are classified as individual, external and internal factors in this chapter. Several theoretical perspectives have been emphasized to help analysts understand comprehensively the meaning of foreign policy within this chapter. Individual, internal and external factors in the context of understanding and explaining foreign policy has been analysed also in this chapter. The fifth chapter of the book is about the decision making processes in foreign policy and substate actors. In this context this chapter examined the bureaucracy, interest groups, pressure groups, public opinion and media as a substate actors of the decision making process. The sixth chapter of the book related to foreign policy preferences of states. The dynamics of different foreign policy preferences that states could potentially employ in their external relations are described in this chapter. In this context, the main features of isolationism, neutrality, alliances, balance of power as a foreign policy preferences has been discussed in the chapter. The seventh chapter evaluate the foreign policy instruments of states. Diplomacy, Propaganda and Economic methods are the topics discussed here. Differences between the types of economic instruments of foreign policy that the states use in their international relations are also evaluated in this chapter. Distinctive levels and ways of implementation of propaganda in international relations has been analyzed in the seventh chapter. The last part of the book contains other foreign policy instruments of states namely the conflict and war. In this chapter of the book, it is aimed to present to the students the meaning and role of war and conflict as a foreign policy tool. The definition of various types of war and conflict was also made under this section.

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Chapter 1

Definition of the Concept of Foreign Policy (Definition, Foreign Policy Objectives of States)

After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

1. Define and discuss the concept of foreign policy
2. Understand and explain the structure-agency debate in international relations
3. Discuss foreign policy objectives of states

Learning Outcomes

Chapter Outline

Introduction
Fundamental Elements of Foreign Policy
Actors and Structures in Foreign Policy
Key Concepts in Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy Objectives of States

Key Terms

Foreign Policy
Actors in Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy Behavior
Foreign Policy Outcomes
Power
Elements of National Power
National Interest
Agent
Structure
Sovereignty
Anarchy
INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy is a subject area within the discipline of International Relation which is covered study is covered by the sub-field of Foreign Policy Analysis. It consists of self-interested strategies chosen by the sovereign state actors to safeguard their national interests and to achieve goals within the milieu of international relations milieu. Fundamentally it manifests itself through the daily practices regarding interactions of states. This chapter will guide you through different definitions of foreign policy, and inform you about the continuing relevance of some of the fundamental works, the commonalities and nuances included therein. It will be addressing to the elements of foreign policy and discussing the questions regarding the actors and structures within the framework set by the key concepts used in the debates on foreign policy. Hence the chapter will be concluded by a discussion on how states interact in their external relations while pursuing their objectives as independent actors.

Foreign Policy:

- “the strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities.” (Hudson, 2008, p.12)
- “the sum of decisions made on behalf of a given political unit (usually a state) entailing the implementation of goals with direct reference to its external environment. Foreign policy inputs are those many factors that influence decision-making, whilst the observable outputs of foreign policy are a feature of state (and non-state) behavior within the international system.” (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne, 2008, p.392)
- “A set of actions or rules governing the actions of an independent political authority deployed in the international environment” (Morin and Paquin, 2018, p.3).
- “Foreign policy in its traditional definition is the policy of a state towards external actors and especially other states. In contrast particularly to neorealism, it therefore does not primarily look at the international system as such but offers an ‘inside-out’ perspective to understand the decision-making process within a state that produces policies directed beyond the state.” (Diez, Bode, and Costa, 2011, p. 58)
- “The totality of a country’s policies toward and interactions with the environment beyond its borders” (Breuning, 2007, p.180).
- “The totality whereby state actors act, react and interact. Foreign policy has been termed a boundary activity. The term ‘boundary’ implies that those making policy straddle two environments: an internal or domestic environment and an external or global environment. The policy makers and the policy system stand therefore at these junction points and seek to mediate between the various milieu.” (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 179)
- “Foreign policy is seen usually as the quintessential ‘boundary’ activity, at the interface between the domestic and the external spheres. While these spheres have never been completely separate, the boundary between them seems to have become more porous as a result of globalization – a multidimensional contested process that involves an increasing embedding of political, military, economic, social and cultural activities in politically unified (quasi) global spheres of activity.” (Alden and Aran, 2017, p.107)

DEFINITION AND FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY

Definition of Foreign Policy

It should be said from the start that, at the first glance, the concept of foreign policy might seem to be elusive. Even though it is a central concept of the discipline of International Relations, at times one can feel to be stranded in the same paradox that St. Augustinus of Hippo (AD 354 – Ad 430) has so eloquently described in his conception of time; “If no one asks me, I know what it is.” Indeed, there exists a multiplicity of definitions, and a consensual definition of foreign policy is somewhat lacking in the literature on the subject. The tools and frameworks utilized in the execution of foreign policy evolve in time. As a result
Foreign policy is affected by the transformation of the domestic and international contexts. Therefore, the modalities and practices covered by the concept itself remain in a state of “constant mutation”.

**International Relations**

This term refers to an academic discipline that focuses on the study of the interaction of the actors within the international system. These actors are agencies that, through their actions, can create meaningful outcomes within the international milieu and include states, as well as, and non-state actors. Although considered as a branch of political science concerned with relations between nations and primarily with foreign policies, it is essentially an interdisciplinary field of a serious academic study of which requires knowledge of international history, law, and economics as well as foreign policy and international politics. It is a comparatively new comer amongst academic disciplines. Its first dedicated university professorship was founded in 1920 at University College of Wales at Aberystwyth. While International Relations (IR) in capital letter is used refer to the discipline, the lower case international relations is frequently used to mean the relations between states, but also between states and non-state organizations, especially in the context of political, economic, or cultural relationships.

Some of the workable definitions of foreign policy used in the literature include broader definitions that put the focus on actions and/ or rule governing the actions such as; “a set of actions or rules governing the actions of an independent political authority deployed in the international environment.” (Morin and Paquin, 2018, p.3) Others draw attention to the role of the state as ‘the agent’ of foreign policy and define the concept as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) in international relations,” (Hill, 2003, 3). Foreign policy might also be defined as not merely the action itself, but as the underlying vision, that also includes a specific role conception that informs and advises the action. Overall, this chapter concurs with the definition suggested by Carlsnaes;

“those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed towards objectives, conditions and actors - both governmental and non-governmental - which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy” (Carlsnaes, 2002, p.335)
Role Conception

This notion is defined as the perceptions of foreign policy makers’ on their nations’ position in the international system, its national interests and the key principles that allow it to defend them. They include perceptions of the general kinds of decisions, rules, commitments, and long term functions associated with these factors. Role conception varies with the perception of status, motivational orientation, and might be related with the particular circumstances surrounding a foreign policy issue. They remain fairly consistent and stable over extended time periods, and therefore, feed into the continuity of particular behaviors on foreign. Thus, they are potentially useful in understanding and explaining patterns of foreign policy actions of a particular state. They are also valuable in understanding idiosyncrasies that might, from the outside, seem like a diversion from what seems to be an “obvious”, “rational” decision, response or behavior to a particular foreign policy situation.

Foreign policy “is about the outside world”. (Brighi and Hill, 2008, p.126) That is; the structures, agents and contexts covered by foreign policy are beyond the political borders of a state. However, foreign policy decision-making is an area that sprawls the boundary between the internal and external spheres of actions of a state, as much as it concerns its politics and decision makers. Hence, any meaningful analysis of a state’ foreign policy should comprehend and include these factors, and processes related therein, that have an impact on these two spheres of action. In fact, the internal and external (international) environments within which foreign policy is taking shape is complex, not only because of the inherent complexities of these spares themselves, but also because of the intricacies introduced by the interaction between the two. The relationship is further complicated, where essentially a line between Political Science and International Relations is drawn namely, the different manifestations of the effects of power in the two realms.

Power

Power is a concept that refers to the influence and control exercised by one nation over others. Power is both the means used and the goal sought by states in political, military, economic, and social competition with each other. In his seminal book Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, originally published in 1948, Hans J. Morgenthau, one of the great thinkers of the classical realist school of international relations, has placed “interest defined as power” as the “link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood” as “statesman think and act in terms of interest defined as power”, (Morgenthau, 1993, p.5) Although every state action is not motivated by considerations of power, the ones relating to enhancing or defending the national interest are almost always deeply involved in power politics and decision makers are engaged in the exercise and pursuit of power to develop and implement foreign policy. In contemporary International Relations power is discussed either within the context of being a capability and/or possession, or as a relationship. Independent of whichever definition one chooses, in essence power is, “a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised”, (Morgenthau, 1993, p. 30) and fundamentally may be defined as comprising of “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man.” (Morgenthau, 1993, p.11)

In effect foreign policy involves actors within and outside of state boundaries; organized as different groups with both contradicting and overlapping interests, interacting through differing networks. In essence, the substance of foreign policy is determined by both domestic and international issues, and
Definition of the Concept of Foreign Policy (Definition, Foreign Policy Objectives of States)

involves processes of negotiation, bargaining, conflict and compromise. Often, this dual nature of foreign policy issues creates tensions for the actors engaged in the foreign policy decision-making processes, as it generates both domestic and international effects of the said issues. Actors engaging in foreign policy, often, have to manage the tensions that are creating a compressing effect on their priorities forcing them to play a two-level game.

Two-Level Games

"The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign." (Putnam, 1988, p. 434)

The Interrelatedness of Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy

Foreign policy is “the ‘actions of an independent political authority’ because it is reserved to sovereign states.” (Morin and Paquin, 2018, p.3) However, foreign policy decisions are not made in an “international” vacuum. There is a strong domestic dimension of every foreign policy decision. As representatives of different states are displaying foreign policy behavior, (Throughout the present chapter the term foreign policy behavior and state behavior will be used interchangeably.) they also have to market their “international” decisions and actions to their domestic stakeholders and constituencies. The direct result of this phenomenon is a broader decision-making process. As such “foreign policy-making will not be restricted to “traditional” foreign policy actors only and that other bureaucracies will become involved”, and even “actors from other countries may have… (an impact) on the politics surrounding foreign policymaking.” (Kirişçi, 2009, p.41) Hence, the study of foreign policy represents a challenge to understand how states, institutions and peoples engage amongst themselves both within, and with, a vibrant and complex international system.

Foreign Policy Behavior

This term is the execution of a foreign policy decision in order to influence the behavior of an external actor for securing the interests of the agent. A deeper analysis of the concept requires a realization of the fact that foreign policy behavior “may include behavior that was accidental or unintended by the government, and in addition, decisions to do nothing may not leave any behavioral artifact; thus, there is slippage between the concept of foreign policy and the concept of foreign policy behavior.”(Hudson, 2008, p.12) Understanding the foreign policy behavior of states, usually, require an analysis of the decision processes. The capabilities of the actors and environmental factors affecting them are absolutely important as they provide the foundations that inform the foreign policy decision. However foreign policy behavior entails a two-way interaction. The quality of the decisions taken is essential. An equally critical issue is the quality of the execution. The potential factors that might impair the quality of execution are not limited to poor performance or miscommunication. It might include the conscious resistance of the bureaucracies that are involved. In this regard, there might be inconsonance between the intended and the manifested action. Nevertheless, how the counterparts of a certain state on a given issue interprets and reacts to the actions informed by the said decisions is equally important. In other words, it is not only what you do that counts but also how others perceive and respond to it. A related concept, foreign policy outcomes can properly be defined as, “the end result of a state’s foreign policy behavior in interaction with the foreign policy behaviors of other states.” (Breuning, 2007, p.180)
The traditional assumption on foreign policy has been that states – and actors representing them – think and act in a rational manner. Under this traditional assumption these actors decide in consideration of all present alternatives, through a process that is focused on utility-maximization, while suffering minimum costs, in the best interest of the country and every effort is made to achieve the relevant information on the situation. This idea led to the understanding of the state as a black-box – a unitary actor of internal differences of which, does not have any relevance pertaining to its foreign policy actions. In other words, regarding their foreign policies all states act upon a certain set of principles, affecting them in similar ways, which stem out of their ontology as states. Such an essentialist approach renders issues like; ideological or psychological predispositions of the decision-makers, or differences of governmental systems, regime types, ideas or policymaking processes irrelevant. Hence, it takes systemic constrains to the core of foreign policy. It also assumes the existence of a prevailing understanding of the national interest that is mostly static and immune to changes in international politics.

Cold War

The Cold War refers to the non-violent conflict between the Western block led by the United States of America and the Eastern block led by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and it lasted between the years 1947 and 1989. The term Cold War itself was first coined by George Orwell in 1945 in order to explain the political and as well as ideological dispute between these two superpowers. During that period, the most ubiquitous fear of the parties of the conflict was nuclear escalation. Basically, nuclear escalation addresses the issue of the rising probability of a thermonuclear war at the end of a nuclear arms race. The emergence of a bipolar world order, (a political system is encompassed by distribution of power between two capable states to the degree of their economic and political resources as well as military facilities) in the international politics marked the period where two competing superpowers dominated world politics. The main characteristics of the Cold War were ideological antagonism, nuclear arms race and global geopolitical rivalry between the parties.
Web Link

- For a short video on Cold War history see, “Cold War in 9 Minutes”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVqziNV7dGY

Reason d’état (Reason of State)

This term is generally the ultimate reason or purpose for someone or something’s existence. In the case of a sovereign state it represents the goals of the country the most important of which is to survive in the international system.

However, in today’s global environment foreign and domestic policies are increasingly intertwined. Despite the fact that the actions of the state beyond its sovereign borders are considered as foreign policy, the linkage between what happens at the national level and what happens at the global level has become more apparent. **Globalization** and regional integration has blurred the lines between domestic and foreign spheres of political action. The increase in the number, international reach, capabilities and impact of non-state actors – including but not limited to national and transnational Non-Governmental Organizations – serves as a catalyst in strengthening the link between domestic and foreign policy. This erodes the traditional view of foreign policy “as a distinct domain differing in fundamental respects from all other spheres of politics and public policy.” (Carlsnaess, 2013, p. 300) The present situation is seen as part of “democratization” of foreign policy in which it became more of a sphere open to public scrutiny. Therefore contemporary literature argues that, “foreign policy, although usually linked to the behavior of a state, can apply to other actors. Thus, it is perfectly possible to speak of companies, regional governments, and non-state actors having foreign policies.” (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne, 2008, p.2)
Interdisciplinarity of Foreign Policy

Similar to International Relations, Foreign Policy also forms an interdisciplinary subject area. In actuality, one can contend that almost all case studies in International Relations do have a foreign policy aspect. Furthermore, at least for one particular theory of International Relations, classical realism, foreign policy was a cornerstone in the study of international relations.” (Diez, Bode, and Costa, 2011, p.58) In fact, the analysis of foreign policy requires an intellectual engagement in a number of subfields including public policy, history, economy, law, psychology etc. and theoretical approaches such as decision analysis, rational choice, game theory. However, “within this context of interdisciplinarity… there is a special relationship between foreign policy and IR” (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 2008, p.2) in that theories of foreign policy are intrinsic to theories of International Relations”. (Smith, 1986, p.13) Foreign policy remains an area where an array of issues, crosscutting two spheres of political action (domestic and international), should be understood and explained within the context of multi-level analysis (individual/decision-maker, actor/state and systemic/structural) through a coherent, holistic and integrated interdisciplinary approach.

Globalization

 Defines the processes whereby state-centric agencies, terms of reference and the state’s ability to control the international processes that are limited in favor of interaction and integration between different actors. As a result of this state sovereignty is significantly challenged. The erosion of state control on the “free movement” of goods, services and people creates an environment where tangible goods, intangible social and cultural values and products (such as patterns of consumerism) cross state borders suffering minimum state interference and control. In relevant literature different phases of globalization is referred throughout history. However, the distinguishing aspect of today’s globalization is the intensity and the pace of the changes that are occurring predominantly due to the speed of technological leaps and the impact they create on the norms, values and behavior of the society.

Why do most of case studies in the International Relations have a foreign policy aspect?

ACTORS AND STRUCTURES IN FOREIGN POLICY

The notion of “foreign policy” is centrally related to the existence of actors and structures and the reciprocal relationship between the two. The interaction between the actors and structures consequently
causes reciprocal transformation of these actors and structures. As Alexander Wendt put it in his seminal essay; “1) Human beings and their organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions between these purposeful actors. Taken together these truisms suggest that human agents and social structures are, in one way or another, theoretically interdependent or mutually implicating entities.” (Wendt, 1987, p. 388) Likewise, in the international environment, a multitude of actors, are involved in foreign policy decision-making whose nature, positions, thinking and actions, are affected and shaped by structures both at the domestic and international levels. In return the character and composition of these structures are also transformed by the deliberate actions of these actors.

**State as Primary Actor in Foreign Policy**

As Moon has pointed out; “Foreign policy behavior cannot be understood without an appreciation of the goals and priorities, the internal and external constraints, and the perceptions and expectations that guide state action. Thus, any theory of foreign policy behavior must contain within it a theory of the state, however unconscious or incomplete.” (Moon, 1995, p. 188) That is why, we will be starting this section with a discussion of the state as the primary focus and dominant actor of international relations.

Any entity that plays an identifiable role in international relations that is willing and able to create and impact international outcomes by purposeful decision and action may be termed an actor. Throughout the city states system of the ancient Greek to the Italian Renaissance city state system philosophers and historians of politics centered their analysis on the state. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) formalized the position of the state as the dominant centric actor and unit of analysis of international relations.

This state-centric approach, that International Relations has inherited from traditional political thought, assumes that the issues of high politics pertaining to matters of security and survival prevailed over low politics in the conduct of foreign policy. In this form, it not only assumes states exist as more or less identical units in international relations, but also that they act as cohesive agents when it comes to their decision-making, within a cognitive context where they pursue similar objectives in more or less comparable strategies. It might be argued under such an assumption that, as foreign policy constitutes an area where states themselves must take the ultimate responsibility for their own existence if and when foreign and domestic political priorities collide, especially at times of actual conflict, foreign policy concerns take precedence over domestic politics. This is called as primacy of foreign policy approach that expects party politics to be subordinated to foreign policy and perhaps is the weakest link of the state-centric approach.

Despite the fact that Oran Young challenged it in a seminal essay (The Actors in World Politics) in 1972, the preeminence of the state-centric approach in foreign policy analysis lasted until late 1980s. What Young proposed was a mixed actor model. Young pointed out to the emergence of more heterogeneous and diverse system that is “highly dynamic” and “tends to involve greater complexity than the state-centric-view.” (Young, 1972, pp. 136 – 137) According to Young the states, even though they still remained as important actors in international relations, were no longer to be considered as dominant units. During the late 1980s, effected by the end of the Cold War and the rising currents of globalization, the pluralistic model that Young paved the way for has started to win more advocates. As the awareness on the increasing interconnectedness between states,
coupled with heightened levels of interdependence and growing numbers of non-state actors, grew the pluralist approach has gained a stronger foothold amongst scholars of foreign policy.

Another scholar, James Rosenau has taken Young’s mixed actor model and took it one step further. The paradigm he developed integrates non-state actors as direct participants; hence, actors to international relations, make them to be recognized as recognizing them as participants in foreign policy system directly. Rosenau argued that as simultaneous patterns of change and continuity are increasingly at work in the era since the Second World War thus it is becoming problematic for the traditional state-centric approach to address the intricacies, disorder and turbulence of the international system. The greater interdependence characterizing the post-industrialist era has led to “simultaneous centralizing and decentralizing” tendencies in what Rosenau called ‘the two worlds of world politics’. In this context, an autonomous multi-centric world composed of sovereignty-free (non-state) actors now interacted, challenged, competed and coexisted with the old sovereignty-bound actors of the state-centric world that is characterized by states and their interactions. This is a foreign policy environment where the relevance of actors is decided “by their capability to initiate and sustain actions” rather than “by their legal status, capabilities or sovereignty.” (Rosenau, 1990, p. 246 – 253)

A mixed actor model based on a pluralist approach provides a better framework for analyzing the disorders and complexities of contemporary foreign policy issues. However, the subject matter to be analyzed, i.e. foreign policy, becomes insurmountably more complex to do so by the very ontology of the multi-centric world. In the multi-centric system, the nature of relations is more temporary, and there is greater decentralization. There is a lack of a clear hierarchy of power between the actors, as well as, of formal authority, established institutions, regimes and conflict resolution frameworks (rules, processes and mechanisms). These factors conceive, as Rosenau himself realizes, a more chaotic environment than the “more coherent and structured” state-centric world. Rosenau further states that the autonomy of the state-centric system is not impaired by the emergence of the multi-centric world and; “Sovereignty-bound actors retain the capacity to set the rules by which their systems and sub-systems conduct themselves.” (Rosenau, 1990, p. 249 – 251) Especially when it comes to the constitutive, paramount issue of international relations, both as a discipline and subject area; namely the use of organized violence, the state-centric approach still dominate the central ground of foreign policy.

Max Weber classically defined state as, “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. (Weber, 1918: http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/class%20readings/weber/politicsasavocation.pdf) Regarding this definition an emphasis should be put on the concept of legitimacy as it implies that, it is not only the right to monopoly, but also the responsibility to preserve the legitimate position it holds in doing so, is what defines the state. It has to be noted that most issues that are today analyzed under foreign policy were once “eponymously called as statecraft.” (Gray, 1999, p. 161) As foreign policy is an activity that – at the least primarily – states are, and should be, engaged with, both on account of the “monopoly” Weber mentions that they hold, and the responsibility that the legitimate nature of this monopoly confers upon them, this seems logical.

However, even though the processes of globalization, especially the advent of information technologies, is weakening the states ability to dominate international outcomes, paradoxically they also enable the state to control the societal pressures that forces it to act more in conformity with the preferences of sovereignty-free actors. In fact, globalization is creating an environment where, facing multi-directional adverse effects from an increasing number of policy areas. This creates a situation where, despite their so called empowerment through technology and growing interdependence, societies are left demanding the state to play more of a central, determining role. Furthermore, the multi-dimensionality and scale of the issues (like global-warming or migrant crisis etc.) imposes upon the states the necessity to pool their capabilities, co-ordinate their efforts, and
corporate amongst themselves. This is so as they are at times the only social, economic and/or political vehicles that are able to deal with the magnitude and complexity of the threats posed. At another level the internal structures of the states are also getting increasingly vulnerable to what is happening in the state’s external environment, especially the structure of the international system, effecting the conduct of foreign policy. The approaches based on these phenomena as laid out by Gurevitch (1978) are referred to as second-image reversed. Based on the earlier work of Kenneth N. Waltz on the three images of international relations (Waltz, 1959), these approaches look at the international sources of domestic conduct and essentially are attempts in strengthening our understanding of the nexus between foreign policy and domestic politics.

Waltz’s three images of international relations

Meant denote for the three possible sources of war in international relations because Waltz refers to the three levels of analysis as “images”. In that he explained sources of international behavior, (manifested as foreign policy) in human nature (first image), organizations and structures of the state and struggles among domestic actors (second image), in the structure of the international system, relationships among states and groups of states, alliances etc. (third image). He essentially underrated the explanatory power of the first and second images and concentrated on the third as the main level of analysis to understand causes of war, and international relations as such. As it focused on the systemic sources Waltz’s argument is structural.

(Waltz, 1959)

Figure 1.6 Kenneth N. Waltz

Source: Britannica

The interaction between state and society, and the institutions that represent the societal interests, has historically been a constraining factor on states autonomy of taking decision, including foreign policy decisions. There has always been a linkage between how and why the foreign policy decisions were taken in one way, rather than another, and foregoing interaction between the state and society. As one of the most important proponents of state-centric approaches to international relations confirm, “states are not and never have been the only international actors…[and]…importance of nonstate actors and the extent of transnational activities are obvious.” (Waltz, 1979, p. 93 – 94) The progress of democratic institutions during the twentieth century has complicated the relations, and to the extent that processes of globalization and interdependence weakened state monopoly on social, economic, and perhaps most importantly, political outcomes the abovementioned constraints on state autonomy has strengthened. The networks and factors that mediate state behavior with social interests have grown both in numbers, complexity and influence.
Interdependence

Interdependence implies that the increasing connectivity between the actors and issues led to a world where no actor is immune from the impact of what is happening to another. Interdependence is positively correlated with industrialization, modernization, and most importantly globalization. It is used to describe a new phase in international relations where states were becoming increasingly interdependent on a vast variety of issues. In other words, as the complexity and global characteristics of problems increased, so did the need for globally coordinated efforts for solutions. This strengthened not only the interrelatedness of issues but also the interdependency of the actors. This is because the vulnerabilities of the states to these problems were on the rise, while, the ability of states to individually influence the global outcomes were decreasing.

The increasing interrelatedness of issues means that independent of wherever on the globe they might be taking place they have profound potential affects on the states. It is an environment where 'global problems needed global solutions'. These issues encompassed economy, climate change and migration to name a few. As defined by Keohane and Nye (1977) the concept of complex interdependence suggested that, contrary to the realist view of international politics states were not black-boxes, i.e. coherent units, that were dominant actors of international relations; force, or hard-power (or command power) defined as “the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make other follow your will” (Nye, 2003) has been increasingly supplanted by soft-power that relies to co-option rather than coercion and it is, “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion and payments”, arising from the “attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas and policies” (Nye, 2004x, p.5); and the hierarchy between military/security issues of high politics and economic and social issues, that strongly prioritized the former over the latter, were increasingly becoming less relevant. The rise of multinational corporations; increase in the speed, and transformation in the form, of transnational capital flows; the growing importance of international institutions (both governmental and non-governmental); the accelerated advent of technology, including but not limited to the information technologies; and the growing permeability of borders have all contributed to the momentum of growing interdependence. Issues like human rights, development, environment etc. have risen on the foreign policy agenda of states. Following the end of the Cold War, for many scholars of interdependence it was as if a more cooperative and rule-governed world was emerging.

International relations as a self-help system was not perceived as the correct image of state behavior under complex interdependence. However, after terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, that destroyed the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York and partly Pentagon in Washington DC, the debate took another turn. These attacks, as well as the ensuing chided US interventions in both Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) has fueled a heated debate on the strength of the arguments supporting the notion of interdependence alongside arguments on state sovereignty, anarchy, hard power etc., all classical notions and concepts of the Realist school of International Relations.

Web Link (QR LINK)

On the other hand, the initiatives taken by the states will, almost always, attempt to reinforce the authority, social control and survival of the state, especially when it comes to most issues of foreign policy. Also, the states are unique in their authority to legitimately take decisions, that are binding, on behalf of their societies and coerce their citizens to obey – all the more so as they are able to preserve and exercise their sovereignty. Despite the fact that the states do not “possess the ability to regulate all the possible behaviors of all citizens”, sovereignty-free actors are at times “able to ignore or evade the demands of the state system” and, “their adherence to” state-centric “rules is often formalistic”, the states “as sovereign entities, …possess ultimate or final authority over delimited territories and their inhabitants.” (Rosenau, 1990: p. 249; Lake, 2007, pp. 43 – 44) In the final analysis, with a very few exceptions non-state actors exist under the authority of and constraints imposed by a state counterpart. As such the ultimate ability to create international outcomes, especially when it comes to issues of high politics, the kind that create the most poignant international outcomes as related to foreign policy; and therefore, therefore foreign policy becomes mostly about how states interact with each other and, why they do it the way they effectively choose to do. Hence, the state essentially remains at the heart of foreign policy.

Structure in International Relations

As defined by Baylis, Smith and Owens: “In the philosophy of social sciences a structure is something that exists independently of the actor but is an important determinant in the nature of action.” (2017, p.780) In this sense, structures are distinguishing, long standing and established composition of institutions, rules, organizing principles that provide the framework within which group of actors, or agents, interact, respond and relate to each other in international relations. Hence, as structures change, inevitably do the interactive patterns that actors, or agents, relate with each other. That is why: “[P]erceptions of what the structure of international politics is at a given time strongly influence the policy that one follows.”

Web Link

For a discussion of Waltz’s ideas on international relations, as well as the foregoing quote, watch an interview with him here, Harry Kreisler, “Theory and International Politics, Interview with Kenneth N. Waltz”, Conversations with History, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Feb. 10, 2003, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9eV5gPipZg

For proponents of a structural approach to international relations, approaches concentrating on unit (actor) level, with their strong focus on the states, are somehow reductionist. That is because, although states are dominant agencies with persuasive power over their peers and other agencies, and with ability to exert consequential, though not definitive, influence on the outcomes, state behavior in and of itself is not enough to analyze either the interaction amongst the actors or the abovementioned outcomes. Point is, the “actions of groups, when aggregated, produce patterns of behavior that may be fundamentally different from the behavior patterns of the individual” agency. “In this sense, the behavioral characteristics and the impact of behavioral patterns, or interactions, of the aggregate are greater than, and differentiated from, those of its individual parts.” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1996, p. 100)
Agency
Agents are the actors that do possess the capacity to independently act upon conscious intentions and, at least in part, make their own free choices without consulting with the other actors.

In other words, the structure serves as a mechanism that compels actor behavior in ways that are synergic and transformative. Hence, the argument goes, any thorough understanding of state behavior at any given time would be inadequate if it fails to consider the structure of the international relations at that period. At least two dominant theoretical schools of International Relations, state-centric realists and more pluralistic liberals, and their different strains, although enjoying their distinct assumptions on the nature of the structure of the international system, concur somewhat that anarchy, is the defining principle.

Anarchy
As being one of the essential concepts in International Relations, anarchy alludes to the absence of government or the lack of a central authority within the framework of politics. Anarchy derives from the Greek word “anarkhos” which means “without a ruler”. Put simply, states as the dominant actors of international relations have no absolute control over international system. Since states are political entities that recognize no equal domestically and no superior externally there, is no central authority in international relations. This provides an international politics with its anarchical characteristics. Even though they concur on the nature of the international system as anarchic, major theories of international relations treat anarchy in different ways. For example, while neorealists are motivated to work within the limits anarchy imposes structurally on state behavior, neoliberals are striving to ameliorate its effects.

In the final analysis, the structure which is a part of social interaction that ties elements like political, cultural, psychological, economic, national, regional, global, technological, ideational, cognitive, and normative altogether, and is “probably, in principle, something that can never be brought into the realm of the observable.” (Wight, 2006, p.122) Therefore, it is intrinsic to the observable interactions of the actors – be them states or otherwise. Hence, any conceptualization of the relationship between state, society and foreign policy should include the impact of both agency and structure together.

Agency-Structure Problem
As a matter of fact, the act of foreign policy takes place in the space between the states, made possible by the lack of their ability to control and do everything that interests them. The states work as the guardians and mediators of external influences on the particular interests represented by the domestic polity. They do so by depending on, and vigilantly protecting, their sovereignty. However, how it serves the function that is directly related to the environment, structure, that it survives in. As no biological organism can efficiently pursue its needs and continue its survival denying the habitat that it lives in, the states will find it extremely hard to survive in the international environment by disregarding the constraints and opportunities presented by the structure of the international system.
Sovereignty

Originating with the Peace of Westphalia, ending the 30 Years’ Wars, in 1648, sovereignty, or more properly state-sovereignty, is an externally, i.e. by other actors, recognized right of independent, supreme or final decision-making and decision-enforcing authority possessed by the state, generally over given territory. It arose as a defense of the monarchs right of complete authority over their realms against the claims of lesser local princes, and also in opposition to, universal or supreme authorities such as the Papacy and Holy Roman Empire. Sovereignty could be limited by entering into the international treaties and agreements. The key here is that the traditional notion of sovereignty assumes that states enter into such obligations on their free will. However, as they do they do surrender a certain measure of sovereignty. Sovereignty of the states’ is a doctrine that is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2.1, and is the basic concept of modern International Law. In contemporary International Relations scholarship, there is a tendency to associate the right of sovereignty with a corresponding duty to meet. According to this approach being sovereign obliges the state to obey the rules and norms of the international society including one’s that requires the states to treat their own citizens, within their territory, in a way that is in accordance with the international law and principles of human rights. Failure to do so basically mandates other states with a responsibility to act, possibly disregarding the sovereignty of the state that is in violation. The 21st century state is challenged by new forms of authority and community (as in the case of the European Union) that transcend the domestic and the international divide. On the one hand, new forms of sovereignty, that are either representative of a greater sphere of shared social and political values, or based on more archaic conceptions of polity, as is the case of the experience of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, while ‘traditional’ actors of the original doctrine (contemporary state system) also proves to be resilient. On the other hand, state sovereignty might be said to be one very important cause of anarchy in international relations as it enables the actors to preclude the emergence of any central authority.

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- For the importance and history of the Thirty Years War watch, Tom Richey, “Thirty Years’ War”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B18zwAVQO4q0

Furthermore, it would not be entirely correct to say that the agents always exactly and entirely understand their environment. The decision maker perceives the structure in a certain way. Harold and
Margaret Sprout calls this subjective view of the environment as the “psychological milieu”, while the actual environment in which the policy will be carried out is called the “operational milieu”. (1956) Under ideal circumstances the psychological milieu and operational milieu overlaps perfectly although that is hardly ever the case causing a constant friction between the agent and the structure, complicating the foreign policy decision-making processes further.

The difference between the concepts ‘milieu’ and ‘structure’

While milieu represents the visible, more tangible and emotionally laden conceptualization for man’s environment, structure represents a more abstract world, the underlying forces that effect and shape man’s life.

The agent-structure problem is about the bidirectional relationship of agencies and structures. As foreign policy is an activity that is conducted within and against an external environment, that is the international system, it is perennial to understand how the nature and choices of the actors interact with the nature and structure of the system – and vice versa. In that regard, there are two prominent views in the International Relations scholarship distinguished by their views on whether the structure works as a constraint or as the molding framework that format the actors. The problem with these two approaches is that while the former presupposes the actors as agents with foreordained identities and unchanging interests, that are somehow immune to the effects of social interaction amongst themselves and the social-frameworks within which they stroll and, the latter takes actors as servants of the structure without any real initiative. In fact, this debate has its root in the question of freewill vs. the constraints that is imposed on the said choices by social structures.

On another level, scholars of international relations are leaning towards either a policy or a process-oriented analysis of foreign policy. A policy-oriented approach prioritizes explanations that most effectively explain choices of specific policies over others; whereas the process-oriented approach puts a premium over the decision-making processes. As a result, policy-oriented analysis tends to deal with either the impact of the actors (the role of agency) or the structures in explaining foreign policy behavior. This marks a methodological confrontation between the so-called bottom-up vs. top-down notions. On the other hand, process-oriented analysis concentrates on the decision-making, and labors to include both structures and agency in its attempts of analyzing international relations. However, rather than taking an integrative approach this second school takes up a levels-of-analysis framework. Therefore, such an approach focuses on the interplay between the state-level and the systemic-level, “treating them separately”. (Carlsnaes, 2012, pp.124 – 125) The problem with such an approach would be that it lacks to bring in the strategic interaction between the actors into the discussion. As a matter of fact any proper analysis of foreign policy should realize the dynamic relationship between actors and structures, and incorporate them together in its analysis.

FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF STATES

Foreign policy objectives could simply be defined as the ends that foreign policy is designed to achieve. These might involve mostly abstract goals of survival, security, protection and/ or advancement of a particular ideology, well-being of the society, pursuit of power, etc. Ideally foreign policy objectives are the product of a careful analysis trying to match a country’s priorities, objectives and goals, with the ways and the means that would enable it to attain them, while capabilities represent the available bridges between these. In this process internal and external constraints,
perceptions and expectations that guide state action provide the frameworks in which the foreign policy objectives are addressed. A proper understanding and determination of foreign policy objectives is carried out by conducting a three level situational analysis; of the international system, of the capabilities readily available for the state, and the capabilities and intentions of its counterparts.

**Goal**

“A term used in policy analysis to identify the objectives pursued by actors. Indeed, in some treatments the term ‘goal’ and ‘objective’ are seen as interchangeable. Traditional analysts in the literature on international relations tended to equate the question with the idea of the national interest. This tended to skew the subsequent discussion in a state-centric direction. Thus non-state actors—though clearly pursuing goals/objectives—could not logically be held to pursuing national interests. There was also a tendency in traditional analysis to see national interests as immutable and objectively determined.” (Evans and Newnham, 1998, pp.202-3

**Capability Analysis and Foreign Policy Objectives**

Any effort to understand of foreign policy objectives should start by the determination of the priorities and the objectives of the given country. These priorities and objectives either pertain to a paramount overriding goal that all or most of the foreign policy effort is spend to secure; *(This is usually associated with the high-political concerns pertaining primarily to survival)* or, more often, an attempt to attain specific objectives and goals on a given issue. Objectives and goals are inevitably related to threats, risks and opportunities associated with the issue at hand. However, ideally they are expected to be contemplated contingent to or in consideration of the former. Nonetheless, in practice it is not uncommon to see the everyday pressures created by exigencies take precedence over higher political considerations. In this case, it is not surprising to see urgencies dominating the priorities as they dictate the agenda.

Next, the systemic analysis would provide the decision-maker with the information he/she needs to understand the constraints, risks and opportunities that the structure of the system provides in lieu with the realization of the foreign policy objectives in question. Then, comes the capability analysis through which the decision-maker carries out a systematic evaluation of the available sources of national power. This practically involves an analysis of the means, available and required. It should start with the determination and assessment of required capabilities for the objective, given the ways – strategies – contemplated to attain the goals and reach the objectives. Next, an inventory analysis aimed at determination of available/ relevant means and detection of possible gaps should be carried out. Necessary action to mitigate and, if possible eliminate the gaps should be taken at this stage. The final stage involves the analysis of the capabilities and intentions of the counterparts. Here, the capabilities take precedence over the intentions as the latter might change with changing contexts – as might be brought about by changes of leadership, regimes etc. Hence, an assessment of the ‘objective’ capabilities is perennial in understanding the circumstances within which the actors will operate.

At every step a continuous effort for contingency planning aimed at anticipating the threats and risks should accompany the process. It is not always possible for a state to overcome the means gap, the means available will determine the objective to be chosen. As such, the determination of foreign policy objectives, and the behavior through which it is manifested – i.e. the ways to secure them – is a product of a dialectical
process between the actor’s own strategy and the context that prevails. In other cases events might outrun policy and almost always the discourse, domestic and international of the actors, could have a transforming impact on the nature of the issues, hence on the character of threats and risks.

For the entirety of the process, perceptions work as the veils through which the external reality is perceived by the decision-makers. In lieu to perceptions, expectations function as accelerators of thought and action. This is in the sense that they either motivate or suggest caution in the face of the perceived situation. In the end foreign policy objectives are defined within the context of the information produced during this course. Indeed, the limits of action are outlined according to the constraints superimposed by the structure of the system, by the relevant capabilities – readily available or, depending on the exigency of the situation, reasonably conceivable. If the aspirations, distorted by ideals, greed, or lack of appropriate information, exceed this limit, then the probability of reaching the objectives decrease, or the costs of realizing them could significantly increase. Even in a case where the advancement of an ideology becomes the overriding concern of foreign policy, it might only be realized through a process where the decision-makers; thoroughly realize their context defining the environment, understand constrains determining their limits, appreciate means that are available to them and evaluate opportunities they might benefit from. Therefore, they might come up with a proper, realistic framework of action that would manifest itself as behavior aiming to determine and fulfill their goals and reach foreign policy objectives. Only after such part cognitive, part tangible process is realized a state might start to meaningfully, i.e. with a significant probability of success given the limits imposed, pursue an objective that involves ideational, ideological prerogatives.

The term used to define this process is logic of consequences, how actors make rationally generated decisions by calculating and choosing the action that maximizes their interest. (The idea that actor’s behavior is guided by the desire to maximize their utility stems from micro-economics.) There is almost always an accompanying process that is called the logic of appropriateness that describes the “the logic underlying actions taken with reference to rules and norms that define what is deemed to be proper and legitimate behavior” (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne, 2008, p. 394). The interaction with the foreign policy behavior of the logic of appropriateness varies according to the circumstances (both of milieu and structure), actors’ perception of its environment, and power to transform them. The logic underlying the actions of a foreign policy – including inaction itself – should be concurrent with the logic of consequences, and at least at some rate, will be based on some logic of appropriateness.

**Power and Foreign Policy Objectives**

The power that a country has to secure desired objectives may fall into one of the three categories. These are defined below according to the potency they provide to influence and shape the outcomes. Hence, it could be said that the typology below is defined and ranked in relation to the outcomes. Other typologies are possible that they are based on the nature of the predominant instruments used (hard power, soft power) or their mix (smart power); according to the nature of the inducement mechanism used (coercive power, persuasive power, reward power) etc. However, the taxonomy used here aims for increased relevancy *vis a vis* the relationship between power and foreign policy objectives. The “strength” of power is a function of dimensions of power: the relevancy, domain, weight, strength, means, cost and scale of the power possessed by the actor. These dimensions have a very strong bearing on the actor’s logics of action, consequences and appropriateness.
Definition of the Concept of Foreign Policy (Definition, Foreign Policy Objectives of States)

In this regard, the first category will be called as constructive power. This is the kind of power a country has when it does have determinative power on the outcome of an issue. In this case, the actor could decisively affect and shape the outcomes according to its desired objectives and goals. The second category is comparative power and could be defined as the kind of power states has when it still does possess enough relative power to influence the outcomes according to its priorities and objectives, albeit in a framework defined by comparative advantages. Hence, it can manage to achieve a comparable, convenient outcome. However, in such cases it is beyond the state's power to definitively shape these outcomes. Despite the fact that it is able to achieve an outcome that does not fit with its ideal targets, it can still exercise certain influence to secure outcomes relatively closer to its objectives and goals than those of its rival(s). Finally, there are those issues where the state can exercise veto power. In this case, it can forbid decisions and actions of its counterpart(s). It can deny them the amount of influence they would like to have on its decisions. As a consequence, it can limit their power on the outcome of the issue in question. This might take the form of denying their rival(s) the opportunity to project power. In other words, although it cannot achieve the outcomes it desires, the state can deny its rival(s) the opportunity to influence and shape the outcome of the issue according to their priorities.

However, this kind of power could defuse, as its nature is closely associated with the concept of cost. It is highly contingent to the perceptions, priorities and means available to rival(s). In this case, a state might have hard veto power, where it could absolutely deny its rivals their objectives by increasing the costs. Yet, having to rely on veto power might leave a state in a situation where it is exposed to the risk of not being efficiently able to deny its rival(s) their desired outcomes. This might happen because of sheer differences in power. (That should also be judged and weighed according to the dimensions of power.) In this case, the counterpart(s) might have definitive constructive power over the issue. So, the veto of the state might effectively be scrubbed. Simply put its veto power might be rendered ineffective and consequencial by the overwhelming power of its counterpart(s). In another variant of the same situation the respective importance of the issue for the rival(s) might weaken the veto power. As the essentiality of the issue increases for the rival(s), the resolve and determination on their part would also increase. That could cause any associated cost the state could dish up to make its veto power effective insufficient to dissuade its counterpart(s). Finally, inadequacy of the costs might present a problem. The size of the costs the state can associate with the veto it intends to exercise might any way not be pertinent or simply not enough, even if relatively, making the costs of the veto bearable.

Although it is a generally accepted truism that the main objective of a given country's foreign policy is the realization of national interests, the concept itself remains as an elusive symbol. The concept of an enduring and overriding national interest is a problematic one as it, albeit implicitly, overlooks the impact of social change. As a matter of fact the concept of an overarching, “national interest” is representative of the identity, political and social milieux and role conception of a state during a specific time period. As such it has a temporal component that people find hard to realize while living in the moment. Therefore, it should better be considered as a tentative category, a constitution of material and immaterial factors, rather than an enduring, timeless reality.

Any state can choose to preserve this objective by taking a revisionist or a status-quo stance in foreign policy. Critics of the idea that, national interests should, and actually do guide foreign policy would claim that in effect the concept itself is a rhetorical cognomen. It works as a surrogate for the preferences of the decision-makers of a country – a contraption to justify and legitimize the controversies that these preferences may otherwise evoke. In the process of practical policy making interests is left as overly generalized propositions. Hence, they become somehow inadequate references to materially guide policies. Therefore, they become more informers of actual policies as goals to be attained and objectives to be reached for securing these goals.

Probably where national interest based objectives of foreign policy gets more tangible is the protection and advancement of the territorial integrity of the country, and the protection of the interest of its citizens both within and outside of the country. In the broadest sense this includes economic, political, military security of the country and its citizens, and is closely related to increasing the power and influence of the country. There is a causal relationship between the achievement of these objectives and the matter of economic development. Economic development is a process that effects economic relations in relation
with social, political and cultural relations of the people. Hence, for any nation it is closely related to improving the well-being of the society as a foreign policy objective. This should be considered not narrowly as the growth of GDP of the country, but on broader terms encompassing the furthering the human development indices. For this purpose states generally prefer to follow a policy of status quo. The maintaining of links with other members of the international society either through diplomacy, conflict or co-operation in order to promote interests could be said to be another foreign policy objective.

Major approaches to International Relations theory have diverse understandings of what constitutes overriding foreign policy objectives for a state. For example, realists of different strains would argue that concerns on securing relative gains of power, or increasing their security, determines foreign policy objectives – leading to a conflictual world within an anarchical structure –, neoliberals would contend that absolute, rather than relative gains would govern foreign policy behavior; and as a result, guide foreign policy objectives – leading to a tendency towards cooperation in the articulation of foreign policy objectives.

Figure 1.10 Mahbub ul Haq
Source: The Asian Age

Human Development

The human development approach, developed by the Pakistani economist Mahbub Ul Haq (1934 – 1998), is based on the work of Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Kumar Sen’s work on human capabilities, “often framed in terms of whether people are able to “be” and “do” desirable things in life”. The human development approach focuses on creating fair opportunities and choices for all people. It is based on the notion that economic growth, generally understood as the growth of the GDP of a given country, would not necessarily lead to greater opportunities for the people. It is argued that ultimately enlarging people’s freedoms and opportunities and improving their well-being by ensuring an “equitable, sustainable and stable planet” is more important than achieving sheer growth of the economy. The first United Nations Human Development Report was published in 1990.

Human Development Index

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living.” For the United Nations HDI rankings see http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi


Elements of National Power and Foreign Policy Objectives

A state’s history, culture, geostrategic location, military power, economic resilience, natural resources, system and efficiency of government, and position in the international power hierarchy all have a bearing on its policy choices. Although it is important to assess these factors while making actor specific analysis...
it is difficult to generalize about these factors and make actor general appraisals on their impact “because of diversity that characterizes the actors that make up the contemporary state system.” (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1995, p.63) Nevertheless a thorough analysis of the capabilities available to a state is useful; a) for determining its place in the international system in terms of its hierarchical position; b) to be informed about the extent of what it might realistically aspire and achieve – at the minimum relying only on its own capabilities – within the confines of the self-help framework. Essentially this capability analysis is about assessing the elements of national power.

Elements of national power are the factors that constitute the actual and potential power of a state. Some of these factors are subject to human impulses, organization and capabilities; some are largely beyond it. A short list of the elements of national power would include: the size of the state; its geopolitical location; the number, technical and intellectual quality of scientific elites; the size of the military forces, their technological level, equipment, firepower, force projection capabilities, training, culture and morale; the fertility of the territory it controls; the abundance and variety of natural resources – including but not limited to energy resources –; the size of the population, its demographics, its level of human development; its level of economic development, including the size of GDP, the per capita distribution of GDP, the quality, extent and diffusion of the infrastructure (system and networks of transportation, energy, communication etc.); the strength and diversity of industrial development; the quality of the educational system; the organizational success, quality and competency of research and development activities (the number of original patents, the commercialization ratio of research and development efforts etc.); the nature and strength of the political, social and economic system and institutions; the quality of its foreign policy and diplomats; the quality of leadership; the national character and morale of the population. None of these are able to solely be decisive on the outcome of any inter-state conflict, neither the success of foreign policy. Also, most of them are contingent to change in time. What is more they are relative to how other nations rank in similar categories. However, neither the quality of their foreign policy behavior, nor the success of their policies in reaching their objectives and goals, is contingent solely on their national power or their rank in the international order. Fundamentally the essence of the success of any foreign policy boils down to the quality of the assessments made and decision taken by people responsible for foreign policy decision-making. This is reflected in a state’s foreign policy behavior, guided by strategies devised by the people mentioned before and strengthened by the quality of execution. This aspect of foreign policy processes probably has more bearing on the foreign policy outcomes than any other factor. In that regard, the mental map of the decision-makers, how their perceptions, choices and decisions are informed and encultured, are of perpetual importance. At that point even though the anarchical structure of the self-help system that states coexist provide a framework, in the final analysis structures just “encourage states to do some things and to refrain from doing others.” However, this does not change the fact that, “they are free to do any fool thing they care to, but they are likely to be rewarded for behavior that is responsive to structural pressures and punished for behavior that is not.” (Waltz, 1997, p. 915)

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<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
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<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>Gross national income (GNI) per capita</th>
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Figure 1.11
Relate to Research

A Framework for Understanding the Change Turkish Foreign Policy of the 2000s

In an article written in 2003, the contours of Turkish foreign policy were summarized as traditionally being shaped by five factors: historical experiences, geopolitical and geostrategic location which provide a unique position for the country, a number of vulnerabilities, the political ideology of the governing elite (Kemalism) and the demands of systematic, regional and domestic changes on the country’s external relations at any time (see Aydın 2003, 307-8). From the late 1990s onwards, there have been change and re-thinking on almost all of these factors. From then on, although historical experiences did not change, they were often re-visited and re-interpreted, given new meanings and at times romanticized. The geo-strategic importance of the country was re-emphasized in such a way that it was put forward as a factor bringing new opportunities, “responsibilities” and roles. This was different from the Cold War understanding of Turkey’s geostrategic importance where a more defensive, status quo stance was legitimized rather than activism...

It has been widely argued that Turkish foreign policy since the early days of the Republic has shown elements of continuity which can be considered as its basic principles. One element is an unquestioned Western orientation. The Kemalist military-bureaucratic elite in Turkey, building on the late Ottoman Empire’s efforts of modernization, strove to make Turkey “a European state” – part of the Western system of states that was defined as “contemporary civilization.” As Karaosmanoğlu argues, in the eyes of Turkey’s founders, “there was only one civilization, the Western one, and they would join it in spite of the West” (see Karaosmanoğlu 2000, 208). In the following decades there were alternative domestic visions to Westernization. However, they remained rather marginal and less popular and Westernization continued to be the dominant discourse. The Cold War helped to locate Turkey as a Western state and ally due to its geostrategic position and Turkey’s Western-ness was therefore not questioned within the Cold War context. As Kirişçi argues, “During the Cold War Turkey has benefited from a rent due to her geostrategic position and Turkish foreign policy has showed outstanding success in keeping this rent as high as is possible” (see Kirişçi 2009a, 3).

A second element is the role of history. The transition from Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic – especially the collapse of the Empire – plus wartime developments and the War of Independence left their mark on the foreign policy of Turkey. As argued elsewhere, “the sometimes over-zealous attitude towards issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity and a lingering suspicion of its Western allies despite its goal of becoming a member of their club, for instance, could have been fed by the memory of that past” (see Altmușık and Tür 2005, 91). It was interesting to see that, despite the commitment to become a part of the West, the founders “underlined the lingering European prejudice against Turkey and the unchanged Western objective of disintegrating Turkey” (see Karaosmanoğlu 2000, 208). In particular the Sèvres Treaty and the idea that Turkey is a constant interest in great power rivalry, as well as the great powers having a “project” of dividing Turkish territory, are all important in this context, collectively referred to as the Sèvres Syndrome and still relevant today (see Altmușık and Tür 2005, and also Çandar 2004).

A third element can be described as a preoccupation with security and a security-oriented foreign policy. The threat perception of being surrounded by enemies – a state under continuous security risk – made Turkey security-oriented in its foreign policy. The effects of the bipolar international system, pitched Turkey, as a member of the Western bloc, against some of her neighbors, while historical and political differences contributed to create a hostile security environment with others. Such an emphasis on security dictated by a combination of history and geopolitics as well as the Cold War environment led to a predominantly realist understanding of the international system. In a realist, self-help international system, the bond between foreign policy and security becomes almost inseparable. Turkish foreign policy during the twentieth century was a good example of the inseparability of foreign and security policies. When Turkish decision-makers talked about foreign policy they were in effect talking about security policy and vice versa.

(Tür and Han, 2011, pp. 7-9)
Relate to Life

2018 is likely to present new, complex and complicated foreign policy challenges for Turkey. This does not only relate to the Middle East, where Turkey claims to “build order,” but it also pertains to its relations with the West where it is supposed to be a part of the order.

The Middle East is back to its long-standing and structural conflict between Palestine and Israel. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital came at a time when the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was finally producing a reasonably favorable environment for peace and stability in the region. In such an environment, one would have expected to address the pending problems in a less confrontational approach. Trump’s decision, unfortunately, has revived conflict and portrayed a more unstable future.

The extraordinary summit meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Istanbul on Dec. 13 underlined and supported the understanding of the Palestinian Authority that the United States can no longer be considered as an honest broker in the peace process.

Russia, on the other hand, has declared that it is now beginning to gradually reduce its military presence in Syria and is planning to focus more on the peace process in Geneva. To facilitate this vision, Russia continues to keep its intention to convene a “Congress of the Peoples of Syria” and insists that such a meeting should not exclude actors who have contributed to defeating ISIL, who Russia believes also have the right to a place in the discussions on building Syria’s peaceful future.

Under these circumstances, can Turkey assume the role of being an honest broker in the region? Such a possibility is challenged by U.S. National Security Adviser Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster when he accused Turkey of being identified, together with Qatar, as one of the countries who support the advance of radical Islamist ideology. Turkey’s reduced diplomatic relations with Egypt and its cooling relations with Saudi Arabia, a country which recently increased its efforts to disengage itself from radical ideologies, do not strengthen Turkey’s role in the region as an impartial actor either.

In Syria, Turkey has probably moved from a robust anti-Bashar al-Assad policy to a stance admitting his inevitable presence in Syria’s transition. Turkey’s stance vis-à-vis the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), as a potential actor to play a role in Syria’s political unity and territorial integrity, still needs a similar transformation. If Turkey fails to do that, it will be unable to seize the opportunity to become a facilitator of peace and stability in the Middle East’s dynamics.

The role that Turkey can play in the Middle East is an integral part of its sustainable reliability in the West, too. Turkey’s perception in the West, however, is more likely to be affected by its adherence to common values. NATO members, for example, still fail to find a reasonably acceptable explanation to Turkey’s preference of Russian S-400s in order to enhance its missile defense system. Turkey’s participation in the EUROSAM project is only a positive step forward but it does not reduce the risk of duality in Turkey’s national defense. This, for many allies, is incomprehensible.

Relations with the European Union are also likely to be seen from the viewfinder of the rule of law and respect to fundamental rights and freedoms as well as democratization of the society. This is particularly important because only Turkey can carry such values and help them to be internalized among the societies in its own neighborhood. Turkey’s bid for membership to the EU and Turkey’s accession negotiations help Turkey on this path and therefore should not be interrupted. This is necessary not only for the integration of Turkey into the EU but is also important for reconciliation between the West and the East. All these make Turkey an important catalyzer between Europe and the Middle East. Turkey has been unable to perform in compliance with such expectations in 2017. Let us hope that wisdom will prevail in 2018.

(Çeviköz, 2017)
Foreign Policy Analysis

LO 1 Define and discuss the concept of foreign policy

Foreign policy can be defined as, actions “expressed in the form of explicitly stated goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives acting on behalf of their sovereign communities that are directed towards objectives, conditions and actors- both governmental and non-governmental- which they want to affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy”. Within the confines of the sub-field of Foreign Policy Analysis, foreign policy is a subject area that is studied through the interdisciplinary lens of International Relations. Sovereign state actors that run foreign policy aim to safeguard their national interest via self-interested strategies chosen by decision-makers. Some of the usable definitions of foreign policy in the literature provide wider definitions putting the emphasis on actions and/ or rules governing these actions. Others shed light on the meaning of foreign policy by accepting that states as ‘the agents’ of foreign policy and define the concept accordingly.

LO 2 Understand and explain the structure-agency debate in international relations

As a central topic of discussion in International Relations, the agent-structure problem focuses on the bidirectional relationship of agencies and structures. Within the framework of international politics, foreign policy is an activity which is conducted within and against an external environment, namely the international system. It is important to understand that how the nature and choices of the actors interact with the nature and structure of the system – and vice versa.

LO 3 Discuss foreign policy objectives of states

Foreign policy objectives could simply be defined as the ends that foreign policy is designed to achieve. These might involve mostly abstract goals of survival, security, protection and/ or advancement of a particular ideology, well-being of the society, pursuit of power, etc. Ideally foreign policy objectives are the product of a careful analysis trying to match a country’s priorities, objectives and goals, with the ways and the means that would enable it to attain them, while capabilities represent the available bridges between these. In this process internal and external constraints, perceptions and expectations that guide state action provide the frameworks in which the foreign policy objectives are addressed.
1. What is the difference between International Relations and international relations?
   A. There is no difference between them.
   B. The first one refers to a sub-discipline of social science; however, the second one is a concept defining the current political situation in a global environment among political actors especially states.
   C. The first one focuses solely on politics; however, the second one examines economics as well as trade.
   D. The first one is a way of expressing a specific period; however, the second one describes the characteristics of foreign relations among states.
   E. The first one is a concept of dealing with conflicts among states; however, the second one refers to a concept struggling with conflicts among states and sub-state actors.

2. Which of the following is not a key component of foreign policy?
   A. An independent political authority
   B. The sum of policies towards external political actors
   C. A domestic environment
   D. A global environment
   E. Nationalism

3. Which of the following statements addresses the issue of interdisciplinarity in foreign policy?
   A. Foreign policy, as a wide range of International Relations studies, benefits from several sub-discipline of social science like comparative politics, political science, economics and sociology.
   B. What matters in states foreign policy can solely be understood through the lenses of Political Science.
   C. Foreign policy is a unique concept for International Relations discipline.
   D. In order to understand states foreign policies, the only dynamic that should be considered is available within the discipline of Psychology.
   E. Foreign policy is a major discipline itself in social science.

4. Which of the following cannot be described as one of the major characteristics of a foreign policy decision?
   A. It refers to the foreign policy options by political decision maker.
   B. When a foreign policy decision is made, it would be hard to change it.
   C. It is mostly made within an institutional framework.
   D. It can be made for responding to a specific issue in order to make a proper solution.
   E. There is a common assumption claiming that decision-makers make a foreign policy decision rationally.

5. Which of the following is used to describe as the prominent concept of state behavior that has an objective by rationalizing specific policy concerning foreign relations of states as an analytical tool in foreign policy literature?
   A. National security
   B. Authority
   C. National interest
   D. Legitimacy
   E. Public policy

6. What is the importance of states to the subfield of foreign policy?
   A. States may create a political sphere based on mutual understanding among varied political actors in order to long-term relationship in foreign policy.
   B. States use foreign policy in order to make war against each other.
   C. States are the primary political actors that run foreign policy in accordance with their national interest.
   D. No other political actors than states can get involved in states foreign policy.
   E. States act dependently while taking foreign policy decisions.
7. Which of the following cannot be described as a component of a foreign policy goal?
   A. Target
   B. Direction
   C. Expected outcome
   D. Time scale
   E. Value-based national interest

8. Which of the following cannot be viewed as an element of national power?
   A. The size of the state
   B. Geopolitical location
   C. The size of the military forces
   D. The color of its national flag
   E. Force projection capabilities

9. Which of the following cannot be accepted as foreign policy objectives of states?
   A. Survival
   B. Win the hearts and minds of other states
   C. Security
   D. Protection
   E. The advancement of a particular ideology

10. “The term used to define this process is ………., how actors make rationally generated decisions by calculating and choosing the action that maximizes their interest”
    Which of the following concept can be best suitable one for filling in the blank?
    A. logic of consequences
    B. foreign policy objectives
    C. national Power
    D. agent
    E. structure
**Definition of the Concept of Foreign Policy (Definition, Foreign Policy Objectives of States)**

**Answer Key for “Test Yourself”**

If your answer is wrong, please review the appropriate section.

1. B  If your answer is wrong, please review the “Definition of Foreign Policy” section.

2. A  If your answer is wrong, please review the “Definition of Foreign Policy” section.

3. A  If your answer is wrong, please review the “Interdisciplinarity of Foreign Policy” section.

4. B  If your answer is wrong, please review the “The Interrelatedness of Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy” section.

5. C  If your answer is wrong, please review the “The Interrelatedness of Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy” section.

6. C  If your answer is wrong, please review the “State as Primary Actor in Foreign Policy” section.

7. E  If your answer is wrong, please review the “Foreign Policy Objectives of States” section.

8. D  If your answer is wrong, please review the “Elements of National Power and Foreign Policy Objectives” section.

9. B  If your answer is wrong, please review the “Elements of National Power and Foreign Policy Objectives” section.

10. A If your answer is wrong, please review the “Capability Analysis and Foreign Policy Objectives” section.

**Why do most case studies in the International Relations have a foreign policy aspect?**

**your turn 1**

- International Relations is a discipline which approaches international politics through state actions within the scope of internal and external dynamics of politics. Relatedly, one can say that states are accepted as the major actors running foreign policy and their actions are in large part what constitutes international relations. That is why most of case studies in International Relations do have a foreign policy aspect.

**What is a policy-oriented approach and how does it differ from a process-oriented approach?**

**your turn 2**

- A policy-oriented approach prioritizes explanations that most effectively explain choices of specific policies over others. However, a process-oriented approach puts a premium over the decision-making processes.

**How do you elaborate the difference between realists and neoliberals when it comes to the foreign policy behavior of states?**

**your turn 3**

- Realists of different strains would argue that concerns on securing relative gains of power, or increasing their security, determines foreign policy objectives – leading to a conflictual world within an anarchical structure –, neoliberals would contend that absolute, rather than relative gains would govern foreign policy behavior; and as a result, guide foreign policy objectives – leading to a tendency towards cooperation in the articulation of foreign policy objectives.
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Chapter 2

Foreign Policy Analysis and Theoretical Approaches

After completing this chapter, you will be able to

Learning Outcomes

1. Differentiate between different levels of analysis in Foreign Policy Analysis
2. Review various theoretical approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis

Chapter Outline

Introduction
Levels of Analysis in Foreign Policy
Theories of Foreign Policy Analysis

Key Terms
Levels of Analysis
International Level
State Level
Individual Level
Methodology of FPA
Theories of FPA
Idealism
Realism
Behaviouralism
INTRODUCTION

It is generally accepted that foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has developed as part of and along with the International Relations (IR) discipline around 1950s. Despite the general acceptance about FPA appearing in 1950, Hudson points out that FPA-style work has been around as long as there have been historians and others who have sought to understand why national leaders have made the choices they did regarding inter-state relations (Hudson, 2014, 16). Hudson’s point gives a clue about what FPA is basically about, the foreign decisions taken by decision makers. The analysis may be about a single decision taken in a certain case as well as about the foreign policy of a state or the general patterns of foreign policy actions of a group of states that can be categorised together. Scholars of IR are interested in interactions between two or more states, and particularly in why some of these interactions are cooperative while others are competitive and may even lead to war, whereas foreign policy analysts want to understand why a given country’s government has decided to take certain actions toward foreign governments or foreign non-state actors, why a government has decided that specific foreign policy interests are important to it, and why it has crafted a particular strategy to promote or defend those interests (Grieco et al, 2015, 106). What separates the study area of two disciplines is that while IR mainly focuses on the international system and the relations among states, FPA focuses on how these relations are formulated and conducted. In another aspect, IR focuses on the outcomes whereas FPA focuses on the processes.

The main actors of FPA are states, but it is not limited to them and include other sub and supra state actors. Foreign policy analysts have not only sought to discern patterns from the study of cases […] to develop generalisable theories and concepts to unpick the sources of conduct of states in international affairs, the significance of foreign policy decision making, the role that state and non-states actors have within the overall distinctive process as well as the influence of institutional and societal factors in shaping foreign policy, but also see their task as normative, that is to say, as aimed at improving foreign policy decision making to enable states to achieve better outcomes, and in some instances, even to enhance the possibility of peaceful relations between states (Alden and Aran, 2017, 3). As Singer convincingly illustrates any analysis, and in our case, the FPA requires three dimensions, description, explanation and prediction (Singer, 1961).

Three ground-breaking studies in IR around 1950s and 1960s, are considered to lead the way to FPA: Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics by Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin in 1954, “Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy” by James N. Rosenau in 1964, and Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics by Harold and Margaret Sprout in 1956. The novelty of these studies is that they have stimulated analysis below the nation-state level that include decision making processes and mechanisms (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin), comparative foreign policy analysis that enables testable generalisations (Rosenau), and analysis that take into consideration the psycho-milieu of the individuals and group decision-makers, that is their perceptions, beliefs and knowledge acquiring processes (Sprout and Sprout). It is with these three studies that different levels of analyses could be clearly defined in FPA.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS IN FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy is an interaction between the actors and their environment, be it domestic or international. In seeking to provide a fuller explanation for foreign policy choice, scholars have had to take account of the boundaries between the state’s internal or domestic environment and the external environment (Alden and Aran, 2017, 3). Hence, there are three levels in it its analyses as: the international level, national or state level, and the individual level. The level of analysis was introduced to IR studies by Kenneth Waltz in his book Man, the State and War. Published in 1959, Man, the State and War tries to find the causes of international conflicts. Waltz defines images in order to explain; human behaviour, internal structure of states and international anarchy. These images coincide to three levels of analysis: individual, state and international levels. Another important contribution to the debate about the level of analysis is David Singer’s article The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,
which was published in 1961. The definition of levels in the study of IR was also applied to FPA by the scholars of the discipline.

The first level of analysis is the international level. According to analyses that attempt to explain foreign policy on this level, international system is the strongest if not the only determinant of foreign policy decisions. The system level explores dynamics such as the nature and the rules of the international system, distribution of power among states and other actors like the international or transnational organisations, the number of poles in the system, etc. According to David Singer, the systemic level enables to examine international relations in the whole, with a comprehensiveness that is of necessity lost when the focus is shifted to a lower and more partial level (Singer, 1961). On the other hand, he also points out the shortcomings of this level. One of these shortcomings is that the analysis on this level “exaggerates the impact of the system upon the national actors, and conversely, discounts the impact of the actors on the system.” Another problem is that this level of analysis assumes “a high degree of uniformity in the foreign policy operational codes of national actors.” That is because focusing on the whole, namely the system, may cause overlooking the various different characteristics of the parts, namely the states. Since it is not possible to expect each state to behave in the same way and make the same decisions in their foreign policies, state level analysis becomes inevitable. Hudson also points out that with the collapse of the bipolar system following the fall of the Soviet bloc regimes, an important theoretical discovery was made: “it is impossible to explain or predict system change on the basis of system-level variables alone” (Hudson, 2014, 32).

The analyses on state level have to take into consideration material dynamics such as the size of the country, geopolitical positions, resources, economy and population as well as the nature of the state such as the political system and institution. These are the elements that help states to be categorised as small, medium or great power states and gives a strong hand to those states that have more capabilities in terms of the material dynamics in pursuing their foreign policy goals. The material features of states are not the only determinants in state level analysis, and other dynamics such as the state system may be more effective. For instance, democratic peace theory claims that states with democratic regimes are less likely to go to war with each other.

Following his critique of the system level analysis, Singer points out that state level brings more favourable results, is more comprehensive and detailed as it portrays significant differentiation among the actors in the international system and enables “valid generalisations of a comparative nature” (Singer, 1961). As he also mentions, this level of analysis makes it possible to ask and answer questions about the goals, motivations, and purposes of national policy. In this respect, it is central to the decision-making approach in FPA (See below and Chapter 3). But he also warns that this level has the risk of exaggerating “the differences among sub-systemic actors” and may even lead to ethnocentrism. Another challenge for the state-level analysis has been the developments that got pace with rapid globalisation that not only eroded the role of states in international relations but also increased their interdependencies.

According to Hudson, ignoring the individual level would paint “a world of no change, no creativity, no persuasion, no accountability” (Hudson, 2014, 8).

Singer does not define the individual level as a separate level of analysis and places it in the state/nation level. He defines the state level analysis as the investigation of the processes by which national goals are selected, the internal and external factors that have impact on those processes, and the institutional framework from which they emerge. According to Singer, the question that arises at this level is whether the analysis involves the study of the actor’s behaviour in terms of the objective factors that influence that behaviour, holding that “individuals and groups respond in a quasi-deterministic fashion to the realities of physical
environment, the acts or power of other individuals or groups, and similar ‘objective’ and ‘real’ forces of stimuli” or the study of actor’s behaviour in terms of the actor’s perception of these objective factors, holding that “individuals and groups are not influenced in their behaviour by such objective forces but by the fashion in which these factors are perceived and evaluated, however distorted or incomplete such perceptions may be.” These two approaches are not definitely separate and a comprehensive analysis should include both the objective conditions and circumstances and how those are perceived by the decision makers, be it individual or group. Here another issue appears: the difficulty of accurately observing and analysing these perceptions.

The question of which level should be used has led to the agent-structure debate in FPA. In this debate, the structure refers to the international system and its role in the formation and conduct of foreign policy while agent refers to the decisive role of the state and individual and its impact on the international system. Defining the state or the individual as the agent depends on the approach adopted in the analysis.

Although these three levels are instrumental and explanatory in analysing foreign policy, the rise in the number and density of transnational actors (TNAs) has transformed the international system, making interconnectivity outside of traditional state-to-state conduct more likely (Alden and Aran, 2017, 3). It is not always possible to detect one level in different approaches of FPA. While some approaches strictly stick to one level of analysis, others use different levels in the same analysis even if they feature one of the levels. In addition to this, interdisciplinary research including disciplines such as political science, economics, sociology, psychology, organisational behaviour also contribute to a comprehensive and complete analysis of foreign policy.

Explaining Iraq’s Foreign Policy and Decision to Go to War in 1991

“In 1990 Iraq occupied its small oil rich neighbour Kuwait. An international coalition, led by the United States and Great Britain, formed to oust Iraq from Kuwait, first by imposing economic sanctions, and second by setting a deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait or face a devastating military attack. The coalition was far superior militarily and made strong efforts to convince Iraq that it would attack if Iraq did not retreat. Yet, Saddam Hussein refused to back down, ended up in a lopsided war and suffered a significant military defeat. How might we explain this puzzling Iraqi foreign policy choice? We cannot know for sure, but there are a number of plausible arguments from different analytical perspectives

Saddam’s Personality

Leaders always matter in decisions to go to war, particularly so in non-democratic countries where political power is heavily concentrated in the hands of one or a few individuals. Saddam Hussein was ambitious and paranoid, had a proclivity towards violence, and was willing to take risks. Saddam ordered Iraq to invade a more powerful Iran in 1980, hoping to exploit Iran’s revolutionary instability and gain advantage over its traditional adversary. That risky war ended as a bloody stalemate eight years later. Saddam also appeared to believe that international actors were continually conspiring against him. He perceived neighbours such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait conspiring to squeeze Iraq economically, and others such as Israel and America conspiring to undermine his power at home.

Misperception and ‘Groupthink’

Saddam may have believed that the coalition, and in particular the United States, would not carry through on their threat to attack. Saddam seemed influenced by the US experience in Lebanon in 1983. When a car bomb struck the US embassy and killed over 200 Marines, the Reagan administration pulled its peacekeeping force out of Lebanon. On the eve of the 1991 war, Saddam in effect told US Ambassador April Glaspie that the United States did not have the stomach for war because it was unwilling to suffer large numbers of casualties.

What about other Iraqi leaders, in particular the small group of Ba’ath Party officials that advised Saddam Hussein? Some appear to have worried that Iraq was about to suffer a big defeat given the forces arrayed against it. But, they were generally reluctant to disagree with Saddam or share with him views or information.
THEORIES OF FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

There are different theoretical approaches that aim to analyse foreign policy. Some theories are formulated only to analyse foreign policy while others are derived from IR theories. The first group of theories in this context are actually IR theories that also include analytical explanations about foreign policy. The traditional theories of IR, idealism and realism, are among these theories. As FPA began developing as a separate discipline, various theories have been developed using different methodological approaches, both qualitative and quantitative. Brought together under the framework of, behaviouralism, these theories are decision-making approach, comparative foreign policy approach, case study approach, event data approach, prospect theory approach and role theory approach. A third group of theories are contemporary theories which were based on the critiques of previous theories and offering new explanations for foreign policy like constructivism and neoclassical realism.

Traditional Approaches

Before FPA analysis has developed as a discipline, it was still an area widely studied within IR. Thus, the traditional theories of IR, namely idealism and realism, also have inquiries about foreign policy. They base their explanation of foreign policy on systemic factors, that is they believe foreign policy decisions are influenced by the nature of the international system. While doing this, both idealism and realism attribute features of human nature to the states. This methodology is defined as rational-choice theory, which assumes a unified decision-making body in the form of the state, as well as a belief that the pursuit of self-interest guided all decision makers (Alden and Aran, 2017, 6).

Idealism

Being formulated after the First World War, idealist theory of IR has been concerned with ways to prevent wars. Consequently, they opt out war as a foreign policy instrument in their analysis. Their approach to human nature is inspired by liberalism, and hence optimistic, in the sense that it perceives human nature as good and inclined to cooperation rather than conflict. Therefore, the causes of war cannot be found in human nature. The human beings are all rational in their behaviours. It is due to rationality that idealists believe that human beings would deny war and seek and support ways that would build and sustain peace. As Smith explains, for idealists, “foreign policy was contrary to his preferred course of action. Saddam was intolerant of dissent; when he took power in 1979, he summarily executed two dozen Ba’ath Party leaders who had opposed his rise to power. He surrounded himself with likeminded individuals who, even if inclined to disagree, knew better than to do so.

National Economic Distress

The war with Iran exhausted Iraq financially. Iraq demanded contributions from other Gulf states to finance its war effort. When the war ended and the money stopped flowing, Iraq was in severe economic distress. It needed oil prices to remain high to earn hard currency for economic recovery. Saddam believed that Kuwait was overproducing oil and driving down the global price. But taking over Kuwait he could control Kuwaiti oil supply and keep the global price higher. From this perspective, once Saddam had Kuwait he could not afford to give up, and therefore he was willing to try to ‘ride out’ a coalition attack rather than back down.

Geopolitical Opportunism

Iraq under Saddam Hussein fashioned itself as a regional power and the leader of the Arab world. Saddam attacked Iran because its new fundamentalist Shiite regime had aspired to dominate the region. He threatened the Arab world’s common enemy, Israel. By taking Kuwait, he hoped to signal the Arab countries that Iraq was the regional leader and they should accommodate its wishes. By standing up to the United States and international coalition, even if he lost a war, Saddam may have believed that Iraq’s prestige would be enhanced.

Students should recognise the operation of level of analysis in the differing perspectives ascribed above. Arguments for Iraq’s seemingly puzzling decision to go to war range across individual, state and international levels” (Grieco et. al, 2015, 115).
to be explained through an understanding of what human beings could become and why existing structures, both domestic and international, stood in the way” (Smith, 1986, 14). On that account, they were in favour of international mechanism and institutions that would be superior in a way to overcome the anarchic nature of the international system and build international peace. In that sense, idealism is also institutionalist. The institution that they had formulated materialised in the League of Nations. Peace would be secured through collective security, which would bind them together against an aggressor. They also assume that interest of states do not clash, and they are more inclined to cooperation than conflict. Domestic political structures of states could also further this inclination. They believe that if democratic regimes are spread and enhanced, peace would again be secured since democratic states are less likely to go to war with each other. These improvements in both the international and domestic structures would also avoid misperceptions and avoid misleading ideas in the foreign policy decision making process that lead to wars.

Realism

Realism is considered to be the foundational approach to IR in the sense that many other approaches and theories are formulated either in response or in support to it. This is true for not only IR but also FPA. Realist theories were formulated in the post-Second World War era, influenced by the idea that idealist theories failed since they proved unsuccessful in preventing or even foreseeing another world war. Therefore, according to the realist theory, the way to prevent wars was not moral values or international institutions but balance of power in the international system. Although the state is the main actor in realist theory, it is also attributed features from human nature. But human nature does not have positive connotations like it has in the idealist theories. Realist theories presume human nature to be egoist. Human nature is considered to be dominated by self-interest, and likewise, states are guided by national interests. This is also a consequence of considering the state as a unitary body. Components of the state are not deemed to be important and collective interest dominate it. Therefore, national interest is defined as a whole and superior to the parts. Thus, what defines the foreign policy is the national interest of state. States seek to maximise national interest and act rationally in seeking them. This is to say that calculation of national interest is self-evident; it can be arrived at rationality through careful analysis of the material conditions of states (Alden and Aran, 2017, 3). The stance that states take in their international relations after this calculation makes their foreign policy. National interests of states are considered to be independent of time and space. At this point, how national interest is defined and implemented is important since it constitutes the essence of foreign policy. The well-known realist definition of national interest is made by Hans Morgenthau depending on the fact that all nations try to “protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations” (Morgenthau, 1952: 972). This is so because of the anarchical nature of the international system. The key to be safe and secure in such a system is power. Indeed, according to Morgenthau, national interest is “defined in terms of power-political, military, and economic” (Morgenthau, 1952: 964). The anarchic nature of the international system is the main dynamic that drives states to seek for power. In the absence of a higher authority, any state could restore to force to reach its goals and maximise its interests, which in return, creates a feeling of insecurity. To overcome this insecurity, states resort to power. There is an endless struggle of power, which makes the international system conflictual. Power is thus considered vital for a successful foreign policy in such an environment. The relative power of states in the international system vis-a-vis other states is determinant on their foreign policy decision in a way that would secure their national interests. Wohlforth defines realist approach to foreign policy as “an orientation toward to most powerful groups at any given time; a skepticism towards professed time aims of foreign policy other than the state’s interest; a tendency to question the ability of any state’s foreign policy to transcend power politics and a penchant for looking beyond rhetoric to the power realities that realists expect nearly always underlie policy” (Wohlforth, 2008, 33).
Behavioural Approaches

Behavioural approaches are those aiming to explain how foreign policy decisions are made. Behaviouralism as a scientific approach has first appeared in psychology. It has an empirical methodology based on the observing the acts, conditions and environment of individuals. According to behaviourists, knowledge is acquired with the accumulation of observable data. Therefore, when this approach was applied to IR, it criticised the traditional theories on the grounds that there cannot be any a priori assumptions about human nature without observation. They differ from the traditional approaches in the sense that they focus on processes and motives of foreign policy-making. Behavioural approaches have developed as part of the methodological critiques of rational choice theory. According to this, rationality is not absolute and is constrained by other dynamics that should be included in the analysis of foreign policy. There are different approaches in behaviouralist theories of FPA. These approaches are basically differentiated based on their methodologies. That is why they sometimes intertwine and sometimes collide. The most common methodologies in this context are decision-making approach, comparative foreign policy approach, case study approach, event data approach, prospect theory approach and role theory approach.

Decision-making Approach

Decision-making constitutes one of the core aspects of FPA. There are different stages of decision-making from problem recognition, framing, and perception to more advanced stages of goal prioritisation, contingency planning, and option assessment (Hudson, 2014, 4). At the centre of this approach stands the decision maker, group or individual. Decision-making approach studies focus on these decision makers, their motivations, psychologies, environment along with decision-making apparatuses and processes. These elements together constitute the conditions that shape the foreign policy decisions, and hence the foreign policy of a state. By defining a decision maker, this approach distances itself from the abstract and objective conceptualisations of traditional approaches and adopts subjective perspective. Along with this perspective comes the critique of rationality assumptions in the traditional theories. According to the decision making approach, the rationality of people are limited. That is due to series of factors that should all be included in FPA such as psychological and cognitive factors, processes of acquiring knowledge, experience, values, belief systems, etc. These factors are mostly shaped
by the social, political, demographic, cultural, historical, ideological, institutional conditions that surround the decision maker. All these dynamics come together and shape the perceptions of the decision maker. In a way, the analysis through this approach aims to understand and explain the perceptions that lead to foreign policy decisions and the dynamics that lead to these perceptions. Perceptions play a crucial role when the decision maker has misperceptions about the intentions of other states or about his own countries, capabilities. Like the decision maker, the nation may also have perceptions about itself and its role, and these may affect the decisions of foreign policy makers. The culture of the society plays a significant role on the formation of these perceptions. Culture also has an impact on the cognitive processes through which the decision maker acquires knowledge and information.

The individual level does not necessarily mean that there is a single individual decision maker. In many cases, there may be a small group of individuals making the foreign policy decisions. Indeed, according to some scholars, foreign policy decisions and processes cannot possibly be formulated by a single person, and are inevitably outcomes of groupthink at different levels. In such cases, the analysis focuses on the ways foreign policy issues are perceived by the members of the group and the motives that lead them to a decision. Like the analysis concerning the individual decision maker, psychological dynamics are thoroughly examined to answer these questions.

On the other hand, some theories in decision making approach believe that focusing on the individual or group decision maker is not explanatory since s/he is not the only determinant and is accompanied by certain organisational processes and bureaucracies. According to these approaches, the bureaucratic environment is more decisive in foreign policy decisions than the individual decision makers. Institutions such as the ministries of foreign affairs, defence, trade, their departments and agents influence the foreign policy decisions as they are the ones that will interpret and implement these decisions. Hudson notes that “organisations and bureaucracies put their own survival at the top of their list of priorities, and this survival is measured by relative influence vis- à-vis other organisations, by the organisation’s budget, and by the morale of its personnel” (Hudson, 2014, 20).

Some analyses further this approach by also investigating the impact of public opinion and interest groups on decision making.

**Graham Allison’s Explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962**

“One of the most influential twentieth century studies of foreign policy is Graham Allison’s Essence of decision Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, first published in 1971. […] This study focuses on the thirteen days in October 1962, when John F. Kennedy learned that the Soviet Union was in the process of installing intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Fidel Castro’s Cuba. This action was viewed as an unacceptable provocation by the president and his key advisors, who thus felt impelled to insist that the Soviets withdraw these missiles. The US government considered three options in this context: to invade Cuba, to conduct air strikes against the missile sites, or to impose a naval blockade of Cuba. The president finally chose the third option, a tactic that turned out to be successful. Allison’s purpose is to explain why and how this choice was made, and he does so in the form of first constructing three different conceptual models or lenses (Rational Actor, Organisational Behaviour and Governmental Politics). Allison then uses each in three separate empirical chapters to explain and assess the actions taken by Kennedy and his advisors during these thirteen days. Allison does not claim that three models are the only feasible ones in explaining the puzzles generated by this crisis, but he does show how our view of events are strongly influenced by ‘basic assumptions we make, categories we use, our angle of vision’ and that by ‘comparing and contrasting the three frameworks, we see each magnifies, highlights and reveals as well as what each blurs or neglects.’ What has made this so influential is that although it purports to explain the same events, it comes to the conclusion that different explanations are reached depending on the conceptual model employed (Carlnaes, 2008, 91).
Comparative Foreign Policy Approach

Comparative foreign policy approach has developed through the way Rosenau opened for reaching testable generalisations by cross-national analysis. According to this approach, “events could be compared along behavioural dimensions, such as whether positive or negative affect was being displayed, or what instruments of statecraft (e.g., diplomatic, military, economics, etc.) were used in the influence attempt, or what level of commitment of resources was evident”, and thus behaviour as disparate as a war, a treaty, and a state visit can be compared and aggregated in a theoretically meaningful fashion (Hudson, 2014, 21). This is because this approach rejects that events are unique. In accordance with this rejection, the comparative foreign policy approach attempts to formulate a foreign policy theory that is scientific in the sense that it can be generalisable. The aim of this attempt is to predict the future foreign policy acts of states. Scholars of this approach believe that “through the use of methods borrowed from natural science, FPA could lead to a general theory” (Smith, 1986, 14). This could be done either by comparing different states and detecting the similarities and differences in their practices, or by focusing on a single state and comparing its foreign policy practices at different times and different conditions or at similar cases and similar conditions. But it should be noted that what is compared in this analysis is the official and factual foreign policy practices of states, not the dynamics behind them. Thus, the methodology preferred by the scholars of this approach is conducting not only cross-nation but also cross-time empirical testing that is collecting data on a variety of possible explanatory factors and determining the patterns by which these independent variables were correlated with foreign policy behaviour (Hudson, 2014, 21). Comparative foreign policy approach is hence behaviouralist in the sense that it examines behaviours as the source of data but differs from the decision making approach since it focuses on them in empirical and objective sense and ignores the social, psychological, cognitive dynamics behind those behaviours. This constitutes one side of the criticism directed to the approach. But the main critique of comparative foreign policy analysis is about the attempt to formulate a general theory of foreign policy.

Case-Study Approach

Case-study approach stands on the opposite of comparative foreign policy approach. Whereas comparative foreign policy approach attempt to formulate a generalisable theory of foreign policy, case-study approach claims that each state has a unique foreign policy. The central belief in this approach is that any explanation of foreign policy behaviours through generalisations would cause the loss of unique factors that make up a foreign policy action and creating patterns, models and theories, and trying to fit the foreign policy behaviour of states into these, ignore the essence of foreign policy that is being explained (Tayfur, 1994, 126). According to this approach, each state has different social, historical, cultural backgrounds which consequently differentiate their foreign policies. That is why the foreign policies of each state should be studied separately without attempting to find out similarities that would enable generalisations. Therefore, there is not a single methodology that can be applied to this approach. But, studying the histories of states could overcome this methodological problem and enable the analysis of unique foreign policies of individual states.

Event-Data Approach

Event data is a quantitative methodological approach in the study of international politics. It is initiated by Charles McClelland as a link between the general systems theories of international behaviour and the textual histories which provided an empirical basis for understanding that behaviour (Schrodt, 1995, 151) in 1960s, and has been used by many scholars of FPA since then. The event data approach can be explained by breaking the concept into two: “what is data?” and “what is event?” Event data approach is among the approaches that claim to bring scientific methods to the study of IR and FPA. In terms of data event data, is an approach that aims to systematically code a very large number
of individual foreign policy interactions and then use that information to test general hypotheses about foreign policy behaviour using statistical techniques (Schrodt, 1995, 164). In that sense, it is closely related to comparative foreign policy. Just like comparative foreign policy approach, it is an approach that aims to formulate meaningful patterns out of foreign policy interactions. Likewise, it is an empirical approach and bases the analysis on observable data. The data should also be verifiable. Therefore, it is not interested in social, psychological cultural dynamics or motives and perceptions of the decision makers which constitute the main analysis of the decision making approach. It is also critical of the case study approach since it claims that single cases are limited and even misleading. Instead, the data is generated in process that resembles content analysis, by examining thousands of newspaper reports on the day-to-day interactions of nation-states and assigning each reported interaction a numerical score or a categorical code (Schrodt, 1995, 146).

**Prospect Theory Approach**

Prospect theory is an approach that focuses on decision making under risk. It was developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1979 and was later applied to foreign policy decision making in the late 1980s and 1990s by several scholars. Prospect theory approach foresees two phases in making decisions. The editing phase involves a preliminary analysis of the choice problem and includes identification of the options available to the actor, the possible outcomes or consequences of each, and the values and probabilities associated with each of these outcomes. In the evaluation phase, the edited prospects are evaluated and the preferred prospect is selected, which means that the decision is made (Levy, 1992, 179-180). According to this theory, the individual attitude towards gain and loss are not the same and people fear loss more than they expect gain. This makes them take more risks in cases of loss. Prospect theory suggests that avoiding loss is more important than securing gain and that is why individuals cherish what they possess and are wary of losing what they already have (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010, 76). In line with this suggestion, Levy also summarises six points about prospect theory based on the work of Kahneman and Tversky (Levy, 1992, 174-178). The first point is that people tend to think in terms of gains and losses rather than in terms of their net assets, and therefore encode choices in terms of deviations from a reference which is usually defined in terms of what one already has or the status quo. The second point, which is defined as reflection effect, as mentioned above, is that individuals tend to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses. Third point, called the endowment effect, in connection with the second one is that people prefer the status quo over a 50/50 chance for positive and negative alternatives with the same absolute value, which means that people value what they have more than comparable things they do not have. Forth point, defined as the translation effect, suggests that because of the encoding of outcomes in terms of a reference point and the differential treatment of gains and losses, the identification of the reference point, or framing of a choice problem, becomes critical. The fifth point is that individuals oversight outcomes which
are certain, relative to outcomes which are merely probable and is defined as the certainty effect. The sixth and the last point, isolation effect, assumes that individuals often disregard components that are common to each alternative option, and focus on components which are different in order to simplify the choice between alternatives.

**Role Theory Approach**

Role theory in FPA was initiated by K. J. Holsti with his article *National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Holsti, 1970). According to Holsti, “those responsible for making decisions and taking actions for the state are aware of international status distinctions and that their policies reflect this awareness.” This is to say that foreign policy decision makers are aware of the position of their state in the international system that is determined by the extent of foreign commitments, military capabilities, prestige, economic and technological levels. The role performance, conducted within the setting of a position, is also influenced by “the expectations of peer groups, organisational rules, social mores, cultural values and traditions, and laws, as well as by self-conceptions of role. Foreign policy decisions and actions (role performances) thus derive primarily from policymakers’ role conceptions, domestic needs and demands, and critical events or trends in the external environment.” There are two concepts in these explanations: national role performance and national role conceptions. Holsti defines national role performance as the general foreign policy behaviour of governments which includes “patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions and commitments toward other states.” National role conception, on the other hand, includes “the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional system.” These role performances and role conceptions are valuable explanatory frameworks in analysing foreign policy. If it is assumed that most decisions will be reasonably consistent with role conceptions, then the task of foreign policy analysis should be to explain the origins, presence, and sources of change of national role conceptions rather than single decisions (Holsti, 1970, 306).

In other words, if the roles that states attribute to themselves are defined, then their foreign policies could be analysed correspondingly. Thus, the role theory assumes states are actors who behave consistent with the roles with which they identify (Chafetz et al, 1996, 732).

In this context, Holsti defines 17 national role conceptions. These are:

1. **Bastion of revolution-liberator** who sees their task as to liberate others or to act as the “bastion” or revolutionary movements;
2. **Regional leader**, which refers to duties or special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in its relation to states in a particular region with which it identifies, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as international communist movements;
3. **Regional protector** which places emphasis on the function of providing protection for adjacent regions;
4. **Active independent** whose role conception emphasises at once independence, self-determination, possible mediation functions, and active programs to extend diplomatic and commercial relations to diverse areas of the world;
5. **Liberation supporter** which, unlike the bastion of the revolution-liberator national role conception, does not indicate formal responsibilities for organising, leading, or physically supporting liberation movements abroad, but instead publish routine and formal statements supporting liberation movements, suggesting rather unstructured and vague attitudes about actions required to enact the role conception;

6. **Anti-imperialist agent**, who sees itself as an agent of “struggle” against this imperialism where it is perceived as a serious threat by many governments not limited to communist party states;

7. **Defender of the faith**, which refers to some governments that view their foreign policy objectives and commitments in terms of defending value systems from attack and presumably undertake special responsibilities to guarantee ideological purity for a group of other states;

8. **Mediator-integrator** role conception to define states that perceive themselves as capable of, or responsible for, fulfilling or undertaking special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states or groups of states;

9. **Regional-subsystem collaborator**, which not only envisages occasional interposition into areas or issues of conflict but also indicate far-reaching commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build wider communities, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as the Communist movement;

10. **Developer** national role conception that indicates a special duty or obligation to assist underdeveloped countries; bridge national role conception which imply a communication function, that is, acting as a “translator” and information between peoples of different cultures;

11. **Bridge**, to refer to states acting as a “translator” or conveyor of messages and information between peoples of different cultures

12. **Faithful ally**, which makes a specific commitment to support the policies of another government;

13. **Independent** national role conception which affirms commitment to the policy of non-alignment indicate that the government will make policy decisions according to the state's own interests rather than in support of the objectives of other states;

14. **Example** national role conception that emphasises the importance of promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies;

15. **Internal development** national role, which does not foresee a particular task or function within the international system, but instead emphasises that most efforts of the government should be directed toward problems of internal development;

16. **Isolate**, which demands, a minimum of external contacts of whatever variety on the contrary to the internal development role conception which often includes references to external cooperation, particularly in the economic and cultural fields;

17. **Protectee**, which refers to governments that allude to the responsibility of other states to defend them, but otherwise do not indicate any particular orientation, tasks, or functions toward the external environment.

Apart from the national roles defined for states, role theory also includes the impact of individual roles on foreign policy. According to this, the role played by the individual in the foreign policy process is likely to affect his or her perceptions and behaviours and that an individual decision maker is expected to act in conformity with the requirements of his or her role which is assumed to be played by any occupant of that position (Tayfur, 1994, 136).

**Contemporary Approaches**

By the end of 1980s with the critical turn in IR, traditional approaches of IR have been criticised in many aspects. The critical turn in IR has generated several approaches ranging from Critical IR to post-structural approaches and from constructivism to new versions of realism. The main point these approaches have in common is the assumption...
that world politics is socially constructed. This assumption leads social constructivist approaches to place the human subject again into the analyses of IR, which was overlooked by traditional systemic approaches. However, this replacement of the human subject into analyses of IR have not brought the approaches about to the individual or state level appropriate for FPA. Instead, critical and post-structural approaches tend clearly to place their analyses into the structural level, which in turn, serve as an obstacle to analysing foreign policies of states. Since the structural stance of these approaches give no room for decision makers or internal state level factors in the face of the determining power of the structure, be it the anarchy or the capitalist world economy. There are only few exceptions to the general tendency of contemporary approaches which mostly emerged as syntheses of contemporary and traditional approaches. In this sense, two of them are worth examining. One of them is the constructivist approach which opened the way for analysing foreign policy with social constructionist assumption. The neo-classical realism, on the other hand, along with social constructivist assumptions, has provided a way for integrating individual level factors to traditional realist assumptions, or in other words, for breaking the chains of the rationality assumption of realism by integrating unit-level behavioural determinants to its analyses.

**Constructivism**

Constructivism in the broadest sense refers to theories that see the world as being socially constructed. Socially constructed world means that the existence of patterns, cause-and-effect relationships, and even states themselves depend on webs of meaning and practices that constitute them (Hurd, 2008, 300). This means that nothing in social life, and accordingly in the international system, is given and exists with the meanings attributed to them. In fact, the international system itself is also socially constructed by the ideas and identities of actors - state or individual. This means that even if the material conditions remain the same, the international system may change if ideas and identities change. There is an interaction between the system and the actors in that sense. Therefore, norms, ideas, beliefs, expectations and interpretations play a defining role in foreign policy formation, states' behaviours and the structure of the international system according to the constructivist theory. All these dynamics are not only constructed but also reconstructed by the acts and interactions of states. A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory, according to Alexander Wendt, is “that people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them” (Wendt, 1992, 396). In terms of FPA constructivism approaches express that most of the FPA concepts also as constructed and focuses on construction processes instead of taking them as given. Interests, which are considered as one of the key concepts in explaining foreign policy practices, are not a given unit for constructivist foreign policy analysts. According to this approach, interests are constructed through a process of social interaction, and thus they explore how these interests are constructed in the first place, emphasising the social interactions - how norms and discourses can lead states to new interests (Checkel, 2008, 75). Grieco et al. note that interests are shaped by the identities of actors, that how people see themselves will shape how they think about their interests and what they want to achieve in politics (Grieco et. al, 2015, 93). In this context, the most important actors in both society and the state are elite individuals, who are mostly also the decision makers, since their ideas and identities shape the way the groups and states they lead take action within the international system. At this point, communication plays an important role. Constructivists advance a communicative understanding of rationality to explain decision making. According to this, rational actors do not so much calculate costs and benefits, or seek cues from their environment; rather they present arguments and try to persuade and convince each other, which means that interests and preferences are open for redefinition and hence reconstruction (Checkel, 2008, 76). As Grieco et al. point out, the interactions of elites and the networks they operate within are important in creating and reinforcing ideas and belief and that elites tend to produce collective or shared world views that shape how interests are defined and pursued through communication and networking.
Synthesis: Neo-classical Realism

Neo-classical realism occupies a middle ground between pure structural theories, which implicitly accept a clear and direct link between systemic constraints and unit-level behaviour and constructivist theories, which deny that any objective systemic constraints exist at all and argue instead that international reality is socially constructed (Rose, 1998, 152). For this reason, it is possible to call this approach a synthesis. According to neo-classical realist theories, foreign policy of states are influenced by the distribution of power in the international system. This is also the main assumption of classical realism. However, neo-classical realism suggests that physical relative power is not the only determinant of foreign policy. This is because not only the physical power but also how it is perceived plays an important role, and thus foreign policy decision makers should also be included to the analysis. Ignoring this link between power and politics would be to assume that all states would act in the same way when they face similar systemic determinants. Classical realist approaches do not consider that states may differ in their ability to control the policy agenda, select policy options, or mobilise resources to respond systemic incentives (Taliaferro et. al, 2009, 19). Thus, as Rose describes, neoclassical realism is realist as it argues that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities, but it further argues that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressure must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level (Rose, 1998, 146). Purely state level explanations (Innenpolitik) fail to explain foreign policy according to neoclassical realism. If this was the case, states with similar structures such as political and economic systems, social, cultural or ideological backgrounds would be expected to follow similar foreign policies. Accordingly, it would also be expected that the same state would always take similar foreign policy actions when facing similar cases. Instead neoclassical realism seeks to explain variations in the foreign policies of the same state over time or across different states facing similar external constraints (Taliaferro et. al, 2009, 21). Likewise, purely systemic explanations are also deficient. Accepting the anarchic nature of the international system, neoclassical realism claims that states do not respond to this anarchic system by trying to increase their power in order to feel secure. They also attempt to control and shape this system.
Summary

LO 1

“Differentiate between different levels of analysis in Foreign Policy Analysis”

As it is generally accepted for the IR studies, three levels of analysis are applied also to FPA. These levels are the international level, which is also referred as the system level the state level, which is also referred as the national level; and the individual level, which may include not only an individual but also small groups. Analyses that attempt to explain foreign policy on international level claim that international system is the strongest if not the only determinant of foreign policy decisions. Analyses on this level include dynamics such as the nature and the rules of the international system, distribution of power among states and other actors like the international or transnational organisations, and the number of poles in the system. According to some scholars, focusing on the international level could cause overlooking the various different characteristics of the states. That is why they suggest state level analysis, which would be more comprehensive and detailed as it portrays significant differentiation among the actors in the international system. State level analysis include material dynamics such as the size of the country, geopolitical positions, resources, economy and population as well as the nature of the state such as the political system and institutions. Some other scholars, on the other hand, prefer to carry out their analysis on individual level, claiming that any analysis that ignores the individual would be incomplete leaving no room for change, creativity, persuasion, or accountability. Analysis on this level usually includes psychological and cognitive factors, processes of acquiring knowledge, experience, values, belief systems of the individual or group foreign policy makers.

LO 2

“Review various theoretical approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis”

There are different theoretical approaches that aim to analyse foreign policy. Some theories are formulated only to analyse foreign policy while others are derived from IR theories. The first generation of FPA is actually used on the traditional theories of IR and brings together what they say about foreign policy or how they explain it. Idealism and realism can be studied in this context. Both theories base their analysis on their assumptions about human nature. While idealism perceives human nature as good and inclined to cooperation rather than conflict, realism considers human nature to be egoist and dominated by self interest. Consequently, idealism claims that it is possible to establish domestic and international systems and institutions that would secure peace and that since it is not possible to compromise national interests, the only way to secure peace is balance of power in the international system. Neither idealism nor realism are theories of foreign policy analysis, but they inevitably have inquiries about foreign policy. Indeed, it is accepted that FPA appeared as a separate discipline later in 1950s and 1960s. The main theories of FPA are the behaviouralist ones, that were first formulated in 1950s. Behaviouralist theories aim to explain how foreign policy decisions are made. They were initiated by the critique of the traditional theories on the grounds that there cannot be any a priori assumptions about human nature without observation. There are different approaches in behaviouralist theories of FPA based on their methodologies. The most common methodologies in this context are decision-making approach, comparative foreign policy approach, case study approach, event data approach, prospect theory approach and role theory approach. Nevertheless, behaviouralist approaches, along with traditional approaches, became the focus of criticism in 1980s, which led to the formation of new theories in both IR and FPA. Constructivism, which assumes that world politics is socially constructed, and neoclassical realism, which has integrated unit-level behavioural determinants to classical realism, are the main approaches that brought new insights to FPA.
1. Who introduced the level of analysis to the study of international relations and foreign policy?
   A. Alexander Wendt
   B. Kenneth Waltz
   C. Hans Morgenthau
   D. James N. Rosenau
   E. Kalevi J. Holsti

2. What are the levels of analysis in foreign policy analysis?
   A. State level - international level
   B. Individual level - state level - international level
   C. Individual level - social level - state level - international level
   D. Individual level - state level - international level - supranational level
   E. Individual level - social level - state level - international level - supranational level

3. According to realist theory, foreign policy of states is determined by the ........
   A. economic relations
   B. ideological rivalry
   C. national interests
   D. state structure
   E. political system

4. Which of the following approaches is not behaviouralist?
   A. Case study approach
   B. Decision making approach
   C. Comparative foreign policy approach
   D. Event data approach
   E. Constructivist approach

5. Comparative foreign policy approach aims to ........
   A. formulate a generalisable foreign policy theory.
   B. point out the uniqueness of each state's foreign policy.
   C. opt out war as a foreign policy instrument.
   D. seek the causes of international conflict.
   E. systematically code large numbers of individual foreign policy interactions.

6. Which of the following is not one of the national role conceptions Holsti defines?
   A. Regional protector
   B. Regional leader
   C. Regional actor
   D. Regional-subsystem collaborator
   E. Liberation supporter

7. States “that view their foreign policy objectives and commitments in terms of defending value systems from attack and presumably undertake special responsibilities to guarantee ideological purity for a group of other states” is defined with which national role conception?
   A. Liberation supporter
   B. Anti-imperialist agent
   C. Active independent
   D. Faithful ally
   E. Defender of the faith

8. Which of the following is not among the assumptions of prospect theory?
   A. People tend to think in terms of gains and losses rather than in terms of their net assets.
   B. People deny war and seek and support ways that would build and sustain peace.
   C. Individuals tend to be risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses.
   D. People value what they have more than comparable things they do not have.
   E. Individuals oversight outcomes which are certain relative to outcomes which are merely probable.
Which of the following is not a constructivist assumption?

A. “The world is socially constructed.”
B. “That people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.”
C. “Interests are shaped by the identities of actors.”
D. “Interests are defined in terms of power-political, military, and economic.”
E. “Interests and preferences are open for redefinition”

Neoclassical realism is a synthesis in the sense that it links .......

A. the international system and domestic politics.
B. the state level and the individual level.
C. qualitative methods and quantitative methods.
D. realist theories and liberal theories.
E. international relations theories and foreign policy analysis theories.
Analyze the Constructivist approach in international relations

Foreign policy is an interaction between the actors and their environment, be it domestic or international. In seeking to provide a fuller explanation for foreign policy choice, scholars have had to take account of the boundaries between the state’s internal or domestic environment and the external environment (Alden and Aran, 2017, 3). Hence, there are three levels in it its analyses as: the international level, national or state level and the individual level. The level of analysis was introduced to IR studies by Kenneth Waltz in his book Man, the State and War. Published in 1959, Man, the State and War tries to find the causes of international conflicts. Waltz defines images as human behaviour, internal structure of states and international anarchy. These images coincide to three levels of analysis: individual, state and international levels. Another important contribution to the debate about the level of analysis is David Singer’s article The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations which was published in 1961. The definition of levels in the study of IR was also applied to FPA by the scholars of the discipline.
Foreign Policy Analysis and Theoretical Approaches

Please discuss the levels of analysis in foreign policy

Comparative foreign policy approach has developed through the way Rosenau opened for reaching testable generalisations by cross-national analysis. According to this approach, “events could be compared along behavioural dimensions, such as whether positive or negative effect was being displayed, or what instruments of statecraft (e.g., diplomatic, military, economic, etc.) were used in the influence attempt, or what level of commitment of resources was evident”, and thus, behaviour as disparate as a war, a treaty, and a state visit can be compared and aggregated in a theoretically meaningful fashion (Hudson, 2014, 21). This is because this approach rejects that events are unique. In accordance with this rejection, the comparative foreign policy approach attempts to formulate a foreign policy theory that is scientific in the sense that it can be generalisable. The aim of this attempt is to predict the future foreign policy acts of states. Scholars of this approach believe that “through the use of methods borrowed from natural science, FPA could lead to a general theory.”

Evaluate the asset of the comparative foreign policy approach in international relations

Constructivism in the broadest sense refers to theories that see the world as being socially constructed. Socially constructed world means that the existence of patterns, cause-and-effect relationships, and even states themselves depend on webs of meaning and practices that constitute them (Hurd, 2008, 300). This means that nothing in social life, and accordingly in the international system, is given and exists with the meanings attributed to them. In fact, the international system itself is also socially constructed by the ideas and identities of actors - state or individual. This means that even if the material conditions remain the same, the international system may change if ideas and identities change. There is an interaction between the system and the actors in that sense. Therefore, norms, ideas, beliefs, expectations and interpretations play a defining role in foreign policy formation, states’ behaviours and the structure of the international system according to the constructivist theory.
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Chapter 3

After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

1. Grasp the meaning of foreign policy decision making
2. Identify and assess the processes involved in foreign policy decision making
3. Discuss the contexts, pressures, and constraints with which foreign policy makers have to deal

Chapter Outline

Introduction
- Conceptualizing Foreign Policy Decision-Making
- Rational and Cognitive Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Decision Making
- Models of Foreign Policy Decision Making
- The Process of Decision Making
- Factors Influencing The Process of Decision Making

Key Terms

- Decision Making
- Decision Makers
- Foreign Policy
- Models of Decision Making
- Decision Making Process
INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy, as discussed and explained in previous chapters of this book, can be defined in its broader meaning as the behavior of states in the international system. Thus as can be seen from its broad definition, foreign policy is an area of research that could not be confined to a single approach within the study of International Relations.

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which is just one of the various approaches in International Relations, is the sole one of which the explandum of study is the foreign policy of states. FPA is a level of analysis which emerged as a result of the attempt for explaining the sources and the processes of foreign policy by which foreign policy decisions are designed, determined, and implemented. In this way, foreign policy decision making is a subfield of FPA which approaches to foreign policy as a field of decision making and tries to explain the attitude and behavior of states through the analysis of the process of decision making and factors influencing it.

However it was only in the 1970s that a systematic study on the structure and function of decision making process emerged as a new discipline, though the issues related to foreign policy have long been the focal point of discussion in the history of International Relations. It was thanks to the work of Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1969) that a systematic study of foreign policy decision making was set out. Snyder et. al. put forth path breaking ideas that have challenged the traditional approach to the study of foreign policy.

This chapter attempts to give a comprehensive picture of the study of foreign policy decision making, the processes involved in foreign policy decision making, and the contexts, pressures and constraints which foreign policy makers face.

CONCEPTUALIZING FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING

The foreign policy process is a process of decision making. It refers to the choices of individuals, groups, and coalitions that affect a nation’s actions on the international stage. Thus, foreign policy decision making is the process by which governments analyze existing problems, evaluate policy alternatives, and take appropriate actions to overcome the outstanding issues as well as for the maximization of national interest. In this manner foreign policy decision making explains why the government takes such an action, how the decision is going to work out and what could be the possible alternatives and their consequences.

Hence, the study of foreign policy largely attempts to investigate the structure, approach, and process of decision making. The main difference of the decision making approach from other analyses of foreign policy is its focus on the processes instead of outcomes.

The term decision making is often described as the act or process of making choices. In this line, decision making refers to the process of identifying problems, exploring possible alternatives, and selecting the appropriate strategy to resolve those issues. It is therefore a continuous affair and a complex process. Foreign policy decisions resemble a chess game. As Allison mentioned in his groundbreaking work “The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis” (Allison, 1971), foreign policy has often been compared to moves, sequences of moves, and games of chess. If one were limited to observations on a screen upon which moves in the chess game were registered without information as to how the pieces came to be moved, he would assume that an individual chess player was moving the pieces in terms of strategic plans and tactical maneuvers toward a single goal, namely, winning the game. But a pattern of moves can be imagined which would lead the serious observer after watching several games to consider the hypothesis that the chess player was not a single individual but rather a loose alliance of semi-independent organizations, each of which moved its sets of pieces according to standard operating procedures. (Allison, 1971). The essence of many foreign policy decisions is a decision process taken in an interactive setting and consisting of a sequence of decisions. As in chess, players learn from prior moves. When playing with the same opponent for many years, they also learn from game to game. This can also result in bluffing behavior and attempts to mask signals. Just like in professional chess, many foreign policy decisions are taken under stress of time. (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010: 4-5).
We make decisions every day. Some of these decisions require little thought; some decisions must be made quickly and sometime in uncertain conditions. For example, you do not need to think much on what hour you should leave home for school if you use a school bus or another scheduled transportation. But if you miss your regular drive one morning, this time you have to decide the best way for reaching to school on time. You should identify the alternative ways, evaluate them, and choose the best alternative that fits your situation. In addition, if you have an exam in the morning, the situation under which you have to make your decision becomes more stressful.

Dynamics of foreign policy decision making resembles these everyday decision making dynamics, although the stakes in foreign policy decision making is much higher. Components of foreign policy decision making are:

- identifying the problem,
- searching for alternatives,
- choosing an alternative, and
- executing the alternative.

Foreign policy decisions are not typical, there are different types of decisions depending upon the situation the decisions are made. Mintz identifies five types of decisions; one-shot (single) decisions, interactive decisions, sequential decisions, sequential-interactive decisions, and group decisions (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010: 115-21).

- **One-shot (single) decisions:** these types of decisions are rare in foreign policy decision making because relations related to international relations are sequential in general. However a single decision on a single case can be analyzed as a one-shot decision. For example, although in nature it is sequential, a decision not to join an international treaty can be analyzed as such.

- **Interactive decisions:** are those involving at least two players who make decisions that affect and are affected by the other player's decision. For example, if one state has to decide on an offer, say of a peace agreement, by another state, this is an interactive decision because it affects both its own future and the situation of the other state.

- **Sequential decisions:** involve a series of interrelated decisions, such as whether to intervene in Syria; increase or decrease troop levels; whether to withdraw or to stay; and, finally, when the operation should end.

- **Foreign policy decisions are mostly sequential interactive decisions:** they are on one hand sequential but on the other interactive for they involve at least two actors that are affected by the decision.

- **Foreign policy decisions are mostly group decisions.** Foreign policy making is never in the hands of a single leader no matter how s/he is powerful and influential. Foreign policy decisions always involve group dynamics ranging from small to larger ones (Hudson, 2007: 65).

Another possible, and say more plain and simple, classification of the types of foreign policy decisions can be made by grouping decisions as macro, micro, and crisis decisions.

**Macro decisions** occur in an anticipated manner, they are not responses to sudden and unexpected situations, they are made in a relatively long time frame and the decision making process in which these decisions are taken include a large variety of domestic political actors. For example, the reevaluation of the relations with a country and/or a region, the level of defense spending, the policy towards nuclear armament etc. can be labeled as macro foreign policy decisions (Pearson and Rochester, 1992: 201).

**Micro decisions** are also called administrative decisions and take an enormous place within foreign policy decisions. These decisions are narrow in scope, include a low threat, and handled at lower levels of foreign policy bureaucracy. Examples are, authorization of a visa, responding a request coming from an embassy, arrangements for hosting foreign missions, and so forth. Micro decisions are supposed to be depending upon macro decisions, for instance, when the relations of two countries spoil the routine visa policies and arrangements which are part of micro decision would change depending on the reversal of bilateral relations.
Crisis decisions are made in situations which include a high degree of threat, a high level of time pressure, and a very small group of decision actors consisting mainly of only high level decision makers. In other words, crisis situations entail a sufficiently serious problem to command the intense, sustained attention of the top level leadership within a finite time frame (Pearson and Rochester, 1992: 203). One of the most studied crises in the literature of crisis decision making is the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 between the USA and the Soviet Union.

As one of the most and best studied foreign policy crisis and crisis decision making case, The Cuban Missile Crisis has also been subject to movies. An American movie named Thirteen Days is dramatizing the Cuban missile crisis seen from the perspective of the US political leadership. The movie is based on the book "The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis" and can support to your understanding of crisis decision making.

RATIONAL AND COGNITIVE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

Traditional understandings of foreign policy analyses proceed from the rational actor assumption. This assumption is derived originally from microeconomics. It is assumed that decision makers are rational actors and make the best choice among its alternatives. The actor is not only predicated as acting rationally but also as having complete information. However, situations in foreign policy are characterized by risk, uncertainty, and incomplete information (Snyder, Bruck, Sapin, 1969: 110), therefore it is not possible to claim that foreign policy decision makers act in a purely rational manner. At best, it could be said foreign policy decision makers operate within the framework of the information available to them and make decisions on that limited basis. Moreover, decision makers are also subject to other influences, such as their perceptions, pre-existing beliefs or prejudices and cognitive limitations on handling information (Alden and Amnon, 2017: 25).

The rationality assumption of traditional approaches to the study of foreign policy had been challenged by the cognitive turn that began in psychology and later penetrated into foreign policy analyses. The cognitive revolution in psychology showed the limits of the rationality assumption. Cognitive psychology revealed at first that decision makers make their decisions based on their perceptions which are influenced by the information they acquire, their existing beliefs, targets, and bureaucratic roles.
The implication of the psychological approach to foreign policy analyses began with studies on individual leaders. At this point Harold and Margaret Sprout’s seminal work “Man – Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics” (Sprout and Sprout, 1956) played an important role in opening the way for critiques of the rational approach to foreign policy analyses. Sprouts examined the environment within which foreign policy decisions are taken by distinguishing the operational and psychological environment. While the operational environment was posited as the objective reality, the psychological environment was held as subjective since it is supposed to be under the influence of perpetual biases and cognitive stimuli. With this division between the operational and psychological environments, it became possible to study the inner lives of individual decision makers.

The work of Sprouts later was developed by the works of Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin which emphasized the centrality of decision makers in foreign policy decision making process. Following these studies, perception and cognition became a critical resource for understanding the dynamics of decision making (Alden and Amnon, 2017: 25). One of the most influential works on the impact of perception in the decision making process was set forth by Robert Jervis in “Perception and Misperception in International Politics”. In his book, Jervis states that foreign policy decision maker’s base on their perceptions rather than their operational environment and examines the dynamics that influence the perceptions of decision makers. Jervis’ and other following studies which were based on the perception assumption suggest that the perceptions of individual decision makers are influenced by a set of dynamics like their belief systems, individual characteristics, and past experiences; hence studies individually began to focus on each of these dynamics (Holsti, 1989: 83-97; Jervis, 1989: 75-82; Voss and Dorsey, 1992: 3-22). For example, belief systems were defined as the sum of beliefs and images of an individual through which s/he perceives the world, and various methods were developed in order to examine these belief systems to reveal their impact of perception. Operational code analyses, content analyses, and cognitive mapping are some of these methods.

The same human psychological and cognitive limitations which challenge the rational actor model of decision making apply also to groups. Irving L. Janis, in his seminal work Victims of Groupthink based on a motivational approach, shows convincingly that the motivation to maintain group consensus and personal acceptance to the group cause deterioration of the decision making process. In Janis’s words, decision makers suffer from “groupthink” (Janis, 1982). According to Janis groupthink is a process which causes symptoms that can lead to risky and/or irrational decisions. Janis, defines eight symptoms under three categories. The first category of symptoms stem from overconfidence in the group’s power and merit. The illusion on the group’s invulnerability can cause excessive optimism which in turn leads to hazardous decisions. The second category of symptoms is about collective rationalization which leads to ignorance of existing and new information about the situation at hand and could result in irrational decisions. The third category consists of symptoms that compel the group members to consensus (Janis, 1989: 97-107).

With the evolvement of psychological – cognitive approaches, the rationality assumption in studies of decision making has lost its acclaim, and rational decision making has been suggested to be almost impossible. Moreover, it is suggested that attempting to be rational in foreign policy decision making is itself irrational because the time, energy and money needed for such an attempt would cause an unbearable cost. However the general tendency in terms of rationality is to take rationality as “bounded” and this approach to rationality is mainly the result of a number of new approaches that emerged in an attempt to synthesize the insights of the rationality assumption and the opposing views.

Bounded rationality was first suggested by an economist, Herbert Simon--who suggested that decision makers satisfice rather than maximize. Simon suggested that if rationality is a need in the process of decision making, it could be found within the context of partial information and other limitations placed on decisions. In other words, decision makers act rationally but within the limited context of alternatives.

Another valuable effort to bridge the gap between rational and cognitive approaches is the “poliheuristic theory” developed by Alex Mintz. Poliheuristic theory postulates a two-stage decision process. During the first stage, the set of possible options is reduced by applying a “non-compensatory principle” to eliminate
any alternative with an unacceptable return on a political decision dimension (Mintz, 2004). The non-compensatory principle eliminates non-rational elements, and brings politically possible considerations on the fore. Once the choice set has been reduced to alternatives that are acceptable to the decision maker, the process moves to a second stage during which the decision maker uses more analytic processing in an attempt to minimize risks and maximize benefits.

It is clear from the above explanation that a purely rational account of foreign policy decision making is not strong enough to meet the criticisms levelled against it. A decision maker could be a rational person individually, but when factors of individual characteristics and the psychological environment, like their roles as a group member, their perceptions, past experiences and beliefs are ascribed, it is not possible to expect them to act purely rational.

MODELS OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

Decision making is a complex and ever changing process. It is possible to divide decision making models as models of rationality and models of non-rationality (not irrationality). However, since models of non-rationality base their analyses on different units of analysis, thus vary in their scope and analysis, it is more useful to follow Allison’s division. Graham T. Allison has divided the decision making style into three different models based on the structure and function of the decision making unit. These are The Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Process Model (OPM), and Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM).

The Rational Actor Model (RAM)

As Allison mentioned, the trademark of the RAM is “the attempt to explain international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments” (Allison, 1971:10). It is possible in terms of the RAM because it assumes the decision maker as rational; hence they choose the right options to achieve their goal by analyzing all possible alternatives and its consequences without any bias or other emotional influences.

When faced with a decision making situation, rational actors within the framework of RAM follow a process with certain stages. They;

1. define the situation basing on objective assessment,
2. specify the goal to be achieved and if there is conflict among them prioritize the goal
3. consider all possible alternative means of achieving the goal,
4. select the final alternative that is calculated to maximize achievement of the goal,
5. take the necessary actions to implement the decision.

While this model clearly resembles a chess game strategy, it should also be noted that it is a type of “ideal model” not possible in the real world to be fully conformed. As discussed above in the rationality discussion viewing the world in a totally objective, unbiased manner is not possible for any individual. Or, on the other hand, how many decision makers have the time needed to ponder all conceivable options, say in a foreign policy crisis situation? Another feature of the RAM is that the only actor in the foreign policy decision making process is the state. There is no place for non-state actors.
actors like non-governmental organizations, pressure or interest groups, terror organizations or other such organizations because otherwise it would be against the logic of rationality assumption as it could influence the process and finally the decision.

There are some other approaches, such as the game theory models, the expected utility model, or the synthesis models like poliheuristic theory which also assumes rationality in decision making. The rational actor model is still attractive because it is simpler and has relatively more predictive power. It places relatively few informational demands on the observer to explain and predict a wide variety of decisions.

**Game Theory is built on the rational actor assumption. A brief explanation of two primary games could be useful to grasp the logic underlying the rational actor assumption** (Mintz and DeRouen, 2010: 64-66).

The most common game is the **Prisoner’s Dilemma**. In this scenario, two suspects are arrested on suspicion of carrying out a serious crime. The suspects are interrogated separately. They each have one choice. They can accept a plea bargain deal offered by the police. This deal would mean testifying against the other suspect. Or they can refuse the deal and stay loyal to their partner. Staying loyal to the partner might be costly because there is no guarantee the partner will reciprocate.

Neither suspect knows what the other is doing. They cannot communicate before making their decision. Because the players do not know what the other is doing, they will choose the best outcome regardless of what the other player does. The result is that each will choose to take the plea bargain. This is known as minimax behavior. Each player is acting to avoid the worst outcome that could result from the other player’s actions.

Because each takes the deal, the police do not need to offer a generous deal to either. If the players could have communicated, they could have agreed not to take the deal, and both would have done better because there would have been no testimony to link either to any serious crime.

The **Chicken Game** is commonly used to depict strategic and rational behavior. The popular narrative for this game is as follows. Two drivers are facing each other in cars. They will drive toward each other head-on, and whoever swerves is the loser. If they both swerve, they each lose but avoid the worst outcome of a head-on crash. If only one driver swerves, he loses relatively more than if both had swerved. The driver who does not swerve in that situation would be the winner. So the payoff structure is ranked as: winner (other driver swerves), survivor (both swerve), sucker (other driver wins), and crash (neither swerve).

Chicken game is more complicated than Prisoner’s Dilemma. Although it would seem that swerving is the right thing to do, if the player wants to win, he could risk thinking the other player would choose the rational alternative of swerving. To win at Chicken, a player must signal that he is willing to pay any cost to avoid losing.

**The Organizational Process Model (OPM)**

The organizational process model is one of two new decision-making approaches introduced by Allison in his groundbreaking book (Allison, 1971). According to this model, the national government is not a unitary actor like assumed in the RAM, it is also not comprised of individual decision makers. Instead, it is, as Allison describes, “a constellation of loosely allied organizations on top of which leaders sit” (Allison, 1971: 79). Each organizational unit of the government has special function responsibilities. For example while diplomacy is the task of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense deals with defense issues. However, no single unit has exclusive authority to deal with any important foreign policy issue, they need coordination. Governments consider foreign policy matters through and from organizational perspectives. Each organization has its own previously set “standard operating procedures”. Standard operating procedures are the key element for the organizational process and in case of decision making each organization operates its own procedures in order to produce the alternatives among which decision makers make their choices. Accordingly, foreign policy decisions are organizational outputs that emerge as a result of the standard operating procedures. These organizational outputs prepare the first step by defining the problem and provide the information needed before transferring it to the decision maker.
At this point an important factor is that while organizations prepare their organizational outputs they mainly base on organizational interests rather than the national interest. It therefore can often be in conflict with the expectations of the decision maker. Furthermore, organizations and standard operating procedures do not change significantly over time, they rather adapt slowly and incrementally over time. This is troubling for decision makers because they sometimes encounter foreign policy problems that do not correspond to preexisting operating procedures of organizations (Allison 1971: 87–91). Finally, according to this model, the decision making process continue invariably regardless of who the top decision maker is.

Allison uses the Cuban missile crisis as a case study in order to reveal the impact of the standard organizational procedures in foreign policy decision making. Allison suggested that the deficiency of the Soviets in hiding the missiles they were installing in Cuba was a result of standard operating procedures. Before that time Soviets had installed similar missiles but since they were installed in the USSR there was no need to camouflage or deploy radars. That is to say, by the time Soviets, attempted to install missiles in Cuba, there were no standard operating procedures directing such measures. In fact this resulted in a tragic failure for Soviet foreign policy.

The explanatory power of OPM proved to be limited, particularly in relation to change and innovation. Critics in the end claimed that it was not clear whether the OPM was separate from the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM), and eventually the OPM was merged into BPM.

Allison’s third model is the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM), in which decision making is a product of political bargaining of bureaucrats and government officials. Allison stated that the main actors of the decision making process are individual players who act not only according to strategic aims but also to various national, organizational, and even individual interests.

According to the broad definition, bureaucracy is any large-scale organization of appointed officials whose primary function is to implement the policies of the decision makers. However the role of bureaucracy goes far beyond implementation of policies and influences the policy formulation process by itself. Therefore, the bureaucracy remains one of the key actors involved in the making of foreign policy.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM)

While there is consensus on national interests in general, individual interests can only have an influence on individuals whose individual characteristics are open to such influences. Organizational interests, on the other hand, often may not coincide with the ‘national interest’, and in fact, because each bureaucracy manipulates foreign policy in the direction that corresponds to its particular interests, bureaucratic considerations may override the national interest (Allison, 1971: 144-184). After all bureaucrats holding various significant positions are competing with each other to optimize their organizational goals because all departments of the government want to achieve greater influence within the government, greater autonomy, capabilities and resources. In such, bureaucrats of the government engage in bargaining with the government to maximize their organizational interests using various bureaucratic channels and as a result decisions are taken by “pulling and hauling” rather than rational choice.
The phrase mostly cited as Mil’s Law “Where you stand depends on where you sit” explains the core of the arguments of the BPM, meaning that actors or players (here bureaucrats) prefer solutions that serve their organizations power, notwithstanding the national interest.

For example in a crisis situation, each governmental body would evaluate the situation according to its own interests. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would prefer diplomatic negotiation, the government would prefer military action in order to show its power both to the internal and external environment, on the other hand the Military would prefer limited attack if there is a risk of loss, because this would cause to the weakening of the military in country politics.

With this line of approach, the BPM “focuses primarily on the political processes internal to each state” within the framework of foreign policy making because in this model foreign policy is portrayed as the unintended result of a political bargaining process. In this manner, the main question of analyses in BPM is not about why a state acted as X, but rather why did X happen? (Alden and Amnon, 2017: 47).

The BPM rests actually on individuals in its analysis but individual characteristics and thus individual interests are subordinated to their bureaucratic roles. This is the most criticized aspect of the BPM and at this end it resembles to the RAM because both approaches overlook the influence of individual characteristics of decision makers acting in the decision making mechanism. As Hollis and Smith mentioned, if this were the case, a computer uploaded with necessary data could achieve the task of the decision maker (Hollis and Smith, 1991: 150-155).

Allison uses the Cuban Missile Crisis once more as a case study, this time to explain the BPM and shows that the crisis was a long process of debate and arguments before the President could push up a decision as to how to deal with the missiles.

**THE PROCESS OF DECISION MAKING**

Foreign policy decision making is a complex process which involves all sorts of resources and passes through various stages. Beginning from the problem identification, we can identify four main stages of foreign policy decision making.

**Identification of the Problem: Perception, Images, and Information**

Decision makers do not find the problems or opportunities out there; problems/opportunities should be recognized by them. Before a problem is identified by the decision maker, three stages appear; first a stimulus from the environment should be received, then this stimulus should be perceived, and finally this perceived stimulus should be interpreted as a foreign policy problem/opportunity.

This stage is very important because, if the problem is recognized appropriately then suitable measures can be taken to prevent it, but if being failed in this stage, the national security and future aspiration can be endangered. However there are some facts that can ruin the process of problem identification, most important of which are images and misperception.

Images serve as filters for decision makers because they are representations of the world for the decision maker. They are useful in that they help decision makers to filter the unbounded information that come from various channels. Images in this manner guide the decision maker on which information s/he should focus on and which they should ignore. However, because images are not always the real representations of the world, they could be highly resistant to new information and can cause selective interpretation and even ignorance of useful information. In this sense, images are the main cause of misperception which prevents appropriate recognition of the problem. Misperception occurs when the decision maker is to not change his/her views in the face of new/conflicting information. The most common type of misperception in the making of foreign policy is “wishful thinking”, which means interpreting existing information as the decision maker would like them to be, as opposed to what they really are.
One of the best examples of “wishful thinking” can be found in the history of the Second World War. Before the outbreak of the war, European leaders were so strongly hoping to avoid war with Germany that they easily were persuaded by the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who after the Munich Conference (1938) promised Europe peace believing that Hitler was appeased by the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. However, actually there was little, if any, signs coming from Germany suggesting that Hitler would be contended with this concession (Russet and Starr, 1992: 275-276).

Interpretation, Determination and Evaluation of Alternatives

The perceived information at this stage would be interpreted by the decision maker in order to define the situation and to determine the alternative options.

The process of interpretation is open to be influenced by the decision maker’s personal beliefs and past experiences. However, the decision maker at this stage would need more information in order to interpret and define the situation at hand. This additional information would be provided by the bureaucracy who would filter it through its own organizational interests as mentioned previously. This, under certain conditions, can cause misinterpretation of the situation which is not a rare case in terms of foreign policy decision making.

An example can be found in the history of Turkish foreign policy. After Turkey conducted a military operation to Cyprus in 1974, the US Congress proposed an arms embargo against Turkey. Although the US administration, especially President Gerald Ford and the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were against this proposition and tried hard to prevent the Congress from taking this decision, the Congress eventually won the struggle between the legislature and executive and the embargo decision was taken on the 5th February, 1975. While these political maneuvers took place in the US, and various signs for the coming of the embargo were sent (e.g. the US abruptly doubled the military aid it was given to Turkey), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believing in Kissinger’s personal effort to prevent the decision of the embargo ignored all the coming information about it and thus did not warn the government which was itself struggling with political instability. As a result, the government misinterpreted the situation and realized the seriousness of the attempt when there was no chance to recourse (Birand, 1980).

After the decision maker interprets and defines the situation, s/he should determine the alternative options. The main constrains of generating alternatives are time and resources. Especially in crisis situations decision makers get less time to generate more policy options.

The next step is to evaluate the alternatives. Each of the options has to be evaluated thoroughly in terms of costs and benefits along with its contribution to the foreign policy objective, and related future consequences have also to be taken into account.

Selection of the Best Option

After the evaluation of alternatives, the next stage is the selection of the best available option. It is the crucial stage because if the policy selection is biased or wrong, the very purpose of goal optimization will suffer. However, it should also be noted that the overall tendency in selection is choosing the “satisfying” not the “maximizing” alternative, contrary to the suggestions of the RAM (Pearson and Rochester, 1992: 220).

If decision making is going through the organizational process, then another tendency that would appear is choosing the “less risky” alternative. Because while a decision maker could take risky decisions individually if his personality is open to such attitude, a group would tend towards the “moderate” alternative (Pearson and Rochester, 1992: 220-221).

At this stage the decision maker will certainly take into account its political concerns. Unlike the bureaucracy, political concerns are important for decision makers whose existence as decision maker is dependent upon its electoral capacity, of course in democratic systems. Most of governments could assume their reelection as a national interest and would avoid taking decisions that will be received badly by the public (Halperin and Kanter, 1992: 404-405).
We can observe many cases as examples of foreign policy decisions that have been taken by prioritizing political concerns over national interests. However, this certainly does not mean that all foreign policy decisions are taken dependent on domestic political concerns, rather when vital interests are at stake, governments can take confronting decisions without hesitation.

An example can be found in Turkish foreign policy regarding Turkey's relations with the European Union (EU) and Greece. Turkey and Greece followed same courses in their relationship with the EU since their first contact with the organization. Moreover, Turkey and Greece pursued same policies and courses towards all European organizations which were established after the end of the Second World War. They applied at the same time to the Council of Europe, OECD, NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC) memberships. When Greece declared that it would apply for full membership to the EEC in 1975, three policy options appeared for Turkey. The first option was to prevent Greece having being accepted for full membership. However, this option was not achievable, thus not rational due to Turkey's relations with the community after Turkey's Cyprus intervention. The second option was following Greece's course and applying immediately for full membership. Taking into account the political situation of the Cold War and Turkey's position as one of the main barrier along with Greece against Soviet threat, it was clear that this was the most rational option for Turkey. Just as in the past, the Community could not exclude Turkey while accepting Greece, with regard to Cold War security concerns. The last option was a “wait and see” policy which the then government preferred to choose because of domestic political concerns. In this period, the government consisted of the Nationalist Front coalition and Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel declared clearly that in order to provide the survival of the coalition he would not take a decision that would offend its coalition partner (the National Salvation Party) which was pursuing policies against membership to the EEC. As a result of this decision, Turkey remained outside the community while Greece gained full membership and thus consolidated its position in terms of foreign policy (Erhan and Arat, 2001: 849).

Implementation of the Decision

After the policy option has been chosen, the decision maker usually distributes the decisions among the associated departments and agencies for its practical implementation. The decision should reach all related bodies and they should be well informed. For an efficient interpretation, no communication gap should be allowed. Misperception and/or misinterpretation can be influential also at this stage, and this in fact can cause to the pulling of the decision from its essence.

Actors who are assigned to implement the decision can interpret the decision through their own perspective, which would also cause difference between the decision and the implemented policy. Especially when it comes to macro decisions, it is known that high level decision makers prepare only the main framework of the decision and details are left to the bureaucracy mechanism. Therefore it is quite possible that the implementation falls distant from the ground of the decision (Nicholson, 1992: 56).

In terms of implementation, it is also important to observe the results of implementation in order to see whether the decision was sound or not. At this point operating a feed-back mechanism will be important. If the feedback obtained from both the external and internal environment is positive, this will encourage the continuation of the chosen policy, but if the feedback is negative, it shows that the implementation deviated from the ground of the decision and that it needs a reevaluation or be ceased in support of another option.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Soviet President Khrushchev proposed the US side to dismantle the Jupiter missiles from Turkey, if they wanted the Soviets to remove the missiles from Cuba, the US President Kennedy realized that although he decided and ordered twice the removal of the missiles from Turkey, his decision was not implemented. Kennedy ordered in 1961 the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkish soil since they were agitating the Soviet side. US Foreign Secretary Dean Rusk met with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Selim Sarper at the NATO Summit in Oslo, in May 1962 and conveyed this decision. However, the Turkish Minister refused to discuss this offer and therefore the decision could not put into practice. In 1962, President Kennedy issued the National Security Memorandum and this time sent Under Secretary George Ball to the Turkish Ambassador to US to discuss the issue. The Turkish Ambassador refused this offer on the ground that it would offend Turkish public. After these two fruitless attempts, the decision and order of the President was put aside and Kennedy realized only at the time of the crisis that his decision had not been implemented (Gerger, 1998: 101; Pearson and Rochester, 1992: 221-222).

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PROCESS OF DECISION MAKING

Foreign Policy decision making is a complex and multidimensional process, as mentioned previously, there are many actors, agents, and institutions involved in this process. The factors influencing the process are generally categorized as the external or global environment, societal environment, the governmental setting, the roles occupied by policy-makers, and the individual characteristics of the policy-making elites (Rosenau, 1996: 183). In this part, the factors influencing the decision making process is divided into two broad categories which in fact also cover the aspects of the mentioned five categories.

The External Environment

The external environment is the physical environment outside the borders of a state (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1969: 203). In this manner, the external environment consist of other states, all types of international organizations, and the alliance system which they are attached to. In addition to this, states should also take into account the international public opinion which in fact has influence, at least through feedback on their foreign policies. In short, at the present time, states are interrelated and even interdependent in all aspects from political to economic and social aspects and therefore should take into account all these relationships when determining a foreign policy course.

External factors influencing a state’s foreign policies can be explained under two dimensions; actor centered factors and systemic factors.

Actor based influences are direct reactions coming from other states towards the chosen foreign policy course. They are important in that if a state miscalculates the expected reaction of a third country, this can cause in a failure of the policy. For example, if a state decides to intervene in another countries crisis militarily, it should take into account the reactions of neighboring countries along with other systemic dynamics. If other neighboring countries unexpectedly decide to intervene to take side with the country being intervened, this will result in a misstep for it.

Systemic factors are divided as structural and non-structural factors. The structure of the system determines and sometimes limits the foreign policy options of states. Based on the structure of the international system, the effect of structural factors change according to whether the system is bipolar, multi polar, or global. For example on bipolar systems, states are attached to one of the blocks and their foreign policy must be formulated in the verge of the main values and principles of the block they belong to. Non-structural factors are changes in big power relations, increases in the bargaining capability of weaker states, and changes in international norms.
In terms of the external environment, change is an important factor. The external environment is changeable and thus unpredictable. For the decision maker, the important factors of the external environment are what s/he perceives as important. For example, while a local revolt in South Africa in the year 1900 did not interest the US as a primary foreign policy issue, relations with South Africa became a critical issue in 1950s, as it was tackling with racial issues in its own country and also because South Africa had a strong anticomunist stance, and its location on the Cape sea route and its reserves of minerals were crucial for the US at the time.

Rosenau explained the effect of change in the external environment by comparing it to the internal environment. Accordingly, if change is small in the internal setting while there occurs a big change in the external environment, the situation will get so hard that the bureaucratic mechanism could not deal with it by itself and will need high level decision makers to decide on the issue. When change is bigger in the internal setting than the external one than, decision makers will try to influence the external environment in order to get their approval. In 1930s, German diplomats and even military officials made hard effort to justify the fundamental change of Germany's economic and political order (Rosenau, 1972: 160-162).

The Internal Environment

Although foreign policy is the engagement with the external environment, it is designed, formulated, and processed in the internal environment. The internal environment covers the whole political system with political parties, interest and pressure groups, and public opinion. However the internal environment is much more important as it is the setting which determines the decision unit that takes the decisions.

The Structure of the Government

The institutional structure of government is an important dynamic determining the decision making process. However, foreign policy is the task of the executive in every country regardless of the political system. Thus, the decision unit will be the governmental body in which the executive power is vested. In this manner we can mention presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems. In presidential system, the executive power is vested in the president, in semi-presidential systems, the executive power is shared between the president and the prime minister, and finally in parliamentary systems, the main executive power is vested in the prime minister. Then, in terms of foreign policy making the primary decision unit is the executive be it the president, prime minister, or both.

The legislature has also an impact on the foreign policy decision making process, mainly in terms of checking but it is more limited when compared to its impact on domestic politics. This can vary from country to country and according to the constitutional setting, but in general, parliaments serve as confirming bodies rather than formulating ones. While the parliaments have the power to refuse, governments prefer to consult their decisions with them (Frankel, 1963: 25-26). In regard with the checking task of the parliament, it cannot be said that the parliament as a totality checks the decisions and policies of the executive, rather it is more common that the opposition commit itself to check the activities of the government. In this way, the checking power of the parliament in terms of foreign policy is reduced to the opposition part which constitutes the minority in the parliament. Therefore, it can be said that parliaments can only be braking mechanism with regard to foreign policy, and the success of the parliament in this manner can be measured by the success of the parliament in bringing foreign policy issues in front of the parliament for discussion. However, at this point, it should also be mentioned that foreign policy in general is limited to be discussed because the “national interest” phenomenon is clipping the wings of the opposition (Soysal, 1964: 258-269).

Foreign policy is then in the hands of the executive, in other words in the hands of the head of the government. At this point, one of the main actors along with the head of the government is the minister of
Foreign ministers are selected generally by the head of the government among individuals with whom s/he prefers to work together. In this manner, figures outside the foreign policy mechanism can be assigned as Foreign Ministers. However, the role of Foreign Ministers in making foreign policy has been reduced in the contemporary world, thus they lost their role as decision makers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the ministry under his/her governing are implementers, not decision makers any more. Of course, there are exceptions to the rule and in some cases Foreign Ministers can play the role of the main actor making the foreign policy in relation with their interest and experience in foreign policy and their individual power within the government. Such Foreign Ministers can formulate the overall framework of the foreign policy and thus can play the role as a main decision maker.

For example Ahmet Davutoğlu, as minister of foreign affairs (2009-2014) and later as prime minister (2014-2016), was considered as the architect of Turkey’s foreign policy. Davutoğlu himself formulated the overall framework of the foreign policy basing on his strategic depth doctrine which had been proposed in his book entitled Strategic Depth (2001). Throughout the years when Davutoğlu was in office, the foreign policy of the government was guided by Davutoğlu’s formulation and even when mentioning Turkey’s foreign policy it was called as Davutoğlu’s foreign policy. While as a prime minister, this was the normal course of events, he had the same impact also as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-2014).

Another very influential figure is Henry Kissinger, who guided US foreign policy as both Secretary of State and head of the National Security Council from 1969 to 1977 and even through his various published work. When Kissinger was afforded the chance to develop a new international framework for American foreign policy, he aimed to construct a new world order based on a realpolitik strategy. As the architect of US foreign policy, he emphasized the dominance of national interest against international liberalism. In the year 1973 Kissinger won the Nobel Peace Prize for negotiating a cease-fire in Vietnam.

The Bureaucracy

Decision makers in every state work within a bureaucracy mechanism and are heavily influenced by the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy in foreign policy is a reflection of the need for expertise and is organized to provide the gathering of information, its interpretation, and the transmission of it to the right people at the right time (Wendzel, 1981: 423).

As discussed previously in this chapter (see page … 4. The implementation of the decision), bureaucracies influence foreign policy mostly through their filtering of the information. Decision makers depend on the information provided by the bureaucracy, and what they receive as information is what the bureaucracy chooses to pass on. In addition to providing information, bureaucracies influence foreign policy by recommending options to decision makers. They narrow the range of options available to decision makers by presenting to them only those options that the bureaucratic organization favors. However, it would not be fair to think that decisions are made not by the leader himself but the bureaucracy because the information and even policy options received by the decision maker are oriented in general. In fact, the decision maker receives information, though oriented by various channels, and it can be claimed that this provide the leader with a broader point of view (Jervis and Art, 1992: 394). Finally, implementation is another powerful bureaucratic tool influencing foreign policy decision making which can have the effect of changing the direction of the main goal of the policy implemented.

Public Opinion

Public opinion influences foreign policy to some extent. Even in democracies, the public usually plays only a limited role in determining foreign policy. The main reason for the public’s limited role is that few citizens have sufficient information about and pay much attention to foreign policy. The public opinion in
terms of foreign policy is divided into three categories; people, attentive people, and opinion leaders. Passive people are masses who are not interested in foreign policy and approach it emotionally. The attentive public is a minor group among the masses who are interested in foreign policy and have sufficient knowledge about it. Opinion leaders, on the other hand, are a very small group who has not only knowledge about foreign policy but also has the ability to influence, guide, and reflect the opinion of the public. They can be politicians, business leaders, community leaders, journalists, educators, even celebrities, and sports stars.

Although the public is not efficient determiner in foreign policy, they hold a view about the overall principles of the country's foreign policy, and therefore decision makers have to take their sensitivities into account in certain situations. For example in the present time, not any Greek or Turkish government can decide on a policy which is supporting the other party's thesis in regard with the Cyprus issue unless they persuade the public for such a new policy.

In certain situations, when the public is more attentive to the situation hand, decision makers take them into account, and this in fact influences the decision. In addition, public opinion for decision makers in democratic countries is a legitimizing factor of their policies. Leaders also wary of the negative influences they could face in the next election if they ignore the public. Moreover, decision makers believe that if the chosen policy is supported by the public, the possibility of its success will increase (Rourke, 2008: 89).

**Interest Groups**

Interest groups are private associations of people who have similar policy views and who pressure the government to adopt those views as policy. Traditionally, interest groups were generally less influential on foreign policy than on domestic policy issues; however they are becoming a more important part of the foreign policy-making process especially in democratic countries.

One type of interest groups is cultural groups which consist of people bound in terms of religious beliefs, ideological goals or cultural demands. Economic groups are another prominent form of interest activity. As international trade increases, they try to influence their governments for support of their interests in other countries. Issue-oriented groups make up another category of interest. Groups of this type are not based on any narrow socioeconomic category such as ethnicity or economics. Instead, they draw their membership from people who have a common policy goal (Rourke, 2008: 87).

Interest groups have no formal policy-making authority, and must rely on those people within the government who do have such authority to translate their policy preferences into decisional outputs. As a result, the central considerations for interest groups are to find out where and when decisions are to be made and then to select the appropriate strategy for effectively communicating with policy-makers. In that, interest groups use strategies which can be grouped under the two headings of “direct” and “indirect” attempts to influence policy decisions (Trice, 1978: 238).

Indirect strategies are those by which an interest group attempts to use other nongovernmental actors or elements, such as public opinion, in its political environment in order to influence policy decisions. Other nongovernmental groups, the mass media, and public opinion can be used by interest groups to exert indirect influence.

Direct influence strategies are aimed at policy-makers. However, a large number of empirical studies show us that the ability of interest groups to affect policy decisions through the use of direct influence strategies is tenuous (Trice, 1978:239).
The Leader

The decision maker or leader is the most important part of the decision making process, in fact, the leader is the one who makes the last choice and thus the decision. However, the personality of the leader does not influence the decision making process directly. Such direct influences might be seen in crisis situations where great social and political changes occur or in political systems where decision making is not a part of a developed bureaucratic mechanism, namely when it is totally in the hands of the leader. Apart from such situations, the leader influences the decision making process indirectly depending upon a number of conditions like the interest and knowledge of the decision maker on the issue at hand. Accordingly, the more the interest and knowledge of the decision maker on the issue the less his/her personality will have influence on it. In other words, if the decision maker has sufficient knowledge on the issue s/he will not base its decision on the criteria rooted in his/her personality. If the decision maker has knowledge on problem solving strategies and can relate the issue with other subjects through a historical approach, if s/he is intellectually profound and prescient personal characteristics will less influential in the process. In addition, when the decision maker feels himself/herself responsible for the decision, s/he probably might appeal to more rational decision making criteria (Verba, 1969: 221-222).

In another aspect, the structure of the problem and the situation are also determining the extent of the influence of the decision makers’ personality. In crisis situations, personal characteristics might become more prominent because of the time pressure, stress, and lack of information involved in.

Finally the personality of the leader is also an important factor. If the decision maker has a personality which shows narcissistic traits with the tendency to focus on their own thoughts and feelings to arrive at their own judgments independent of those of others, it is highly possible that the decision will be a product of the leaders’ personality directly.

However in foreign policy decision making, direct influences of personality is quite rare and what is more common is the indirect influence of the personality of the leader through his/her belief system. The belief system of an individual is the sum of his/her images of the past, present, and future. One of the essential components of the belief system is values which mean the preference of a specific part of reality over another. In this manner, values refer not to the actual reality but to the belief of what the reality ought to be. Belief on the other hand is an acceptance of one special definition of reality as true. Values and beliefs are different from each other. Beliefs are contextual, they arise from learned experiences, resulting from the cultural and environmental situations we face. Values on the other hand transcend contexts because they are based on what is important to us. For example, a leader can believe that from the economic point of view the communist system is better than capitalism while s/he at the same time can believe that capitalism is the best system in terms of individual freedom. A decision maker with such a belief should decide according to his/her values on whether economic development or individual freedom is more important (Jones, 1996: 223). Belief systems serve for decision makers as filters during the decision making process which emerge out of the relationship between information and images. When the information received by the decision maker contradict with his/her beliefs, s/he might accept the new information or refuse it in order to maintain his/her existing beliefs. However studies on this issue up to the present show us that beliefs and values tend not to change before new information (Jones, 1996: 224).

Foreign policy decision makers are individuals settled in governments thus in the bureaucracy mechanism. Therefore, their information processing as a part of the whole decision making process is also influenced by the bureaucratic roles decision makers possess. Role can be defined as the responsibilities that stem from the bureaucratic position. Bureaucratic roles determine the model of action of the decision maker, which influence their actual decision-making behavior. Thus it gets the decision maker acting according to organizational concerns even if they contradict with the past and existing beliefs of the decision maker. In such manner, a bureaucrat supporting the idea to reduce the defense expenditures while working at the Ministry of Finance might support the increasing of them when he becomes a high level decision maker. As an example Turgut Özal, the 8th President of Turkey, was one of the main figures who were strongly against Turkey’s membership to the European Union (then European Economic
Community) as a bureaucrat and later the Secretariat of the State Planning Organization during 1966-1977. However, when he became Prime Minister, one of his main foreign policy decision was applying to the Union for Turkey's full membership in 1987.

The political culture of a decision maker is also a factor influencing the decision making process. The influences of political culture on foreign policy decision making are divided as direct and indirect influences. Direct influence of political culture operates through shaping the perceptions of the decision maker, and in that reflects itself in the images, regarding his/her country. Political culture, by shaping the decision makers images determines how the decision maker defines national interest, security and peace, and all other related phenomenon of foreign policy. While political culture is one of the main determinants of the decision making environment, this can be seen as an indirect effect of political culture on the decision making mechanism. Thus while the direct effects are with regard to the psychological environment of the decision maker, indirect effect are related to the instrumental environment (Berman, 1998: 6-7). After all, direct or indirect political culture has a critical influence on foreign policy decisions by shaping the images of decision makers regarding his/her own country and the others and by guiding them in how to behave in similar situations.

Analyze the Factors Influencing the Process of Decision Making
Everyday we make decisions in the sense that we explore alternatives and choose the one that is the most appropriate one in a given time and condition. Likewise, foreign policies of states also function through a set of decisions. The aim of foreign policy decision making is the maximization of national interest in the international arena, where states face problems, challenges, and crises. The process of foreign policy decision making therefore includes identification of the issues, evaluation of possible stances to be taken, and selection of one of those stances, which constitutes the final decision. But it should not be supposed that the decision made would be the most reasonable of all the alternatives. Neither, that it is always the one that maximizes the national interest. Even though the decision makers are assumed to be rational actors, having complete information to make the best choice among its alternatives, it is possible to say this is hardly the case. Decision makers do not and cannot have full access to all the information concerning foreign policy issues since there are other parties involved. Besides the lack of information, decision makers are subject to other influences such as perceptions, beliefs, values, and prejudices which in many cases limit their capacities to make rational choices in foreign policy. To these should be added the fact that foreign policy makers are politicians that have concerns of being elected and hence need popular support - at least in democratic countries. This concern may make them follow not the most rational path but the one that has most support from the public. Popular support may also effect the successful implementation of a foreign policy decision and hence is an important factor to be considered in foreign policy decision making.

It is possible to categorize foreign policy decisions according to the number of actors involved, the conditions under which they were made, and their sequence etc. Mintz and DeRouen’s classification defines four types of foreign policy decisions; one-shot (single) decisions which can be defined as single decisions on single cases, interactive decisions where there are at least two players involved making decisions that affect and are affected by the other player’s decision, sequential decisions which involve a series of interrelated decisions, and group decisions involve group dynamics ranging from small to larger ones. Having made this classification, it should be noted that foreign policy decisions are mostly sequential interactive decisions. Another classification can be made between macro, micro, and crises decisions. Macro decisions are those made in a relatively long time frame including a large variety of domestic political actors, while macro decisions narrow in scope, include a low threat and handled at lower levels of foreign policy bureaucracy. Crisis decisions on the other hand made in situations which include a high degree of threat, a high level of time pressure and a very small group of decision actors consisting mainly of only high level decision makers.

There are four basic stages in foreign policy making as there is in any decision to be made in daily life; identification of the problem, interpretation determination and evaluation of alternatives, selection of the best option, and implementation. Identification of the problem takes place in three stages. First a stimulus from the environment should be received, then this stimulus should be perceived and finally this perceived stimulus should be interpreted as a foreign policy problem/opportunity. Images and misperceptions play an important role in the identification of the problem. Images can be useful as they serve to filter the unbounded information that come from various channels but they may turn into misperceptions that would be misleading for the decision makers. Once the problem is identified it should be interpreted in order to determine the alternative ways that can be followed. These options are then thoroughly evaluated. After the options are evaluated, best available option is selected. The best option is considered to be not the most maximizing alternative but the most satisfying one or in some cases the less risky one. The final step in foreign policy decision making is the implementation of the decision. At this stage, divergence from the original decision may appear, if the actors responsible for the implementations interpret the decision through their own perspective. In any case, the process does not end here, and the results of the implementation should also be carefully observed through feed-back mechanisms in order to see if the decision was sound or not in order to decide on continuation or deviation.
Foreign policy makers are not isolated or free of influence. Foreign policy decisions are shaped in and by two environments; external and internal. There are certain factors that shape the policy makers’ decisions in these environments. The first factors that influence the foreign policy decisions are the external ones. Outside their borders, states are surrounded by and in interaction with other states, international organizations, and actors. The first dynamic about the external environment is actor based influences, namely direct reactions coming from other states. The second dynamic is the systemic factors. Systemic factors can be structural, - that is it can be bipolar, multi polar, or global - or they can be non-structural like changes in big power relations, increases in the bargaining capability of weaker states and changes in international norms. Internal environment is where the foreign policy decisions are designed, formulated, and processed. The first element of internal environment is the structure of the government. The state system determines with whom the executive power lies and thus the foreign policy decision making since it is the executive that conducts foreign policy. In presidential systems, the executive power is vested in the president, in semi-presidential systems the executive power is shared between the president and the prime minister, and finally in parliamentary systems the main executive power is vested in the prime minister as the heads of government. The head of the governments the appoint the ministers of foreign affairs who are the other major actors in foreign policy, although their role in foreign policy is dramatically reduced and in decision making is completely lost. The second element of internal environment in foreign policy decision making is the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is the foreign policy agents that gathers of information, interprets it and transmits it. Its role is crucial since foreign policy decisions are made depending on this information. Therefore, the information they filter actually influences the decisions made. They also influence foreign policy decisions by recommending certain options out of wide range of possible options to the policy makers. Another way bureaucracy can influence foreign policy decision making is due to their task of implementing the decisions, which in some cases may end up in changing the main goal of the decisions. The third element of internal environment in foreign policy decision making is the public opinion. The public opinion in terms of foreign policy is divided into three categories; passive people who are not interested in foreign policy and approach to it emotionally, attentive people who constitute a minor group interested in foreign policy and have sufficient knowledge about it, and opinion leaders who are a very small group that has not only knowledge about foreign policy but also the ability to influence, guide, and reflect the opinion of the public such as the politicians, business leaders, community leaders, journalists, educators, even celebrities, and sports stars. Interest groups as an internal element influencing foreign policy decision making are generally less influential on foreign policy than on domestic policy issues; however, they are becoming a more important part of the foreign policy-making process especially in democratic countries. The fifth and the last element of internal environment in foreign policy decision making is the leader. The leader is the one who makes the last choice and thus the decision. At this point some other factors like the personality, beliefs, values and prejudices, knowledge, and interests of the leader are also added to the equation.
1. With respect to the role of bureaucratic agencies in foreign policy making, __________.
   A. the various agencies of a state are generally in agreement on the foreign policies to be pursued.
   B. the various agencies of a state always take the same side on an issue.
   C. bargaining among agencies suggests that a state does not have a single national interest.
   D. representatives of agencies promote only the interests of their own bureaucracy.
   E. Ambassadors influence on foreign policy decisions by shaping the images of decision makers regarding his/her own country and the others, and by guiding them in how to behave in similar situations.

2. Which of the following characterizes decision-making during crises?
   A. Important options are more likely to be discussed.
   B. Biases become far less likely.
   C. Decision actors consist mainly of only high level decision makers.
   D. Decision makers are more likely to allocate their decision making task.
   E. Political culture

3. The __________ model of decision-making consists of negotiations between bureaucratic agencies with divergent interests.
   A. rational
   B. organizational-process
   C. risk aversion
   D. bureaucratic politics
   E. individual freedom

4. The __________ model of decision-making relies on standard operating procedures.
   A. rational
   B. organizational-process
   C. bureaucratic
   D. individual
   E. politic

5. Decisions of individuals can most frequently diverge from __________ because of information screens.
   A. a cognitive bias
   B. a bounded rationality
   C. the rational model
   D. the affective model
   E. the bureaucratic model

6. According to the concept of bounded rationality, decision makers __________.
   A. will choose the best response to a situation
   B. will choose a response that is good enough to meet some minimal criteria
   C. use historical analogies in responding to a situation
   D. make choices within the boundaries established by groups within the government
   E. make influence of the decision makers’ personality

7. Standard operation procedures include the following?
   A. Applying what you know of general principles
   B. Ensuring efficient outcomes
   C. Reconsideration of goals
   D. Challenging policy precedents
   E. Appropriate strategy

8. The part of the population that stays informed about international issues is called the __________ public.
   A. international
   B. expert
   C. savvy
   D. attentive
   E. rational

9. Public opinion __________.
   A. has greater force in authoritarian governments than in democracies.
   B. has greater force in democracies than in authoritarian governments.
   C. influences foreign policy decisions but is not influenced by them.
   D. has more effect on foreign policy than domestic policy in democracies.
   E. have no formal policy-making authority

10. “The more the interest and knowledge of the decision maker is __________ on the issue __________ his/her personality will have influence on it.
    A. more
    B. greater
    C. less
    D. none
    E. lack
Discuss the models of foreign policy decision making

Decision making is a complex and ever changing process. It is possible to divide decision making models as models of rationality and models of non-rationality (not irrationality). However, since models of non-rationality base their analyses on different units of analysis, thus vary in their scope and analysis, it is more useful to follow Allison's division. Graham T. Allison, has divided the decision making style into three different models based on the structure and function of the decision making unit. These are The Rational Actor Model (RAM), Organizational Process Model (OPM), and Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM).

Please evaluate the process of decision making

Foreign policy decision making is a complex process which involves all sorts of resources and passes through various stages. Beginning from the problem identification, we can identify four main stages of foreign policy decision making.
1. Identification of the Problem: Perception, Images, and Information
2. Interpretation, determination, and evaluation of alternatives
3. Selection of the Best Option
4. Implementation of the decision
Foreign Policy decision making is a complex and multidimensional process, as mentioned previously, there are many actors, agents, and institutions involved in this process. The factors influencing the process are generally categorized as the external or global environment, societal environment, the governmental setting, the roles occupied by policy-makers, and the individual characteristics of the policy-making elites (Rosenau, 1996: 183). In this part, the factors influencing the decision making process is divided into two broad categories which in fact also cover the aspects of the mentioned five categories. Those are the External Environment and The Internal Environment. The internal environment covers the whole political system with political parties, interest and pressure groups, and public opinion.

References


Chapter 4  Factors Determining Foreign Policy

After completing this chapter, you will be able to;

Learning Outcomes

1. Comprehend the various theoretical perspectives that help analysts make sense of foreign policy in a comprehensive manner.

2. Distinguish individual, internal and external factors in the context of understanding and explaining foreign policy.

Chapter Outline

Introduction
A Theoretical Account
Conclusion

Key Terms

Foreign Policy
Foreign Policy Theories
Individual Factors
Internal Factors
External Factors
INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy analysis as an academic discipline examines how states, the main actors of international relations, respond to external developments and engage with other actors (Neack, 2008). Trying to make sense of foreign policies of states requires an in-depth analysis of the factors that play a role in this process. Of such factors, individual, internal, and external factors stand out the most. Whether the particular characteristics of leaders, state-societal level factors or external-systemic factors play the most decisive role in this regard is a time-tested research question in the literature. This chapter examines the explanatory value of such factors in a comparative manner in light of real world examples.

The academic debate on the factors determining foreign policy is quite similar to the discussion on the level of analysis. Each particular level is a lens through which analysts try to make sense of foreign policy decisions of countries. Another way of contextualizing this debate is to focus on alternative images in international relations. Kenneth Waltz, one of the founding fathers of modern International Relations disciple, argues that there exist three images in international relations, which are first, second and third images (Waltz, 1954). These images correspond to the three levels.

First image is about the leaders and statesmen who are in charge of their countries. According to this view, foreign policy should be examined from the perspective of statesmen because foreign policy is a high politics activity immune to the infiltration of societal factors. The public itself should be kept outside of analysis because dealing with foreign policy and taking foreign policy decisions requires expertise and state-level secrecy.

Second image is about the state-society level factors, whereas the third image is very much about the impact of international systemic factors on foreign policy. Whereas the first and second images are very much inside-out perspectives, the third image is very much about outside-in analysis. The question to be answered in this context is on the basis of which level of analysis we can make sense of foreign policy decisions of states.

A THEORETICAL ACCOUNT

The academic literature on foreign policy analysis is replete with different theoretical accounts, each of which tries to make sense of foreign policy decision from a different perspective (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 2012). Classical realism puts the main emphasize on individual factors and prioritizes the role of leaders and statesmen in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy decisions. Statesmen represent their countries and approach foreign policy from power perspective. Similar to individuals, states are interested in survival, security and having influence on the choices of other states. The human nature is bad and greedy and states try to maximize their power capabilities to survive in the conflictual international environment. Though classical realists give credit to the role of morality in foreign policy, the way how they define morality in interstate relations radically differs from the understanding of morality as applied to interpersonal relations. Any particular foreign policy action would be deemed as moral so long as it serves to the survival, security and power needs of states (Ersoy, 2014, 166-172).

Liberal pluralist perspective values the role of societal and intra-state level factors in foreign policy analysis. States are not unitary actors and their internal characteristics would decisively shape their foreign policy preferences and actions (Jackson and Sorenson, 2003, 105-137).

Structural realism does on the other hand single out distribution of material power capabilities among states and the anarchical structure of international system as the most important explanatory factor in this regard and turns a blind eye to the potential impact of individual and internal factors on foreign policy (Waltz, 1979). External factors as they are defined within the context of international system are more influential in shaping foreign policy preferences and actions. Assuming that states are black boxes, neorealism assumes that all states, irrespective of their internal differences, put survival, territorial security and power maximization at the center of their foreign policies. Put another way, states would respond to external stimuli in similar ways. The anarchical structure of international environment would suggest that states have to pursue self-help security and foreign policy strategies.
Factors Determining Foreign Policy

Structural realism assumes that the international structure is basically anarchical and there is no authority over states that could potentially set the rules, provide order and punish the ones which breach the rules. This means that states can never be certain about the intentions of each other and interstate trust is difficult to achieve. The possibility of cooperation among states is extremely low because it is not for sure that states would keep their promises. States would tend eschew interstate cooperation because other might free-ride on the ones which cooperate and keep their promises. Concerns over relative gains might also discourage states from entering into cooperative relations (Grieco, 1993, 116-140).

This leads to the conclusion that states would basically have two prime security and foreign policy strategies to employ with a view to surviving in a self-help environment. They would either have to rely on their internal power capabilities or seek the help of other states if they were not powerful enough. Internal balancing and external balancing are the two most important security strategies states could theoretically employ. Order in the international environment can only be maintained through balance of power.

Recent years have also witnessed the rise of another alternative theoretical perspective on foreign policy, namely neoclassical realism. This school of thought tries to combine the insights of structural realism with those of classical realism and liberalism. It offers a more holistic account of foreign policy (Lobell, Ripsman and Taliaferro, 2009).

Similar to structural realism neoclassical realism gives the main priority to external structural factors, yet unlike the former neoclassical realism argues that the way how states would respond to external stimuli and make sense of external/systemic factors would be decisively informed by their internal characteristics. International environment offers states a mixture of opportunities and constraints, yet the way how states would make sense of them would be fundamentally shaped by their internal characteristics. The way how they respond to external stimuli is not automatic and determined by the anarchical nature of the system. Neoclassical realism argues that the constraining and restraining impacts of external/structural factors should not be taken for granted. States, depending on their internal differences, might respond to similar external/structural stimuli differently.

The academic literature on foreign policy decision making process also reveals that states do not always act as strong unitary actors. States are generally composed of institutional autocracies, some of which operate in the realm of foreign policy. One school, organizational behavior approach, argues that states are made up of different organizations which compete with each other in order to shape the foreign policy preferences and behaviors of their states (Hudson, 2014, 84-101). Each organization approaches foreign policy problems from its own institutional perspectives and therefore, tries to make sure that the final foreign policy consensus reflects its institutional concerns and priorities. Of such bureaucratic organizations, the ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of defense, ministry of economics, national intelligence organizations and the Chief of Staff stand out the most. Each holds a distinct institutional culture and habit of dealing with foreign policy issues. The more successful they are in shaping the final foreign policy output, the more money they would be given from the government budget. For example, the Ministry of Defense, the Pentagon, is quite influential in the United States. The United States covers nearly half of all military expenditures across the globe. The propensity of the United States to pursue global hegemony strategy in the world following the end of the Second World War, to invest in strong alliance relationships across the globe, to outpace all other countries in military technology and expenditures, to deploy thousands of American soldiers in different quarters of the globe and to frequently resort to military power instruments in its foreign policy can all be attributed, among others, to the primacy of Pentagon in American state administration. A similar case can be made in reverse in the context of German and Japanese foreign policies. In these countries ministries of trade, development and economics are quite influential in state administration. These countries do not spend much on military and tend to define their identity more in civilian and economic than military terms.

Comment on the neoclassical realist approach in foreign policy.
The bureaucratic politics model, on the other hand, suggests that the leaders of such foreign policy related organizations wage turf wars among each other and their ultimate goal is to help strengthen their status and prestige within the state apparatus (Hudson, 2014, 101-110). Both the organizational behavior and the bureaucratic politics models suggest that the state should not be considered as a unitary actor with one single predominant leader holding monopoly over national foreign policy issues. This view is in line with more liberal than realist international relations theory.

**Individual Factors**

Most analysts identify states with their leaders and suggest that leaders speak on behalf of their countries. Saying that President Putin decided to get military involved in the civil war in Syria means Russia took this decision. In discussing how individual leaders factor in foreign policy decision making process, two particular approaches dominate the literature. On the one hand stands the Rational Actor model, whereas on the other the cognitive school of thought.

*Picture 4.1* Pentagon, U.S. Department of Defense

*Picture 4.2* Belgrade, Serbia - October 16, 2014: Russian President Vladimir Putin delivers a speech during the military parade ‘March of the victorious’ in Belgrade. President Vladimir Putin of Russia arrived in Belgrade to commemorate the city’s liberation by the Red Army and Yugoslav Partisans in 1944. during World War II.
Factors Determining Foreign Policy

Rational Actor model assumes that leaders act rationally in foreign policy. States are considered to be unitary actors behaving rationally in their relations with other international actors (Neack, 2008, 31-39). Rationality suggests that leaders undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the particular courses of action available to themselves and picks the one that would yield the highest amount of benefit and least amount of cost. Leaders make a preference ordering based on the expected payoffs of available courses of action. Stated somewhat differently, exposed to a particular foreign policy problem, leaders enumerate all alternative courses of action and choose the most beneficial one. This approach also holds out that leaders have full knowledge of the foreign policy environment that surrounds them and their emotions, feelings, beliefs, etc., are left outside the picture. In other words, leaders are supposed to be well informed about the dynamics of the problem at hand, the position of other parties, the instruments available to them as well as all facilitating and constraining factors. Foreign policy strategy concerns the search for most optimum ways through which states would materialize their foreign policy goals/ends by dint of available means/instruments at hand.

Acting as the spokesperson of their countries, leaders try to achieve national interests of their countries in a rational way. Their fundamental foreign policy concerns are to maximize the material power capability of their countries and ensure the survival and territorial integrity of their states. States are like individuals and they want to have more military and economic power than other states and a stable and peaceful living space. The leadership position they occupy within the state administration shapes their attitudes, calculations, choices and behaviors. Their seats shape leaders. This suggests that leaders act in a mechanical way leaving behind all kind of personal characteristics that could potentially have an impact on their choices and behaviors. Leaders acting rationally put the national interests of their countries above their personal priorities and undertake the cost-benefit calculation from the perspective of the state they lead. Rather than bowing to short-term political calculations, leaders are assumed to put long-term national interests of their countries at the center of their foreign policy choices.

However, the so-called cognitive school of thought, which has become increasingly important in theoretical discussions on foreign policy in recent decades, argues that leaders/individuals are not always as rational as they are assumed to be. Some psychological and sociological factors appear to limit their ability to act rationally (Neack, 2008, 47-64). Leaders tend to view the external environment through their subjective perceptions and the amount of information available to them at a given moment. They might not be able to assess the external environment as it is, since they might lack the full knowledge of the environment and their assessment might be built on their perception of the reality. How they perceive the external reality shapes the limits of their rationality. Stated somewhat differently, there is no objective external reality outside their personal perceptions. And the way how they pursue the environment might be informed by their individual baggage, which consists of, among others, their emotions, past experiences, belief systems, world views, cognitive shortcuts, ideologies and personal traits.

One factor that appears to curtail the degree of rationality of people is the particular group environment in which they find themselves in discussing foreign policy issues. The pressure of group thinking is a very important psychological restraint affecting the rationality of individuals. Imagine that a junior level bureaucrat participates in an official meeting on foreign policy together with high level senior bureaucrats. Imagine also that that the junior participant witnesses extremely contradictory statements from one senior level participant and others give credit to what he says. Listening to a participant who holds a much higher position than himself expresses arguments contradictory to his/her rational analysis, the junior level participant would find himself/herself in an unwanted position. Feeling the group pressure, the junior level participants might node to the authority figure in the meeting room and not express his/her opinions freely. The fear of being isolated and ostracized might lead the junior participant to support the argument of the senior personality, no matter how irrational it is.

The tendency to refer to historical analogies and apply cognitive shortcuts is another factor that appears to constrain rationality. We most of the time tend to interpret the current developments
and make sense of them by dint of historical examples which we think they are similar. Rather than spending time and energy to get full knowledge of the problem at hand and treat it as a unique case, we look for similar cases in the past and build our response on past experiences. Making use of historical analogies is time saving, yet it might result in wrong policies. One of the well-known examples in the literature is the appeasement policy of the British government towards German expansionism and assertiveness in Europe prior to the Second World War. Rather than responding to Hitler's lebensraum policies strongly and at their initial stage, the British government hoped to prevent Germany from pursuing further expansionism by accommodating Germany's early geopolitical gains against the Czechs and Austrians. However, rather than satisfying German appetite for further geopolitical expansionism the appeasement policy of the British government seems to have provided further ammunition to it by encouraging Hitler to believe that whatever he does the British would condone and accommodate him. This historical example is quite often referred to by those who strongly question their governments whenever they fail to show strong protests and resistance against states which pursue revisionist policies.

Leaders might also think that they, the countries they lead, represent the good whereas others the bad. This is what is called in the literature as attribution bias. If something positive happens in their foreign policy contributing to the national interests of their countries, they tend to think this is because of their good intentions and benevolent policies. If something negative happens in the context of their national interests, they tend to attribute the main reason to the bad intentions and evil character of others. Rather than taking responsibility for the negative consequences of their actions, they prefer to put the blame on the shoulders of others.

The sources of attributing good to themselves and bad to others might emanate from strong religious belief. For example, the former US President George W. Bush defined the war against transnational terrorists groups such as Al Qaeda as a crusade and asked the countries around the globe to either align with the United States or join the camp of the infidels. Rather than reflecting on the impact of previous American policies on the rise of transnational terrorism, strong anti-Americanism and Al Qaeda attacks on American soil on September 11, 2011, the Bush team put all the blame on infidels and adopted a coercive regime change-transformation strategy in the Greater Middle East with a crusader mentality (Jervis, 2016, 285-311).
Another psychological factor that might curtail their ability to act rationally is cognitive dissonance. Leaders might hold particular world views and belief systems and these might shape their foreign policy preferences and behaviors decisively. They might be predisposed to interpret the external stimuli in such a way that corresponds and validates their previously held beliefs. Whenever they are exposed to some signals that contradict their previously held world views and belief systems they might tend to ignore them, most of the time at the peril of the national interests of their countries defined rationally. This also suggests that they would likely interpret the particular external signals that are in accordance with their well-established world view and belief systems as evidences of the rightness and appropriateness of their foreign policy behaviors.

**Internal Factors**

As regards the internal factors that play a role in foreign policy, the nature of political regimes, national role conceptualization of ruling elites, strategic culture, political ideologies, religion, interest groups, civil society organizations, public opinion, and etc. stand out the most (Breuning, 2007, 115-140). In line with the liberal International Relations theory, the scholars who focus on internal factors in explaining foreign policies of states assume that states are not unitary actors and what goes within states matter a lot. States cannot be considered as black boxes interacting with each other as billiard balls.

Of all internal factors, the nature of political regimes and political ideologies seem to attract the academic attention most. Whether a country is ruled by democratic or non-democratic regimes might affect how that country defines its foreign policy interests and act accordingly. It has already become a truism that democratic regimes do not fight each other easily and countries ruled by democratic regimes would likely adopt more diplomatic, civilian and economic than coercive and military power instruments in their foreign policies. The institutional structure of democratic regimes as well as the democratic values held by the people would likely prevent states from taking costly decisions and resorting to war. The checks and balances structure in state administration, the need on the part of politicians to secure the votes of electorate for upcoming elections and the consensus building culture among different constituencies would all prevent the ruling elites from taking costly decisions in foreign policy (Burchill, 2009, 60-73). However, this does not mean that democratic regimes would never adopt coercive foreign policy strategies in their dealing with non-democratic countries. The American foreign policy in Middle...
East, particularly the US-led occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the regime transformation approach that the George W. Bush administration adopted in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, demonstrates that liberal democratic countries also employ military/coercive tools in their foreign policy.

Liberal democratic regimes would also value interdependent relations among states, international organizations, international law and the primacy of universal human rights. The idea is that as the number of liberal democratic states increases all around the world, the likelihood of global peace and order would also go up. The US-led liberal international order, as it came into existence in the aftermath of the Second World War, has been built on the above-mentioned principles. In line with the values of openness and multiculturalism that liberal democratic countries seem to adopt internally, the liberal international order presumes that the processes of regional integration, free-trade and globalization process would pave the way for a more ordered and peaceful international environment (Ikenberry, 2011).

Many liberal democratic states do also support the principle of Responsibility to Protect whereby legitimacy of states’ sovereignty would first and foremost emanate from their ability to meet the basic demands of their people. They would be held responsible if they were not to prevent mass atrocities and serious human rights breaches within their territories. If they fail to fulfill their duties, then the responsibility would shift to the international community and the latter might consider to get involved in those states’ internal affairs, even through the use of coercive power instruments (Glanville, 2015, 184-199). Even though liberal democracy as a political ideology respects the principle of self-determination and non-interference in states’ internal affairs, many liberal democratic states find it difficult to turn a blind eye to human sufferings in other countries.

As opposed to democratic states, authoritarian states would feel more comfortable with employing coercive and costly strategies in their foreign policy, since leaders of such regimes would not feel themselves constrained by public opinion and electoral concerns. Such leaders would more likely prioritize the continuation of their rule in government over national interest. That is why authoritarian leaders are more predisposed to take risky and costly decisions in foreign policy. Regime security is more important than national interests in authoritarian states. As opposed to liberal democratic regimes, authoritarian countries are more predisposed to prioritize the principles of realpolitik, sphere of influence, power politics,
unconstrained sovereignty and conservatism in their foreign policies. Russia and China offer the best examples in this regard. Whereas liberal approach shapes foreign policy of liberal democratic regimes decisively, authoritarian countries are much more inclined to build their foreign policy on the operational logic of realist school of thought.

States that believe in the primacy of universal human rights and adopt liberal conceptualization of political and economic rights would tend to have uneasy relations with states that abhor the idea of universal human rights and believe in the primacy of non-involvement in states' internal affairs. Liberal democratic regimes would likely put the promotion of universal human rights worldwide at the center of their foreign policies and question the illiberal authoritarian practices of other countries in their internal affairs. The question of how other states are ruled internally and whether they ascribe to liberal conceptualization of human rights would likely shape foreign policy choices and behaviors of democratic countries. Compared to liberal democratic countries, authoritarian regimes would more easily adopt a realpolitik and security-first mentality and approach foreign policy from the realist perspective.

Ideology is a unit level variable and transmitted from one generation to another through various socialization processes. Ideology manifests its impact on foreign policy in different ways. Some countries, such as the United States and France, tend to ascribe to themselves universal liberal characteristics and champion the promotion of liberal democracy all around the globe (Dunne, 2011, 153-171). A great majority of Americans tend to believe that the United States is a role model for other countries to emulate. Promotion of ideology outside territorial borders is not something unique only to western liberal democratic states. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union put the promotion of its socialist-communist ideology at the center of its foreign policy and viewed relations with other countries from an ideological perspective. Today, China seems to follow in the footsteps of other global powers in that it has been trying to promote its state-led developmental model across the globe. The so-called Beijing consensus holds that free market oriented capitalist economy practices could go hand in hand with authoritarian political ideology and strategically planned state-led development is the shortest way to economic modernization. This particular ideological stance seems to have shaped China's policies in different realms, including foreign policy (Uemura, 2015, 345-365). Ideology is also important in the context of Iranian foreign policy following the establishment of a theocratic Islamic state in the country in late 1970. Since then the Shia regime in Tehran has been trying to spread out the influence of Shi’ism-based Islamic theocracy across the Middle East.

National role conceptualizations are also important because how ruling elites define the mission and vision of their countries affects their engagement with others. Some nations think that they are truly exceptional among others and should pursue a particular vision in their external relations. Some define themselves as endowed with an historical mission of transforming others in the image of their values and norms. The United States and France are good examples in this context. Believing that their political values are truly universal, both the United States and France have long put ‘civilizing mission’ at the center of their engagement with the other countries. Though the strategies that they adopted in this regard showed variations throughout history, their belief that they are exceptional countries has been constant.

Some think that they are truly imperial nations being entitled to their individual spheres of influence. Russia is the best example in this regard. The idea that Russia is a great power and deserves to be treated as such by others has profoundly shaped Russian foreign policy. Russian leaders have long defined Russia’s foreign policy interests from an imperial perspective believing that Russia
is not an ordinary nation-state. Some think that their mission is to foster international trade and free market oriented economic interactions all over the globe. The Netherland is a typical example of trading states. Compared to many other countries, the Netherlands is a staunch supporter of international law, international trade and unfettered globalization. Some ascribe to themselves the task of leading global attempts at international peacekeeping or playing the role of mediator/facilitator in resolving and/or transforming perennial structural conflicts across the globe. Canada, Switzerland and Norway are the textbook examples of such countries.

National role conceptualizations would go hand in hand with geographical imaginations and geopolitical visions. Whether states are inward-looking, outward-looking, status-quo oriented, revisionist, and etc. is a function of particular role conceptualization held by the ruling elites at a given time. The change in Turkey’s role conceptualization with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) in late 2002 can be seen as a very good example in this regard (Aras and Görener, 2010, 73-92). Turkey’s adoption of a more assertive, global, multidimensional, multi-directional and outward-looking foreign policy mentality over the last fifteen years has been made possible, among other factors, by the AK Party leadership questioning Turkey’s traditional western and inward-looking foreign policy mentality. Role conceptualizations profoundly affect the way how states interpret the changes taking place in the structure of international/regional environment.

Strategic cultures of states do also matter in their foreign policy choices and behaviors (Johnston, 1995, 32-64). This culture is transmitted from one generation to another through education and other socialization processes. Past experiences of wars with others as well as how threats and the means adopted to deal with them were defined in the past decisively shape the contemporary security practices of state. Whether states today prioritize neutrality, isolationism, internationalization, alliance formation or collective security practices is to a significant extent informed by their historical experiences. The experiences of the Ottoman Empire with Russia and western European States during the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries seem to have profoundly shaped the strategic culture and security thinking of the Turkish Republic (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000, 199-217). The realpolitik security culture, the primacy of the state as the key securitizing actor, the influence of the military in decision making process, the practices of defining security in military terms and in reference to the needs of the state, as well as the predisposition to enter into alliance relationships with western powers against Russia and other third powers can all be considered the fallouts of historical experiences. Past experiences do also seem to account for the salience of siege mentality in Turkish strategic thinking. The idea that Turkey is surrounded by enemies cannot be properly understood outside the context of Turkey’s bitter memories with other countries which in the past tried to dismember the Ottoman Empire.

Whether states define themselves as maritime or land powers affects their military strategies and financial decisions on armament as well. For example, while the United States and United Kingdom are considered to be maritime powers and build their military strategies decisively on the fire power of navy, marine and air forces, China and Russia tend to give priority to their land forces. Whether states adopt offensive or defensive military capabilities is in great part informed by their strategic cultures. Countries which gained their independence against imperial/colonial powers in the past and built their national identity on the principles of strong nationalism and territorial integrity tend to be more circumspect and cautious in their external relations. If countries are surrounded by numerous neighbors and suffer from siege mentality, their propensity to pursue defensive foreign policies would likely be high. Strategic cultures of states are unique to them and shaped by their historical experiences.

In discussing internal factors shaping foreign policy outcomes one needs to mention the role of organized interest groups, lobbies and civil society organizations as well (Breuning, 2007, 120-125). Their impact is mainly bottom-up because their aspiration is to influence the key decision makers at the state level by helping arouse organized public pressure at the societal level. Whereas some of them are active in the field of economics, some other are quite influential in the fields of environment, religion, human rights, and etc. Their financial capabilities, organizational strength and ability to have access to decision makers would eventually
Factors Determining Foreign Policy

affect the degree of their success. The ability of such societal groups to become influential in foreign policy seems to be closely interrelated with the nature of the political regime. Liberal democratic regimes would offer a more suitable environment for these groups to operate, whereas in closed authoritarian states decision making authority would mainly rest with the strong leadership. In authoritarian political settings, the ruling elites would give an ear to the concerns of such groups so long as they feel this helps them garner legitimacy for their policies.

The influence of the Jewish lobby in American foreign policy is a well-known example in this context. To what extent the Jewish lobby has been instrumental in shaping US foreign policy, particularly in the context of the Arab-Israeli dispute, has been an ongoing debate, yet the liberal democratic nature of the American society seems to provide the Jewish lobby and others with immense opportunities to help influence the key decision makers in White House and Congress (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007).

Similar to above-mentioned societal forces, another internal factor that should be taken into account is the media. The key question in this context is whether the ruling elites use media in its efforts to help shape the public opinion in line with their foreign policy decisions or the media pushes the ruling elites to adopt particular positions on foreign policy issues by dint of framing or agenda setting (Neack, 2008, 111-128). Who uses whom is an important question in the field of foreign policy. In liberal democratic regimes with open societies, media would act more freely and successfully in shaping public opinion, whereas in authoritarian regimes with closed societies, the power of media would be extremely limited and mainly confined to being an institutional device at the hands of ruling elites in their efforts to help legitimize their foreign policies in the eyes of people.

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Comment on the foreign policy preferences of authoritarian states.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH

- basic right
- freedom of speaking
- freedom of expression
- freedom of the press
- obligation to report
- social media
- fundamental right to freedom of expression
- fundamental right of free speech
- basic liberties
- communication
- announcement
- coverage
- up to the minute news
- print media
- newspaper
- commentatorship
- communication
- fundamental right of reporting

Picture 4.7

Comment on the foreign policy preferences of authoritarian states.

Picture 4.8
External Factors

The third set of factors that might help analysts make sense of foreign policy of states is external factors. Focusing on external factors is mostly emphasized by realist and structural realist scholars in International Relations. Here, internal characteristics of states as well as personal attributes of decision makers are drooped out from analysis. What matter in this context are the dynamics of international systemic environment, distribution of material power capabilities among states, geographical location of states and the nature of the terrain on which states are located (Aydin, 1999, 152-186). These are the attributes of the system.

The dynamics of international systemic environment are quite important in this context. Depending on the nature of polarity within the system, foreign policy tools available to states would vary. States’ maneuvering capability within the system would be closely linked with distribution of power capabilities among states. Whether states pursue more assertive and active foreign policies or feel extremely constrained in their foreign policy behaviors would mainly be a function of the nature of polarity at systemic and regional levels as well as how material power capabilities are distributed among states. Unipolar, bipolar and multipolar systems would suggest different foreign policy behaviors. Different polarity configurations affect foreign policies of great, middle and small powers differently (Breuning, 2007, 141-162).

In general, the degree of states’ maneuvering capability would be the highest in multipolar systems because states would be able to align with multiple powers, play one power off against another, and change alliance relations easily. Great powers in multipolar system would have to focus their strategic and foreign policy attention on many theaters and this would provide many middle and small sized powers with more ability to move around. The propensity of states, irrespective of their power capabilities, to pursue multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policies would increase in multipolar settings. The systemic constraints and restraints put on states by the international system would be the lowest in multipolar systems. In such systems, alliances would tend to be short-lived and reflect more pragmatic and interest based calculations than value and identity related considerations. Many middle and small sized powers would find it easy to forge strategic relations with many great powers simultaneously (Neack, 2008, 129-132).

Turkey’s foreign policy has turned out to become more multidimensional and multidirectional since 2008 as the global economic crisis and its aftermath accelerated the transition to multipolarity in global politics. Turkey has not only tried to shape the emerging regional environment in the Middle East as the so-called Arab Spring has unfolded but also spent great efforts to improve its relations with the emerging powers of the non-western world, such as China, Russia, India and Brazil, while paying an utmost importance to preserve the gains of its relations with western powers.

On the other hand, bipolar systems would more heavily constrain states, because there would only exist two major poles/powers. Choices would be more limited in their external relations. The ability of middle and small sized powers to resist the foreign policy demands of the major power with which they align would be extremely limited. Shifting alliance relations would be difficult because international environment would be divided into two main camps, each bringing together a group of countries around common security perceptions and identity-related considerations. The Cold War period between 1949 and 1989 is the best example of the bipolar international environment. In such systems, the possibility of middle and small-sized countries to pursue multidimensional and multidirectional foreign policies in defiance of their alliance commitments would be extremely low. The leaders of power blocks would not likely tolerate mavericks within their camps.
Unipolar systems are by nature more lenient to provide international peace, security and stability. There would exist only one major pole/power within the system and the ability of all other states to counterbalance the unipolar country would be extremely low. The time period between 1990 and 2008 can be considered to reflect the characteristics of a unipolar environment in which only one great power, namely the United States, possessed the ability to play hegemonic/leadership role across the globe. Compared to bipolar systems, unipolar systems would provide states with more maneuvering capability in their foreign policies.

Power distribution is also important for another reason. The literature on foreign policy analysis is replete with studies that contend that global/super powers, middle/medium-sized powers and small-sized power would behave differently in their foreign policy. These are all identity related categorizations and suggest different foreign policy thoughts and foreign policy tools to be employed. Power differences among states would have a decisive impact on their ability to set the rules of international relations in their favor, to help transform other states in the image of their values and norms, to pursue global or regional leadership, to shape the regional environment in which they live and finally to resist the demands of other states. Even though the distribution of material power capabilities among states would put them into different power categories, such as global, middle level or small-sized countries, these labels also suggest different foreign policy roles. The kind of foreign policy roles and behaviors that one expects major powers to embrace would be different from the foreign policy roles and behaviors that less powerful states might adopt (Haas, 2014, 715-753).

Geographical location is another factor emphasized by the ones who focus on external factors in explaining foreign policy of states (Aydin, 2003, 163-184). The first point to underline in this regard is the number of neighbors states have. Should states neighbor with many states, they would be more predisposed to prioritize territorial security concerns. States with multiple neighbors do generally suffer from the infamous siege mentality thinking that they are all surrounded by enemies that covet their territory. Such states would generally hold their neighbors accountable for what goes wrong in their foreign policies. Neighbors would be the usual suspect for anything that could potentially affect regional security environment negative. States with multiple neighbors would likely feel alert against the intentions of others and be more inclined to devote their financial assets to military armament. The degree of internal factors determining foreign policy choices and behaviors of states with multiple neighbors would be extremely low. Foreign policy of such states can therefore be defined as their responses to external stimuli.

On the other hand, states with a few neighbors would likely feel themselves much more secure and safe and spend less on armament. The lines between foreign and domestic politics are drawn much clearly in such states because the dynamics of one realm to affect the dynamics of another would be less. Such states would generally pursue isolationist foreign policies and avoid intensive and multifaceted foreign policy entanglements abroad. The degree of internal factors affecting foreign policy would be much higher in such states. States which are located in stable geographies and having cordial relations with their neighbors are more predisposed to play facilitative roles in conflict resolution process in their regions and globally. Because such states are generally status-quo oriented and derive immense benefits from the existing power configurations, they would be more likely to play ‘good international roles’. They would likely take steps to contribute to the de-escalation of crisis across the globe. The reason why such countries as Australia, Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden are defined as middle powers playing good international roles can be attributed, among others, to their stable geographical location (Cooper and Dal, 2016, 516-528).

Second, maritime and land powers would also demonstrate different foreign policy inclinations. Countries which are located by the sea would have different foreign policy priorities than countries which do not have maritime borders or are totally land-locked. Land powers would likely prioritize spending on their army whereas maritime powers would spend their financial resources more on navy and marine/coastguard forces than land forces. Land powers, compared to maritime powers, would be more preoccupied with concerns over territorial security and survival. Maritime powers,
compared to land powers, would tend to have more interests in international trade and the strengthening of international law in sea traffic. Maritime powers, compared to land powers, would also tend to favor a more isolationist foreign policy line than active engagement in alliance relations with other countries.

Third, the importance of geographical location also manifests itself in the sense of states leveraging their particular geographical features in their foreign relations. Some states, such as Turkey, lie at the intersection of different regions and continental landmasses and this gives them immense bargaining power with third parties. In the context of transporting gas and oil resources of Central Asian, Middle Eastern and Caucasian regions to western European markets, Turkey can act as a transit country. Geographical location can also incur negative consequences in the sense of states being the target of other countries. Holding a key, a geographical location like Turkey might attract the malign intentions of other states. It is quite well known that Turkey was a part of the geopolitical confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union owing to its geographical location. Americans saw Turkey as an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the context of its efforts to contain the Soviet influence in the Balkans, Black Sea, Caucasus and Middle East regions. Similarly, Russians tend to view Turkey as a key country in their historical efforts to reach out to the hot waters in the Mediterranean. That Turkey possesses the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits caused great tension in Turkey’s relations with Russia in the past.
Geographical location and the nature of the terrain on which countries are located are also important in the sense of preparing war plans. Should a country sit on a plain landmass with no highs, it would spend money to improve its defense capabilities as well as tend to be extremely vigilant towards its neighbors. Two examples from different locations would be of value. Russia feels itself extremely vulnerable to its west and south because these parts of Russian territory are quite difficult to defend against strong armed forces of other countries. Russia came under severe attacks from Napoleon’s France during the 19th century and Germany during the First and Second World Wars. The initial defeats of Russian troops at the hands of French and German armies in these cases seem to have influenced Russian foreign policy and strategic culture profoundly (Morozova, 2009, 667-686). From Russian perspective, the countries that lie to the west and south should never come under strong geopolitical influence and control of major powers that see Russia as a threat or rival. This seems to account for why Russia has vehemently argued against the enlargement of European Union and NATO to central and Eastern Europe following the end of the Cold War. The prospects of Ukraine and Georgia joining these two significant western organizations as member appears to have caused Russian military operations in these countries in 2008 and 2014 respectively.

Another example is Germany. Germany sits at the center of the European continent and is difficult to defend against third countries due to the plain nature of its terrain. Following the unification of Germany in the second half of the 19th century, then German Prime Minister Bismark pursued a balance of power policy whose ultimate goal was to make sure that Germany’s potential rivals/challengers to the west and east, namely France and Russia, do never join forces against Germany and Germany soothe its rivals by entering into alliance relations with all of them.

Foreign policies of other states can also be considered among external determinants of foreign policy. Whether other states pursue revisionist or status-quo oriented policies would have a great impact on how states respond to them. Realist scholars share the view that foreign policy is in essence an organized response to the polices and behaviors of other states outside their borders. If states were to act as status
 quo oriented, they would not be viewed dangerous and through skeptical eyes. If the number of status quo oriented states within a particular regional environment is quite high, the likelihood of peace, stability and interdependent economic relations there would increase. If a state views its neighbors as status quo oriented actors, it would not define them as threats and focus its attention on the fields of common interests and the prospects of cooperation. Status quo oriented states would not push their neighbors to increase their military expenditures.

On the other hand, revisionist states would likely trigger alliance formation dynamics in their neighbors. For example, the growing power capabilities of China and its increasing regional assertiveness in its region seem to have caused strong alarm bells to ring in East Asia, particularly on the part of the countries that have traditionally relied on American security protection. When China’s rise coupled with growing isolationist tendencies in Trump’s America, such countries as Japan, India, South Korea, Philippines and Australia have begun to define their foreign and security policies from a more realist than liberal perspective. Not only have their defense spending increased but they have also begun to explore the possibilities of forming alternative institutional relationships, such as quad, in order to ward off the so-called China challenge more credibly (Hughes, 2016, 109-150).

Another example would be the intensification of efforts on the part of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAB) and Egypt to counterbalance the rise of Iran’s geopolitical influence in the Middle East in recent years. Because these countries view Iran as a revisionist country and their perception of the American commitment to their security interests grew negatively during Obama’s presidency, they have decided to spend more on defense and increase their strategic cooperation among each other (Bianco, 2018, 27-41).

CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the explanatory value of individual, internal and external factors of foreign policy in light of different historical examples. Making sense of foreign policy requires a comprehensive approach whereby all such factors should be taken into account.
Summary

LO 1 Comprehend the various theoretical perspectives that help analysts make sense of foreign policy in a comprehensive manner

The academic literature on foreign policy analysis is replete with different theoretical accounts, each of which tries to make sense of foreign policy decision from a different perspective. Classical realism puts the main emphasis on individual factors and prioritizes the role of leaders and statesmen in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy decisions. Statesmen represent their countries and approach foreign policy from a power perspective. Liberal pluralist perspective values the role of societal and intra-state level factors in foreign policy analysis. States are not unitary actors and their internal characteristics decisively shape their foreign policy preferences and actions. Structural realism/neorealism does, on the other hand, single out the anarchical structure of international system as the most important explanatory factor in this regard and turns a blind eye to the potential impact of individual and internal factors on foreign policy. External factors, as they are defined within the context of international system, are more influential in shaping foreign policy preferences and actions. Neoclassical realism tries to combine the insights of structural realism with those of classical realism and liberalism. It offers a more holistic account of foreign policy. Neoclassical realism gives the main priority to external structural factors and holds out that the way how states respond to external stimuli and make sense of external/systemic factors is decisively informed by their internal characteristics. International environment offers states a mixture of opportunities and constraints, yet the way how states would make sense of them would be fundamentally shaped by their internal characteristics. Rational Actor Model, Organizational Behavior Model and Bureaucratic Politics Model are different theoretical perspectives on foreign policy decision making process.

LO 2 Distinguish individual, internal and external factors in the context of understanding and explaining foreign policy

Individual factors are about the role of leaders and statesmen in the formulation of foreign policy preferences. According to this view, foreign policy should be examined from the perspective of statesmen because foreign policy is a high politics activity immune to the infiltration of societal factors. The public itself should be kept outside analysis because dealing with foreign policy and taking foreign policy decisions requires expertize and state-level secrecy. Internal factors are about the role of state-society level inputs in the formation of foreign policy preferences. Internal factors are regime type, political ideologies, national role conceptualizations and geopolitical imaginations, strategic culture, interest groups, public opinion and media. External factors concern the impact of systemic level factors, both at regional and international level, in the formation of foreign policy preferences. Systemic factors are distribution of material power capabilities among states, polarity, geographical location and the nature of the terrain on which states are located. Whereas the individual and internal factors offer an inside-out analysis, external factors offer an outside-in analysis.
First-image theories on foreign policy analysis aim at understanding the role of:
A. Religion in foreign policy
B. Geographical location in foreign policy
C. Worldviews of statesmen in foreign policy
D. Strategic culture in foreign policy
E. Media in foreign policy

Structural realism focuses on the importance of:
A. National role conceptualizations in foreign policy analysis
B. Rational decision makers in foreign policy analysis
C. Political ideology of ruling elites in foreign policy analysis
D. Ethnic lobbies in foreign policy analysis
E. Polarity configurations in foreign policy analysis

Neoclassical realism as a foreign policy analysis theory focuses on the importance of:
A. Systemic factors as the only causal variable in foreign policy analysis
B. How decision makers interpret the external developments taking place at regional and systemic levels based on their world views and internal political calculations
C. State-societal factors as the key variable in foreign policy analysis
D. How personal characteristics of decision makers affect foreign policy outcomes
E. Individual power capabilities of states as the most decisive factor in foreign policy analysis

Organizational behavior approach argues that:
A. Foreign policy preferences are determined by the outcome of rivalries among different civil society organizations.
B. Foreign policy preferences reflect the personal political rivalry between the leaders of governing and opposition parties within the parliament. Making Turkey the leader of the community of Muslim nations.
C. Ministry of foreign affairs is the ultimate decision making authority in foreign policy
D. Foreign policy preferences are an outcome of power rivalries between different organizations within the state administration
E. Powerful leaders determine policies of the organizations they lead.

Cognitive school in foreign policy analysis argues that:
A. Decision makers do not always act rationally
B. Rationality of decision makers is unbounded
C. Geopolitical location of countries is an internal factor determining foreign policy
D. Decision makers have always full knowledge of the environment in which they act
E. Religious beliefs of decision makers do not impact rationality of decision makers.

Which of the following can be said about the internal factors of foreign policy?
A. Internal factors play the most important role in foreign policy.
B. Strategic culture is an internal factor
C. The psychological attributes of leaders is an internal factor.
D. Media is an internal factor.
E. The physical features of terrain on which countries are located is an internal factor.
7. Which of the following can be said about foreign policy understanding of countries which they think are exceptional?
A. Those countries are always ruled by liberal democratic regimes.
B. Those countries think they constitute role models for other countries.
C. Those countries generally adopt isolationist foreign policies.
D. Those countries do not believe that their values are universal and can be adopted by other countries.
E. Those countries do always try to transform other countries in the image of their values and norms.

8. States’ maneuvering capability in foreign policy would be the highest in:
A. Anarchical system
B. Hierarchical system
C. Bipolar system
D. Unipolar systems
E. Multipolar system

9. Which of the following can be said about foreign policy preferences of maritime powers?
A. Those powers do generally feel themselves more secure than land powers
B. Those powers tend to prioritize expenditure on army.
C. Those powers generally pursue expansionist foreign policies
D. Those powers generally pursue democracy promotion foreign policies
E. Those powers think that they are global hegemons

10. Which theoretical perspective argues that foreign policy is in essence an organized response to the policies and behaviors of other states?
A. Marxism
B. Neo-classical realism
C. Realism
D. Liberalism
E. Constructivism
Comment on the neoclassical realist approach in foreign policy.

This school of thought tries to combine the insights of structural realism with those of classical realism and liberalism. It offers a more holistic account of foreign policy. However, similar to structural realism, neoclassical realism also gives the main priority to external structural factors, yet unlike the former, neoclassical realism argues that the way how states would respond to external stimuli and make sense of external/systemic factors would be decisively informed by their internal characteristics. International environment offers states a mixture of opportunities and constraints, yet the way how states would make sense of them would be fundamentally shaped by their internal characteristics. The way how states respond to external stimuli is not automatically determined by the anarchical nature of the system. Neo-classical realism has come to fore as the most popular theoretical perspective in recent years in the context of combining internal and external variables with a view to offering a more convincing explanation of foreign policy behaviors. Similar to neorealism, neo classical realism also assumes that systemic variables should be given priority in the sequence of variables that might explain foreign policy outcomes. Yet, unlike the structural realist approach, neo-classical realism argues that the constraining and restraining impacts of external/structural factors should not be taken for granted. States, depending on their internal differences, might respond to similar external/structural stimuli differently. The way how states respond to external developments is not automatically determined by the structural conditions, yet filtered through internal factors.
What kind of insights does the Rational Actor Model offer in foreign policy analysis?

Rational Actor model assumes that leaders act rationally in foreign policy. States are considered to be unitary actors behaving rationally in their relations with other international actors. Rationality suggests that leaders undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the particular courses of action available to themselves and picks the one that would yield the highest amount of benefit and least amount of cost. Leaders make a preference ordering based on the expected payoffs of available courses of action. Stated somewhat differently, exposed to a particular foreign policy problem, leaders enumerate all alternative courses of action and choose the most beneficial one. This approach also holds out that leaders have full knowledge of the foreign policy environment that surrounds them and their emotions, feelings, beliefs, etc., are left outside the picture. In other words, leaders are supposed to be well informed about the dynamics of the problem at hand, the position of other parties, the instruments available to them as well as all facilitating and constraining factors. Foreign policy strategy concerns the search for most optimum ways through which states would materialize their foreign policy goals/ends by dint of available means/instruments at hand. Acting as the spokesperson of their countries, leaders try to achieve national interests of their countries in a rational way. Their fundamental foreign policy concerns are to maximize the material power capability of their countries and ensure the survival and territorial integrity of their states. States are like individuals and they want to have more military and economic power than other states and a stable and peaceful living space. The leadership position they occupy within the state administration shape their attitudes, calculations, choices and behaviors. Their seats shape leaders. This suggests that leaders act in a mechanical way leaving behind all kind of personal characteristics that could potentially have an impact on their choices and behaviors. Leaders acting rationally put the national interests of their countries above their personal priorities and undertake the cost-benefit calculation from the perspective of the state they lead. Rather than bowing to short-term political calculations, leaders are assumed to put long-term national interests of their countries at the center of their foreign policy choices.

Comment on the foreign policy preferences of authoritarian states.

As opposed to democratic states, authoritarian states would feel more comfortable with employing coercive and costly strategies in their foreign policy, since leaders of such regimes would not feel themselves constrained by public opinion and electoral concerns. Such leaders would more likely prioritize the continuation of their rule in government over national interest. That is why authoritarian leaders are more predisposed to take risky and costly decisions in foreign policy. Regime security is more important than national interests in authoritarian states. As opposed to liberal democratic regimes, authoritarian countries are more predisposed to prioritize the principles of realpolitik, sphere of influence, power politics, unconstrained sovereignty and conservatism in their foreign policies. Russia and China offer the best examples in this regard. Whereas liberal approach shapes foreign policy of liberal democratic regimes decisively, authoritarian countries are much more inclined to build their foreign policy on the operational logic of realist school of thought.
Comment on the impact of strategic culture on foreign policy.

*Strategic cultures* of states do also matter in their foreign policy choices and behaviors. This culture is transmitted from one generation to another through education and other socialization processes. Past experiences of wars with others as well as how threats and the means adopted to deal with them were defined in the past decisively shape the contemporary security practices of state. Whether states today prioritize neutrality, isolationism, internationalization, alliance formation or collective security practices is to a significant extent informed by their historical experiences. The experiences of the Ottoman Empire with Russia and western European States during the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries seem to have profoundly shaped the strategic culture and security thinking of the Turkish Republic. The realpolitik security culture, the primacy of the state as the key securitizing actor, the influence of the military in decision making process, the practices of defining security in military terms and in reference to the needs of the state, as well as the predisposition to enter into alliance relationships with western powers against Russia and other third powers can all be considered the fallouts of historical experiences. Past experiences do also seem to account for the salience of siege mentality in Turkish strategic thinking. The idea that Turkey is surrounded by enemies cannot be properly understood outside the context of Turkey's bitter memories with other countries which in the past tried to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Whether states define themselves as maritime or land powers affects their military strategies and financial decisions on armament as well. For example, while the United States and United Kingdom are considered to be maritime powers and build their military strategies decisively on the fire power of navy, marine and air forces, China and Russia tend to give priority to their land forces. Whether states adopt offensive or defensive military capabilities is in great part informed by their strategic cultures. Countries which gained their independence against imperial/colonial powers in the past and built their national identity on the principles of strong nationalism and territorial integrity tend to be more circumspect and cautious in their external relations. If countries are surrounded by numerous neighbors and suffer from siege mentality, their propensity to pursue defensive foreign policies would likely be high. Strategic cultures of states are unique to them and shaped by their historical experiences.
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Chapter 5

Decision Making Processes in Foreign Policy and Sub-State Actors: Bureaucracy, Interest Groups, Pressure Groups, Public Opinion, Media

After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

1. Describe and analyze the major elements of decision making process in foreign policy
   - Distinguish between the major sub-state actors of foreign policy, such as bureaucracy, interest groups, pressure groups by understanding the role of media on decision making process in foreign policy

2. Identify the most important approaches of decision making models

Learning Outcomes

Chapter Outline
- Introduction
- Key Concepts and Models in Decision Making Process
- Sub-State Actors in Decision Making Process in Foreign Policy

Key Terms
- Decision Making Process
- Rational Decision Making
- Organizational Model
- Bureaucratic Model
- Cognitive Approach
- Bureaucracy
- Interest Groups
- Pressure Groups
- Public Opinion
- Media
INTRODUCTION

This chapter aims to deal with decision-making process by focusing on the role of sub-state actors in foreign policy. While doing so, the first thing that is mentioned here is the decision making models in foreign policy in so far as they relate to the influence of the sub-state actors on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. In order to understand the effect of sub-state actors on foreign policy, we need to know the role of bureaucracy, pressure groups, public opinion, interest groups, and media. Hence, the chapter will provide the definitions of these groupings and explain how they relate to foreign policy. The chapter will also discuss the role of the media as an influence on foreign policy both as a constraint and at times as a convenient tool for manufacturing of consent for certain policies while debasing others. In this context, the role of the foreign policy elites will also be discussed.

Manufacturing Consent

A term coined by Walter Lippmann (1889–1974). Lippman felt that in order for democracy to thrive, public opinion should have been managed. This was because of the nature of public opinion as a blunt force that could stir policy in irrational directions. In their book titled Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (1988), Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky further elaborated the concept arguing that the acceptance of government policies by the people of the United States was partly facilitated by mass media and institutions serving a system-supportive propaganda function. This process also included denying the people the ability to access differing views that could lead to them opposing the policies supported by the system. Hence, in their opinion this becomes a propaganda model that promotes the values of the governing elites. On the one hand, some would argue that the consensus manufactured as such enables the society to sustain itself. On the other, especially according to some strains of Marxism, the dominant classes sustain their hegemony through engineering the process of manufacturing the acquiescence of masses through institutions that they control.

KEY CONCEPTS AND MODELS IN DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Decision-making is a process of making choices. It involves coming to a decision by way of gathering relevant information and evaluating possible alternatives. The decision making process involves a set of steps that the decision-maker goes through in order to make cohesive decisions. When it comes to the issue of foreign policy, decision-making could be viewed as a process of reaching different political objectives.

Decision Making Process and Foreign Policy

Decision making process in foreign policy requires a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach to analyze foreign relations in today’s globalized world. The reason of such diversity stems out of the multiplicity of decision makers and differing management styles in foreign policy. Since politics at the systemic level is an outcome of complex subsystems of ideas, the importance and impact of individual choices and isolated decision units should not be overemphasized. Though, one cannot afford to neglect the impact of the decision-makers and groups on foreign policy as well. In fact, the foreign policy decision-making process comprises of a rather complex network of interactions between the systemic and individual levels. Explaining this complexity requires learning the definition of decision-making and the core elements of the decision processes in foreign policy. Hence, the question of who makes foreign policy and how becomes crucially important. In foreign policy literature, the core assumption is that foreign policy is run by individuals, “acting alone or in concert with others and taking advantage of opportunities or acting within constraints.” (Breuning, 2007, p.59).
Decision units

Are the individuals or group of individuals, (for example an executive committee such as a National Security Council) who are able, authorized and responsible for making foreign policy decisions while also preventing any other government agency from unequivocally altering, suspending or blocking that decision.

The MGK has been a part of consecutive Turkish constitutions since 1961, and functions as a consultative body on issues of national security and by implication on issue of foreign policy. It is tasked with producing the classified National Security Policy Document, widely known as the “Red Book”, probably the most important document on national security in Turkey.

The Council has been modified several times in terms of its institutional structure. Today, it is characterized by a civilian majority and is led by the President.

Source: www.mgk.gov.tr

As Morin and Paquin (2018, p.102), states, “the decision-making process in foreign policy varies as a function of the leaders’ management style”. What creates different foreign policy styles in today’s globalized world is related to how leaders approach their country’s foreign policy priorities. In other words, different ideas, worldviews, logics of action, management styles lead to different foreign policy decision making processes and, hence, different foreign policy decisions.

Obviously the decision-makers neither operate in a vacuum, nor they could achieve much without the enabling institutions and mechanisms of the state. Therefore, the decision-making process in foreign policy cannot be completely understood without an informed discussion on a modern state. The states’ ability to influence foreign policy outcomes depends on their resources, capabilities and the instruments that they avail to themselves to create power and influence to limit, affect and change the behavior of other states. A good news for analysts of foreign policy is that the said attributes of states are finite and observable. In other words, a hierarchical categorization of states according to their capabilities and power is doable. This accounts for a landscape where not only different foreign policy styles, especially apparent in the implementation of decision-making, is possible, but also provides a framework where anticipation and analysis of probable decisions is viable.

Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI): https://www.fpri.org/

Implementation is a different way of naming decision-making. However, the concepts implementation and decision-making should not be used interchangeably since not every decision needs to be implemented. In other words, implementation is described as “a set of discrete acts or as a process” (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p. 245).
Three Paradigmatic Works of Foreign Policy Analysis

“Richard Snyder

Decision-making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics by Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1954: also see Snyder et al., 1963; reprinted in 2002).

Contributed a focus on the decision-making process itself as part of the explanation, rather than just foreign policy outputs.

James Rosenau


Development of actor-specific theory that would lead to the development of generalizable proposition at the level of middle range theory.

Harold and Margaret Sprout

Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956: expanded and revised in article form in 1957 and their 1965 book The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics).

Foreign policy can only be explained with reference to the psycho-milieu (the psychological, situational, political, and social context) of the individuals involved in the decision-making” (Hudson, 2008, p. 14).

Decision Makers as Influencers of Foreign Policy

Under the duress created by processes of globalization on the traditional state, foreign policy is increasingly becoming a non-exclusive domain for states and their decision-making elites. In other words, there are several other actors that are not other states that are able to influence a state’s foreign policy. These might be actors outside of the territory of a state as well as agencies located within the borders of the state itself. Therefore, in order to understand decision-making process and the role of sub-state actors in foreign policy, we need to know who can be viewed as a decision-maker in foreign policy.

A common sense, colloquial definition of foreign policy decision-makers could be made as, units making decisions in the name of global political actors concerning their external environment. Apparently, it is not always an easy task to define who are the decision-makers. Especially in a democratic state, the decisions are usually taken as a result of a collective process based on collective deliberation. As a result, most foreign policy decisions could be viewed as taken by a group of individuals providing their ideas and insights, contributing their expertise and feedback and participating in the shaping of the outcome through a process of deliberation and negotiation. It is assumed that this process is characterized by rationality. As a result, the question and boundaries of whom the decision makers in foreign policy are shows variations in accordance with the internal and external factors pertaining to domestic political context.
However, there are issues to be tackled with, as rationality is what decision-makers strive for, or more often than not a justifier of the accuracy of their decisions, than a standard that defines decision-making processes. After all, political leaders are decision-makers that are human beings like the rest of us. Much like the rest of us, they suffer from cognitive biases that distort their minds, leading to deviations in their perception and judgment of the situation from the reality of the challenge before them. They usually are as vulnerable to cognitive dissonances. Therefore, when they are left in a position that leaves them in between their long held ideas, beliefs and values and circumstances contradicting the said ideas, beliefs and values, they try to resolve it by adapting their perception of the situation rather than adopting their behavior to the reality of it. This could be done by either creating a new cognition of the reality they face by adding new parts or ignoring and denying information that leads to the dissonance etc. Also, decision-makers resort to heuristics, or more simply put “rules of thumb”, like the rest of us. Human brain is “hardwired to find patterns in complexity” and finds solace in avoiding it. It naturally prefers simple explanations to complex ones as “logic and deductive reasoning take a lot of energy” (Hudson, 2007, p. 42). This is an important reason why it is easy for the general public and nonspecialists to subscribe to conspiracy theories. All of these factors make decision-makers prone to become cognitive misers as often as the rest of us, clouding, destabilizing and faulting the decision-making processes on foreign policy.
Independent of how they think, the personality of decision makers also has an impact on their way of making foreign policy decisions. Different leaders bring different leadership styles and varying biases to office “and can exercise dramatically different influences over their countries’ foreign policies.” Building on the ‘motivational’ model of decision making developed by Irving Janis and Leon Mann in their 1977 study *Decision Making*, Alden and Aran underline that “leaders are emotional beings seeking to resolve internal decisional conflict’ and the influence of emotions are most visible in times of crisis when “stress intervenes, causing a lack of ability to abstract and tolerate ambiguity and an increased tendency towards aggressive behaviour” kicks in (Alden and Aran, 2017, p.28). It is also plausible and completely possible that people, including leaders, might misperceive a situation, its dynamics, including the motivations of their adversaries. What leads to misperception is a gap between the real circumstances governing the situation and the psychological environment that is influencing the decision maker. This might lead to escalation or de-escalation of a crisis, stemming out of completely different assessments of the same objective situation by decision makers perceiving the situation from their own psychological milieu. These might be influenced by the constraints within which the individual performs, the specific contents of the environments, and the frame of reference factors (Vertzberger, 1982).

**Conspiracy Theories**

“Conspiracy” is derived from the Latin word *conspirare*. It means ‘to breath together’ and signifies the coming together of a number of individuals in order to act in complicity to reach a desired outcome. As the world around us gets intractably complex and the pace and quantity of the information flow that the general public is exposed outruns its cognitive ability, and depth of knowledge, required for processing it, “conspiracy theories have migrated from the margins of the society to the center ground of politics and public life and have become a ubiquitous feature of contemporary political and public culture” as an “epistemological quick fix” (Byford, 2011, p. 3). As people are inclined to hold onto explanations that provide a coherent quick answer to an otherwise complex issue, once adopted, conspiracy theories become incised into the mind. Conspiracy theories emphasize the human agency’s intentional role over that of structure. They overlook historical causality and attribute causality to human agency’s capabilities of design and determination. On the one hand, they are over-generalizing, while on the other, they are reductionist. They simplify events usually by reducing an output that has been produced by diverse, multiple inputs into a single cause outcome, making it more intelligible for the general-public in the process. “Conspiracies are especially likely to become popular when they feed already existing prejudices or superstitions” (Grüter, 2004, p. 70). The current pervasiveness and popularity of conspiracy theories may also be attributed to them being convenient vehicles for aspirant politicians and self-proclaimed experts in their vie for attention, legitimacy and influence. It should be noted that conspiracy theories in fact does not bestow the recipient of the information thus provided an increased ability to understand, and hence, deal with the challenge they face. On the contrary, they often feed into the feeling of insecurity and breed vulnerability in the face of the “puppets” devising a “grand scheme”. Yet, it is also true that the label “conspiracy theory” is used to dismiss and delegitimize dissenting, unorthodox opinions. Taking into consideration that conspiracy theories are a frequent occurrence in politics and international relations, a student of foreign policy should be well aware of both their nature as a flabbergast, aimed at desensitizing and disheartening the public, and as a convenient political tool for delegitimizing alternative, nonconformist explanations.

Overcoming such difficulties mostly stemming out of the ontology of the decision maker as a human being is not easy. Yearning for some abstract notion of efficiency in decision making regarding an environment that is as complex and, more often than not, ambiguous as the realm of international relations, shaping and getting shaped by diverse, and at times contradictory, influences and limitations exerted by human character, cognitive abilities, structural and systemic factors is a demanding effort. What is more, the foreign policy decision making environment is not a court where decision makers and their circle of advisors, political allies, and even bureaucrats – however problematic their internal networks of relations might be – play a game of diplomacy with their counterparts elsewhere. On the contrary, not only that a “foreign policy decision that is qualified as rational is not necessarily the result of an inclusive process where participants share a common objective and genuinely strive to reach a consensus”, (Morin and Paquin, 2018, pp.108-9), the domestic landscape often serves as a multiplier of complexities inherent in the process. Ideally, an efficient and functional checks and balances system that normally lies at the heart of a democratic system is expected to have a rationalizing impact on foreign policy decision-making. Not only the deliberative nature of democratic politics but also the public scrutiny that it involves is thought to generate more rational outcomes than would otherwise be possible. Also, at times in democratic states the systems forcing of open diplomacy works as a constraint against the kind of aggressive behavior that the decision makers are prone under duress. However, it is equally possible that the pressure created by the public opinion, manipulated by those who are in government or by those who are in opposition or by some special interest groups through the manufacturing of consent, may sway foreign policy into a more risky, irrational, even aggressive stance. The pressures created by the omnipresent political instinct of staying in power might generate behavior that might be in the interest of those who are in power, albeit with very meager outcomes for the long-term interests of the state and society. As such, even though the case for democratization of foreign policy and advocacy for collective decision making processes that enables diverse segments of the society contribute in the decision making process remains a solid argument, there are inescapable intricacies and linkages between the realms of domestic and foreign policies.

The Linkage Between Domestic and Foreign Policy

A famous quote generally attributed to American politician Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill states that “All politics is local”. Undoubtedly the domestic political landscape does have a profound effect in shaping foreign policy. The strength of the government, the domestic political climate, the relations amongst political parties and between them and civil society have an important bearing on the decision making environment on foreign policy. After all, usually the most important element of decision-making process in foreign policy is the “political struggle and bargaining between groups” (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1990, p. 477) within a given polity. The aim for all actors involved in this process is, “to maximize its interests, agendas, and goals” (Allison, 1971, p.257).
Apart from the impact of intertwined networks of relations between disparate groups with differing priorities, what complicates foreign policy decision making environment more is the impact of transnational actors on different elements of the society. Rosenau called this phenomenon “linkage politics”. Linkage politics is defined as “a recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one state and is reacted in another” (Rosenau, 1969, 45). Growing linkages between the international system and domestic environment, where foreign policy decisions are made, forces foreign policy analysts to re-examine the role of the state as the exclusive sentinel governing the relations of their own society with the rest of the world.

Rosenau identified three kinds of linkages. Reactive linkages are observed when an event in one society leads to an impromptu reaction in another. Here governments play no role. This might be exemplified by the reactions that Turkish society shows to the events between the Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip, and Israel. Emulative linkages happen when a development in one society is imitated by another. The events of the so-called Arab Spring that started in Tunis in 2010 quickly spreading to Libya, Egypt, and Syria are a case in point. Finally, Rosenau points out to penetrative linkages. What he means here is deliberate attempts of elements of one society to influence and, at times, manipulate the other. Such attempts usually involve soft power and utilize means like public diplomacy, but might also include lobbying and propaganda activities. Some of the moves aimed at penetrative linkages are usually perceived by more nationalistic elements in the receiving society as hostile acts targeted towards manipulating and organizing the society and politics. The increasingly globalized nature of international relations creates an environment where there are myriad linkages across societies.

**Arab Spring**

The Arab Spring was a series of pro-democracy uprisings that was ignited in December 2010, in Tunis when street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire to protest the arbitrary seizing of his vegetable stand by the police. Starting from the Spring of 2011, the protests spread to other countries in the Middle East and North Africa including Morocco, Syria, Libya, Egypt and Bahrain. The political and social impact of these popular uprisings was transformative and led to the overthrow of long-standing authoritarian leaders like Libya’s Muammar Al Qaddafi, and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, while in Syria a Civil War still goes on. Whether Arab Spring movements were successful is a question that is not easy to answer as they mostly failed to bring increased democracy and cultural freedom to even in the states that regime change occurred.

**Source:** All Jazeera [https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/01/egypt-revolution-160124191716737.html](https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/01/egypt-revolution-160124191716737.html)
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Despite the inclination of the traditional foreign policy experts, analysts and bureaucrats directly dealing with foreign and security policy to keep these areas as exclusive, independent, realms, “policy outcomes are vulnerable to events which are primarily ‘domestic’ and, conversely,…. foreign policy impacts upon domestic politics” (Hill, 2003, p. 219). This makes a return to traditional, elite-run, paternalistic model of foreign policy largely impractical in the current international system. The more competitive and transparent nature of politics makes an exclusionist and exclusivist foreign policy management style fundamentally tricky.

In actuality, foreign and domestic are categories that gain meaning only with respect to each other. They are also two competing realms of action that the governments are obliged to prioritize for the purpose of allocation of resources. As governments have to live with the political consequences of their preferences, these choices become a crucial area where a lot of bargaining takes place. These preferences are typically made according to whom the decision makers in question feel primarily responsible to within their societies, and also at times, are taken in consideration of the cost of securing the confirmation of parts of the society with relevant credibility to legitimize the act. The problem of responsibility begs for the answer of questions such as, who are the decision makers core constituency, what are the shared values between the decision makers and their constituencies and how do these values relate to the available preferences, etc. The dilemma of confirmation, on the other hand, calls for determination of the importance of the foreign policy problem, existing political alliances and climate in the country, as well as the structure and nature of the political system that mediates and governs these relations. It should be noted that as states get destabilized, the line between domestic politics and foreign policy gets blurred, and they become thoroughly penetrated by outside interest. Such is the situation in most of the Middle East states. Also, “Where we find weak, ‘failed’, ‘quasi’, or ‘prebendal’ states we shall probably find weak, erratic and dependent ‘foreign policies’” (Hill, 2003, p. 224).

**Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Decision Making**

Over recent years, there has been an outstanding paradigm shift in principal International Relations theories to take in the domestic factors in decision making process in foreign policy. Through the lenses of classical and structural realism, the notion of foreign policy is a subject of high politics. However, the area of domestic politics is also engrossed with “the legislature, interest groups, and the general public” as well (James and Rioux, 1998, p.781-2). As it was explained in the previous chapters, states are viewed as billiard balls within the scope of the realist school of thought. Concerning this, “and what goes on inside does not (and should not) affect how states interact on the international table” (James and Rioux, 1998, p.781-2).

On the other way around, after a major shift in IR theories considering the impacts of the role of domestic politics on foreign policy decision making processes, these two spheres have become more interwoven, then formerly supposed. It is important to discuss that the extent to which domestic politics affects decision making processes in foreign policy. As said by Fearon (1998, p.302), “the distinction between two types of systematic IR theory implies two basic ways that domestic politics can enter into the explanation of foreign policy. Put simply, domestic politics can matter either (a) by causing states to pursue suboptimal foreign policies, or (b) when differences in states’ political institutions, cultures, economic structures, or leadership goals unrelated to relative power are casually relevant to explaining different foreign policy choices”.

The interconnectedness between foreign policy and domestic politics is mostly expressed through political economy models. As stated by Mesquita and Smith (2012, p.163), these models “assess foreign policy choices within a game theoretic perspective, identifying equilibrium behavior induced by domestic political concerns including policy preferences and domestic institutional structures”. Other than that, the significance of decision makers in foreign policy analyses can be related to the ones who make foreign policy decisions. According to literature, foreign policy choices are made by individuals like national leaders. For that reason, the primary point of researches on the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy is the agency issues. In particular, “domestic institutional structures, such as the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of governance and the extent to which government is accountable and transparent or personalist and opaque, are also viewed as central to shaping the interplay between domestic and international leaders, elites, and ordinary citizens” (Mesquita and Smith, 2012, p. 163).
In conformity with the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis, there is a huge debate about the role of domestic politics in decision making process in foreign policy. This is because most of the entire foreign policy decisions are made by decision makers in a particular domestic environment implicating “the values, national character, political culture, and historical traditions of a society, its structural attributes (size, level of industrialization, form of government, etc.), and the particular political issues that are important at any given time” (Gerner, 1995, p.21). What we mean by saying domestic factors in foreign policy is fundamentally the factors which are external to the formal state fabric, i.e. “lobbyists, the media, class factors, constitutional restrictions” (Alden and Aran, 2017, p. 63). To understand how domestic factors create an impact upon foreign policy, what needs to be done is to classify the major political actors in domestic politics which are available as summarized below:

**Domestic Actors**
- the executive branch of government
- the legislative branch
- the judicial branch
- political parties, their factions and wings
- businesses and business coalitions
- political action groups
- domestic interest groups
- the media
- unions
- state governments
- powerful/influential individuals, such as the Senate majority leader, former presidents, etc.
- epistemic communities, such as environmental scientists
- religious groups
- criminal and terrorist forces (domestic)

**Non-domestic Actors:**
- other nation-states
- treaty alliances
- multinational corporations
- international nongovernmental organizations
- intergovernmental organizations
- trans-governmental coalitions
- foreign media
- foreign powerful/influential individuals
- foreign epistemic communities
- foreign courts
- foreign criminal and terrorist forces (Hudson, 2013, p.144-5)

One can claim that it is noteworthy to explain the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy nexus the studies of James Rosenau (1966, 1967). His main contribution to the field by writing his famous pre-theory article in 1966 was to see “the concept of issue area as a vertical boundary in politics” (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p.285). Issue area is a term used first by Robert Dahl (1961) as an important element of a political system, but Dahl has not defined the conception of issue-area in a definite way. As stated by Sher (1977, p.44), Dahl labeled three issue-areas “which were of relevance to governmental and non-governmental leadership, these being urban development, education and nominations”. In this sense, James Rosenau has taken Dahl’s approaches to issue-area and took it one step further. For Rosenau, the conception of issue-area composed of “(i) a cluster of values, the allocation or potential allocation of which (ii) leads the affected or potentially affected actors to differ so greatly over (a) the way which the values should be allocated or (b) the horizontal levels at which the allocations should be authorized that (iii) they engage in distinctive behavior designed to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values” (Rosenau, 1971, p.141). To put it simply, Rosenau proposed four issue areas in his seminal piece of pre-theory as territorial, status, human resources, and non-human resources.
As parallel with the ground, the principal aim of Rosenau in his pre-theory article was not to identify the internal sources of foreign policy. As quoted by Starr (1998, p.5) from Rosenau (1966, p.28), “…the dynamics of the process which culminate in the external behavior of societies remain obscure. To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To uncover processes that affect external behavior is not to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or to indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other.” As opposed to focus on to identify domestic factors, Rosenau tried to gather the relevant sources of foreign policy decisions into five different classifications and presenting newer methods to range the significance of these variables. Here, one should note that his pre-theory was not to aim for generating a fully stipulated model. As claimed by Gerner (1995, p.19), “it was a typology for organizing research on foreign policy”. The significance of his contribution to the field was much more than it was likely assumed. Until 1964, one can assume that the role of domestic factors on foreign policy did not even prevail.

There are multiple constraints affecting decision makers while making foreign policy decisions. Within the scope of states’ foreign relations with other states, one can discuss that a state’s foreign policy decisions might be viewed as dependent on other states’ foreign policy preferences and actions. One can discuss how domestic politics influence the foreign policy of states. Indeed this is an important topic of international politics that was eloquently addressed by Rosenau (1969). His studies in the 1960s have led to the emergence of school of comparative foreign policy analysis. As criticized by Rosenau, the main issue to be dealt with is the one-case studies in foreign policy with a lack of scientific position. Instead of examining single case studies, it is much better to follow a comparative approach on foreign policy analysis with a diligent eye on the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy.

In that vein, one can easily assert that these multiple constraints may affect each state in consonance with the political effectiveness, namely the political power of states in foreign policy. Some historical examples of such a dichotomy show that some middle or small powers might pursue an omnibalancing strategy in order to restrain some internal and external challenges that can cause unintended foreign policy outcomes. One of the core assumptions of this approach says that several developing countries with weak institutions might create an impact on international politics because of irresolute internal conflicts within emerging states.

Omnibalancing The concept of omnibalancing was firstly coined by Steven David (1991) in order to explain such a tendency. David argues that if the main threat to decision-makers is seen as coming from within, challenging domestic political power of the said decision-makers, as in the case of 3rd world states, then foreign policy might be deployed chiefly as a tool to deal with internal threats. The aim here becomes generating domestic legitimacy and weakening domestic opponents. However, to the extent that foreign policy is designed to balance threats internally, it may not be designed to deal effectively with those in the external arena.
SUB-STATE ACTORS IN DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN FOREIGN POLICY

The present part of this chapter aims to address the impact of the role of sub-state actors in foreign policy decisions. By the end of the Cold War, the number of political actors who could shape the way of implementing a foreign policy decision has increased a lot. There were not only nation-states but also sub-state actors that could create a significant impact upon decision making process by either putting some pressure on elected officials or gathering and deliberating information to decision makers in order to influence governments. Consequently, there is a link between the role of sub-state actors and decision making process in foreign policy, which is explained in this section. To put it another way, the primary objective of this part is to explain the function of pressure groups, interest groups, think-tanks, the notion of public opinion, and media within the scope of foreign policy decision making process and show how these actors affect foreign policy decisions.

Internal Sources of Foreign Policy

There are some internal factors that influence foreign policy decisions, such as bureaucracy, interest groups, pressure groups, media and public opinion. In that vein, some of these sources are used interchangeably, but a slightly dissimilar characteristic might be occurred when it comes to its usage in context. Along with such an interchangeability, think-tanks are also one of those sub-state actors that create an impact on foreign policy. With respect to its meaning, one can state that “a think tank is an independently financed research institute concerned with the study of international relations and foreign policy issue areas” (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p.531-2). Within the sphere of foreign policy analyses, what is mostly debated about think tanks is whether they are independent agents from state when it comes to the issue of affecting decision making processes in foreign policy or not. The reason of such a debate about the autonomous characteristic of think-tanks has emerged by the outset of the Cold War period. This is the major point where the role of think-tanks in foreign policy making has been criticized. As stated by Evans and Newnham (2008, pp.531-2), “…their independence is compromised and there is a trade-off between detachment and relevance in the work and publications of these bodies”.

Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy is any wide-reaching group of assigned officials in order to execute foreign policy decisions of the decision makers. The first usage of bureaucracy was when Max Weber (1864-1920) described the term as the most affective way to establish an organization and administration. Besides, its complex structure of offices, tasks, and rules shape bureaucracy as a large scale institution in order to coordinate the work of employees. In that vein, bureaucracy has a significant impact on foreign policy of which has become an important element of foreign policy literature by the 1960s. The role of the administrative structures of government on foreign policy decision making has become a key topic for the studies in that field. Within the scope of foreign policy, bureaucracy is viewed as a sort of synonym for governments which means a group of official individuals with different policy preferences.

The impacts of bureaucracy upon foreign policy can be understood through the concepts of diplomacy and diplomats. Diplomats are individuals who work in embassies for their governments. Most states establish their diplomatic ties with other states via embassies. In that vein, embassy alludes to a location which represents the diplomatic office of a state in the capital of another country.
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Interest Groups

An interest group is a group of people who share out a common interest. Putting it differently, these are organized groups of individuals that have an attraction on governments when it comes to foreign policy decisions. Labor unions, lobby groups, important figures in business, religious groups might be viewed as interest groups and each of them has distinctive characteristic when it comes to their impacts on foreign policies in their countries. Most interest groups have a participation system in which they can easily get in touch with each other in order to fulfill their goals whatever these goals are.

When they interact with governments, interest groups mostly do two main things. First, interest groups attempt to shape policies by mobilizing the voters or through the way of putting direct pressure on officials. Second, they sometimes prefer to gather information for officials when the need arises. Within this framework, it may be said that well-funded interest groups can provide too costly information to governments when bureaucrats are not enable to reach them.

What interest groups really do is not the same with political parties. This is the point that should not be overlooked. Interest groups aim to influence governments and their policies; however, political parties exist carrying aim of holding political power. When it comes to its dictionary meaning, interest groups can consist of any collection of people organizing an event to support something in foreign policy. One can describe interest groups as a group of people who share same things in order to team up and to establish an interest group for supporting governments economically through donations.

As defined by Morin and Paquin (2018, p.188), “interest groups are organizations dedicated to defending particular interests within the state decision-making process”. Another view on the concept of interest groups is developed by Robert H. Trice (1978). As explained by Trice (1978, p. 238), interest groups can be considered as “auxiliary actors that stand between the government and the mass public, tied to the governmental decision-making system by channels of communication”. On that premise, the concept of pressure groups can be viewed as “an organized group that does not put up candidates for election, but seeks to influence government policy or legislation” (Trueman, 2015).

One can primarily assume that one of the principal features of interest groups is to put domestic pressure on decision making process in foreign policy. As connected with this, most interest groups have three characteristics in common within the scope of the study of Morin and Paquin (2018). In the first place, they are able to affect governments for which they should collaborate with other governments. Secondly, the primary coalitions safeguarding economic and political interests utilize comparable ways of their actions. Lastly, interest groups can pull strings during the preparatory phase of the decision making process in foreign policy. As specified by Morin and Paquin (2018, p.189), “…they can influence the frame through which an issue will be understood by the decision-makers and ensure that it is actually included on the political agenda”.

As one of the founders of modern sociology, Max Weber was a German sociologist born in 1864. His seminal work was The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905) in which Weber focused on the relation between Protestantism and capitalism by discussing his thoughts on the conception of bureaucracy.
Pressure Groups

The conception of pressure groups and interest groups refer to two different classifications within the framework of sub-state actors in foreign policy. One can easily assume that it would be wrong to use them interchangeably. The difference between these two of them lies behind how they are defined at the first place. Pressure groups can mostly be defined as a group of people who share particular political interests. They aspire to increase the level of awareness about some political or social dissident, which is one of the interests of the community by gaining publicly support. As interest groups do, pressure groups also aim to influence governments, not take power themselves. For affecting governments, pressure groups are able to work in different environments with multiple variety of people through different ways like lobbying, media campaigning, and demonstrations. Within the scope of its multiple social environment of pressure groups, it may be said that the existence of pressure groups enhances pluralism in a society.

As interest groups do, pressure groups also aim to influence governments, not take power themselves. For affecting governments, pressure groups are able to work in different environments with multiple variety of people through different ways like lobbying, media campaigning, and demonstrations. Within the scope of its multiple social environment of pressure groups, it may be said that the existence of pressure groups enhances pluralism in a society.

The Role of Media and Public Opinion in Foreign Policy

Governments as a decision maker of a state mostly need to have legitimacy publicly in foreign policy decisions. Such a common acceptance of an authority is needed by governments in order to survive in an anarchical international environment. That is why the significance of public opinion might be evaluated within the scope of foreign policy goals of a state. In this part, what we are tackling with is the role of media and public opinion under the frame of decision making processes in foreign policy. For that reason, this part consists of two subparts explaining the function of public opinion and media in foreign policy issues separately by providing a solid conceptual knowledge about that discussion.

Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

It should be said from the start that the concept of public opinion may be defined in many ways within the framework of foreign policy. In other words, in the literature on public opinion there exists a variety of definitions. For example, Pierre Bourdieu has approached to public opinion as if there is no such a thing like that by saying that “public opinion does not exist” (1979:124). Apart from the discussion about its ontology, one can define the concept of public opinion as “the attitudes and opinions of the population of a society. It is often often measured by through the the use of surveys” (Breuning, 2007, p.183). What is the most arguable point on this subject is what is the best way of measuring public opinion and the jury is still out there. Though public opinion surveys conducted perpetually, as claimed by Morin and Paquin (2018, p.167), “the press only reports a tiny selection of polls” and decision makers in foreign policy kept constantly be informed with these poll results as if these are important elements of public opinion.

Considering one of the fundamental elements in the domestic milieu of states, there is a debate around the conception of public opinion of which discuss that whether public opinion determines foreign policy directly or not. Until the midst of 1970s, the concept of public opinion has been approached exceedingly critical by many scholars. In fact, public opinion was discerned as “being incoherent, volatile and capricious” (Morin and Paquin, 2018, p. 168). Another scholar, Almond (1960) has approached to public opinion in the same vein with Morin and Paquin (2018). For Almond (1960), “public opinion was assumed to be volatile and emotional concerning foreign policy issues” (Powlick and Katz, 1998, p.30).
Even though the way of affecting foreign policy decisions through public opinion has unfolded considerably, how to conduct a public opinion survey or how decision makers make foreign policy decisions has not changed that much. Corresponding to that discussion, some scholars argued that “…public opinion is irrelevant to the foreign policy process, or that public opinion follows the chief executive on foreign policy matters rather than influencing decision making” (Gerner, 1995, p. 22). In light of which of them determines what, it should be kept in mind that while decision makers make decisions in foreign policy, they mostly have lack of knowledge of public opinion. However, it does not mean that agents getting involved in decision making processes in foreign policy have any consideration about public opinion.

Within the scope of foreign policy, one can claim that public opinion is likely to be framed in a graded way with an attentive public facilitating between the mass public and decision makers in foreign policy. As claimed by Evans and Newnham (1998, p.456), one can assume that two communication archetypes dawn upon the framework of public opinion. “First, there is horizontal communication within the elite and between the elite and the informed public. Second, there is vertical communication between the leadership and the mass of the informed population” (Evans and Newnham, 1998, p.456).

One can discuss that there has been a growing interest in foreign policy analyses nexus public opinion especially through the outset of the Cold War period. In that vein, some scholars like Gamson and Modigliani (1966), Verba et al. (1967), Mueller (1973) dealing with foreign policy and public opinion in their studies agreed upon “the followership model of public input into the formulation of national security policy” (Powlick and Katz, 1998, p.29). Within the framework of public opinion and its relation to foreign policy, what should be explained in detail here is the interconnectedness between foreign policy and public opinion. In other words, the reason why decision makers in foreign policy should take into consideration the public opinion while making foreign policy decisions is core to that discussion.

To begin with the functions of public opinion, one can claim that public opinion does not control decision makers perpetually. In lieu of leading decision makers in foreign policy, public opinion put some limitations. As exemplified by Morin and Paquin (2018, p.174), “if public pressure fails to prevent a government from entering a war, it can force the government to strive to create a multilateral coalition or prevent it from deploying weapons of mass destruction from the outset”. Another feature of public opinion within the confines of foreign policy is to stabilize foreign policy issues. Putting it differently, one can claim that public opinion tends to strain pressure on decision makers in foreign policy.

Many scholars approaching to public opinion in dichotomous terms, e.g. Rosenau (1966), Hughes (1979), Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1994), Kegley and Wittkopf (1996), have beheld the features of public opinion over directedness. In other words, if there has been no direct impact of public opinion on foreign policy issues, then, there would be any role to be mentioned. In that respect, one should also be known here as related to public opinion is the opinion makers. As identified by Rosenau (1961) through an analogy of the theater in which he has equalized opinion makers along with actors on the stage, there has been sixteen types of opinion makers who can urge decision making processes in foreign policy so far as possible.
Media and Foreign Policy

It is to be noted from the start that the role of media in foreign policy is a riser in the subject of domestic politics nexus foreign policy issues. In other words, there are plenty of explanations on the functions of media; however, what we are trying to deal with here is to understand its relation with how media affects decision making processes in foreign policy. Before delving into deeper, it would be much better to focus on the dictionary meaning of that concept. According to this, media means the primary tool of mass communication through broadcasting, adversaries, publishing and the internet in order to reach and influence people extensively. Putting it differently, it is a sort of communication channel which news, entertainment products, adversaries are delivered to mass public widely.

In that vein, it is noteworthy to take into consideration of how Rosenau has approached to media within the framework of foreign policy. As quoted from Rosenau by Powlick and Katz (1998, p.29), the role of media is “to circulate opinions between decision makers and elites whom he labeled opinion makers”. Considering this, one can claim that media is not just a random envoy among governments and publics. Besides, it would be also wrong to state that media contemplates public opinion straightaway.

The influence of media on foreign policy goes above and beyond an unbiased public with an impact upon decision makers in foreign policy. Firstly, media can exert pressure on major agents in foreign policy to follow a stance on foreign policy problems which have been disregarded at one point. Secondly, as it is explained by the cognitive approaches to foreign policy, one can claim that human mind is limited, and it is impossible to absorb all the relevant knowledge from the social environment. On account of this, decision makers in foreign policy need some reliable sources for learning how public approaches to their foreign policy decisions. That is why, foreign press reports and editorial notes in principal newspapers are able to exert influence on decision makers’ ideas and core beliefs on foreign policy issues. In the subject of media nexus foreign policy, there has been a concept, which is CNN effect, used to explain such an influence on national leaders. As claimed by Morin and Paquin (2018, pp.183-4), “…several heads of state openly acknowledge that they were influenced by pictures broadcast on CNN or reports in The New York Times”. 

CNN effect is a term used to portray “…circumstances in which news media coverage directly affects foreign policy decision-making, causing policy makers to pursue course of action that, in the absence of media pressure, they would not have embarked upon” (Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne, 2008, p.390).
Further Reading

Apart from its foreign policy framework, decision making process is a term used to describe a comprehensive approach to those who need a strategy for making decisions. When it comes to the issue of foreign policy, decision making process should be evaluated as part of international politics and how states decide on which foreign policy would be implemented. As related to this, one of the major elements of decision making process in foreign policy is to reach a political objective through multiple political actors. Additionally, the number of decision makers in foreign policy can vary, for example, it may be said that governments and pressure groups can be effective in foreign policy making process.

There are three principal approaches to be explained as shedding lights on decision making models in foreign policy. The first one is the rational decision model which assumes that decision makers are rational actors and make their foreign policy decisions as a zero-sum game. In that vein, decision makers should be consistent with their foreign policy objectives while making their decisions and approach foreign policy choices orderly. The second one is bureaucratic and organizational model which discusses that states are in decline in foreign policy, and governments are becoming more influential and, they engage in foreign policy decisions. One of the seminal works on that model is developed by Graham Allison (1971). The last approach of decision making model is the cognitive approach to foreign policy which criticized rational decision making model in foreign policy. According to that approach, foreign policy is conclusively made by individuals who have limited capacity to think and analyze social phenomenon. That is why, it is much better to approach foreign policy through their cognitive maps. In other words, how individuals think and decide matters a lot in foreign policy making.

In today’s globalized world, it would be wrong to say that nation-states are the only one that make foreign policy decisions. There has been an increase in the number of political actors who have an impact on foreign policy. In that vein, some sub-state actors have a lot in common in foreign policy decision making. Bureaucracy is a group of officials in order to execute foreign policy decisions and play a significant role in foreign policy as diplomats. Interest groups can be described as a group of people who share a common interest, and they have an influence on governments. Pressure groups is a term to be differentiated from interest groups and also political parties which is used to describe the notion of sharing common political interest. When it comes to affect mass publics, the role of media should not be overlooked. One can state that media has significant impact on foreign policy decisions of governments by affecting public opinion. In this sense, public opinion does not solely provide a pure and solid knowledge of what public thinks about a particular foreign policy decision and control decision makers, but also public opinion can create a pressure on government’s foreign policy agenda.
Decision Making Processes in Foreign Policy and Sub-State Actors: Bureaucracy, Interest Groups, Pressure Groups, Public Opinion, Media

1. Which of the following concepts describes the principal actors who make decisions on account of international actors?
   A. NGOs
   B. International corporations
   C. Decision-makers
   D. Individuals
   E. Local communities

2. Which of the following studies is known as a seminal work in bureaucratic politics model in foreign policy?
   A. Essence of Decision (1971)
   B. Politics Among Nations (1948)
   C. Man, the State, and War (1959)
   D. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001)

3. What is the meaning of rationality in foreign policy?
   A. The situation of that political decision makers act whatever they want in foreign policy.
   B. The situation of that states might get involved in global crisis as a mediator when they need to establish long-term relationship among other states.
   C. The situation of that individuals play no role in states’ foreign policy agenda.
   D. The situation of that states might attack anyone whenever they want.
   E. The situation of that decision makers are logical when their behaviors are parallel to the decision maker’s goals.

4. What is the main assumption of cognitive approaches to foreign policy?
   A. Structures are more important than individuals in foreign policy.
   B. States are the only political actors running foreign policy.
   C. Individuals are solely independent actors in foreign policy
   D. Foreign policy is ultimately made by individuals and the decision makers’ belief system is a core to foreign policy decision making process.
   E. Military expenditures have no role in foreign policy decision making process.

5. Which of the following cannot be seen as an actor in domestic politics which has a role in foreign policy decision making?
   A. The legislative branch
   B. Other nation states
   C. The judicial branch
   D. Domestic interest groups
   E. The media

6. Which of the following concepts is not seen as an issue-area developed in Rosenau’s pre-theory?
   A. Territorial
   B. Status
   C. Human resources
   D. Taxes
   E. Non-human resources
Which of the following concepts is not an example of internal sources of foreign policy?
A. Bureaucracy
B. Interest Groups
C. Ministry of Foreign Affairs
D. Pressure Groups
E. Media

What is main difference between political parties and interest groups?
A. While political parties aim to hold political power, interest groups only seek to influence governments.
B. There is no difference between them.
C. While interest groups aim to hold political power, political parties only seek to influence governments.
D. Interest groups are an institutionalized version of political parties.
E. Political parties are core elements of interest groups.

One can assume that the existence of pressure groups in a society can enhance the level of pluralism. Why?
A. There is no such an assumption in the foreign policy literature.
B. It is because the level of social and political actors who create an impact on foreign policy has increased a lot.
C. It is because pressure groups are the leading figures of a democracy.
D. It is because pluralism approaches to the pressure groups as if they show competence in a society
E. It is because pressure groups aim to hold political power in a country

Which of following tools is not a primary tool of media?
A. Broadcasting
B. Publishing
C. Internet
D. Adversaries
E. Constitutions
What is the main purpose of the existence such a multiple variety of domestic actor putting some influence on foreign policy?

By the end of the Cold War, there has been an increase in the number of political actors in international politics.

How do you elaborate natural science from social science? Are they dispensable? If so, why? Or is there any chance to bring them together in order to explain social phenomenon?

According to the philosophy of science, natural science derives from social science when it comes to the observable variables and their measurability. Social science, though, includes a wide variety of concepts as dependent upon social contexts and norms. However, one can assume that there are some laws that run social phenomenon which make social science as science.

Why do decision makers need public opinion? If you were a decision maker in a state, what would you do with your limited knowledge about public opinion? Would you delve into more to get more usable public opinion?

Decision makers need public opinion in order to act in accordant with their foreign policy agenda. While doing so, they need to be supported widely by public in some democratic regimes. One can assume that public opinion would enhance the level of efficiency in decision making process in foreign policy.
For such a discussion see in this Volume, Chapter 1.

References


Chapter 6
Foreign Policy Preferences of States

After completing this chapter, you will be able to

Learning Outcomes

1. Comprehend the dynamics of different foreign policy preferences that states could potentially employ in their external relations
2. Comprehend the dynamics of soft power as a foreign policy preference and distinguish its differences from other power conceptualizations

Chapter Outline

Introduction
Alternative Foreign Policy Preferences
Conclusion

Key Terms
Foreign Policy Analysis
Preferences
Isolationism
Internationalism
Alliances
Balancing
Neutrality
Soft Power

Comprehend the dynamics of different foreign policy preferences that states could potentially employ in their external relations
Comprehend the dynamics of soft power as a foreign policy preference and distinguish its differences from other power conceptualizations
INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy preferences of states are not the same as foreign policy behaviors of states. While the former mainly refers to foreign policy predispositions and interests of states defined in a general and long-term perspective, the latter denotes the implementation of those preferences by dint of particular policy behaviors on the ground. While the former are more abstract and long-term oriented, the latter are more concrete and reflect short-term calculations. Foreign policy preferences are about how states think they could achieve their national interests abroad in long-term perspective. Behaviors are particular policies to be implemented in the field. Preferences are about what those foreign policy interests are, whereas behaviors are about how those interests can be achieved. That said, this chapter discusses alternative foreign policy preferences that states could potentially adopt in line with their national interests. The literature on International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis is replete with numerous preferences, each being defined from different theoretical perspectives.

ALTERNATIVE FOREIGN POLICY PREFERENCES

This section aims to discuss alternative foreign policy preferences of states from a comparative perspective and in light of historical examples provided by foreign policy practices of different states.

Isolationism

Isolationism suggests that states would not want to get involved in political developments taking place outside their territorial borders (Barumoeeller, 2010, 349-371). They might think that they have the power capability to protect their territorial integrity and other key national interests by isolating themselves from the external environment. Isolationist states tend to believe that their geographical location, power capabilities, and the nature of the terrain on which they sit would protect them against external threats. Countries which tend to pursue isolationist foreign policies generally believe that they are self-sufficient and capable of meeting all their needs on their own. On the other hand, the feeling of weakness might also equally lead to isolationist thinking in that the more active they become outside their borders, the more they would be exposed to external challenges and their interests would come under danger. Countries which think they are extremely fragile in terms of their internal characteristics might decide to stay as far away as possible from international developments and entering long-term interactions with other states. Pursuing internationalist policies might incur unbearable costs in their internal affairs. The more relations they establish with other countries and the more active they become in the internal affairs of others, the more likely others might also interfere in their internal affairs.

Countries that tend to pursue isolationist foreign policies are predisposed to believe that they are inherently different from other countries in terms of historical experiences, regime type, and national values (Crothers, 2011, 21-34). They do not easily identify themselves with other countries. States that embrace isolationism tend to believe that they are exceptional among other states. Countries that pursue isolationism abroad would not put claims to regional or international leadership at the center of their foreign policy thinking.

The relevance of both logics, namely self-sufficiency and internal fragility, to isolationism can be clearly seen in the example of the United States foreign policy (Johnstone, 2011, 7-20). Since its establishment in the late 18th century till the beginning of the 20th century, the United States pursued an isolationist foreign policy. During this era, the United States had been weaker than many European colonial powers and the latter had geopolitical designs in the American continent. Lest the US invite direct European involvement in its internal affairs and become the target of geopolitical competitions among European colonial powers, American presidents preferred an isolationist foreign policy line. Focusing on internal nation-building, modernization, and development processes, the American statesmen thought they should not go outside their borders to seek monsters to defeat or to get entangled in long-term alliance relations with other countries.

On the other hand, the reason why isolationism as a foreign policy current has continued to attract many followers since the onset of the 20th century till now cannot be satisfactorily explained by the
logic of fragility. Coming out of the American-Spanish war in 1898, the First World War in 1918 and the Second World War in 1945 as victorious, the United States has become the most powerful country in global politics by quite a wide margin. Protected by two oceans to the east and west, bordering much weaker neighbors to the north and south and outpacing all other countries on the global map in terms of material power capabilities, one would expect isolationism would lose its allure in the eyes of American statesmen, strategists, and people alike. Yet, this has not been the case at all (Nichols, 2013, 390-407). Those who have argued in favor of isolationism since the early 1900s till now share the following points in common. First, the United States has already been powerful enough to deal with each and every state that might potentially threaten core American interest. Second, pursuing an internationalist foreign policy line would allow others to free-ride on the United States. Entering into long-term alliance relationships with other countries through NATO and bilateral security agreements or adopting free-trade with minimum protectionism would benefit others more than the United States. Third, the US would do well to focus its attention on internal problems rather than squandering its money, blood, and other assets for the benefit of others. Fourth, the United States is an exceptionalism country and its values are unique to itself. The best it could do is to become a role model for other countries by pursuing exemplary policies at home.

Another country that has adopted an isolationist foreign policy is North Korea. Here, the logic of fragility is more prevailing than the logic of self-sufficiency even though the Pyongyang regime has put the logic of self-sufficiency at the center of its national interests since the end of the Korean War in 1953. Surrounded by powerful countries to its west, south, and east, namely China, South Korea and Japan, and ostracized by the US-led international community for long, Pyongyang feels itself extremely vulnerable to the outside world. The character of its regime and the meager power capabilities at its disposal do not put North Korea in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the outside world. Pursuing an isolationist foreign policy line seems to be informed by the strategic calculation that this is the most effective way of ensuring the survival of the totalitarian and authoritarian regime in Pyongyang (Sagan, 2017, 72-82).

Comment on the reasons why states adopt isolationism as a foreign policy preference
Internationalism

Another foreign policy preference that states could employ is internationalism. Unlike isolationism, internationalism assumes that states define their national identity and interests in such a way to underline the interests and identities that they share with others in common. From the perspective of internationalism, states think they can achieve their foreign policy interests through close interactions and cooperation with other states in the system. Isolationism and protectionism are discarded in favor of developing closer bonds with other states in different policy realms.

Internationalism holds out that all states sail on the same ship and they need to align their policies with each other in order not to lose in the globalizing world. The underlying assumption here is that the shrinking of the world paves the way for a global community of nation states to emerge. Further integration within a globalizing environment would push states to cooperate with a view to find solutions to common problems and challenges. Internationalism owes a great part of its existence as a foreign policy preference to the liberal conceptualization of international relations, thereby states could mitigate the negative consequences of anarchical structure of international relations and bring into existence a community of common interests and identities by increasing interdependency and cooperation among each other (Dunne and McDonald, 2013, 1-17).

Countries which pursue internationalism as a foreign policy course also tend to believe that it is in their national interests to bring about a particular regional or international environment in line with their national priorities. Playing an active role in their neighborhood and globally would not only help them shape the course of developments outside their borders but also enable them to promote their internal values and norms to third parties. However, one needs to admit that the success of states materializing their national interests through internationalist foreign policies is closely linked with their hard and soft power capabilities. It is generally the case that countries which are comparatively more powerful than others in their regions and globally pursue internationalist foreign policies.

Liberal and realist impulses can simultaneously shape the tone of internationalism. Whereas liberal internationalism preaches for the formation of a community of states united around common liberal identities, values, and interests, realist internationalism is mainly about interstate cooperation on the ground of common foreign and security policy interests (Jahn, 2018, 43-61). Realist internationalists do not argue in favor of regime or nation building attempts abroad. Cooperating with illiberal non-democratic regimes in other countries in the name of stability...
and material national interests would be a typical foreign policy course of action sanctified by realist internationalism. Another difference between the two is that realist internationalists would define foreign policy as an exercise in the name of producing an impact only on the foreign policy behaviors of other states whereas liberal internationalism would go much further than this by putting the transformation of identities and values of other states at the center of foreign policy. Realist internationalists preach the formation of strategic alliances with other states within the framework of collective defense organizations whereas liberal internationalists would support the formation of security communities within the framework of collective security organizations at regional or global levels.

Another faultline within internationalism, particularly as regards the American foreign policy, is between liberal internationalists and neo-conservatives. Liberal internationalists support multilateralism whereas neo-conservatives are in favor of unilateralism. Liberal internationalists support democracy promotion through international organizations, diplomatic channels, and multilateral efforts whereas neo-conservatives feel comfortable with using brute force in promoting democracy. Many American presidents have adhered to liberal internationalist script since the early years of the Cold War era. However, Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Donald Trump can be considered as neoconservative in their foreign policy predisposition (Jervis, 2016, 285-311). The change of Saddam’s regime in Iraq in 2003 through brute force and the adoption of democracy promotion as a security strategy in the post-9/11 era in the Middle East is the best example of neo-conservative version of liberal internationalism in American foreign policy.

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**Picture 6.3** 9/11: Images from New York that shocked the world. For many people across the world the terror attacks of 9/11 played out live on television screens.

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**your turn 2**  
Comment on the differences between liberal internationalism and realist internationalism
Alliances and Balancing

One of the foreign policy assets of countries is alliance relationships they build with other states. In today’s globalizing and interconnecting international environment, standing alone is not a virtue. However, the distinction between alliances, viz. collective defense organizations, and other cooperative arrangements that states establish with each other should be spelled out clearly. Alliance relations are different from all others in that members of alliances commit to each other’s security, survival, and territorial integrity and promise to come each other’s aid in case any of them were attacked by countries outside the alliance. Compared to all other cooperative engagements, alliances signify a much deeper cohesion among its members (Johnson, 2017, 736-745). This cohesion and we-feeling might be constructed on the basis of common identity and values or common strategic security interests. The cohesion and harmony would be the highest if alliance members united around both common identity and common interests. The best example in this regard would be NATO, the collective defense organization which came into existence in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Members of NATO shared not only common security interests in the face of the existential threats posed to their survival by the then communist Soviet Union but also such common identity and values as comprising the so-called western international community of liberal democratic states (Cornish, 2004, 63-74).

Unlike collective defense organizations, collective security organizations are much looser in terms of their scope and cohesion. Rather than joining collective defense organizations, membership in collective security organizations might appear a much more attractive foreign policy preference to many states. In such organizations, security is defined indivisible and this offers a great maneuvering capability to its members. Rather than defining a particular country or a group of countries as threats, membership in collective security organizations suggests that members are united around common principles, norms and rules as regards interstate relations. While NATO is a typical collective defense organization, the United Nations is a collective security organization. Members of two rival blocks during the Cold War era also simultaneously existed as members of the United Nations.

NATO is a typical example of hard-balancing in that members bring their material power capabilities together with a view to resist common external threats. Alliances of hard-balancing do also have organizational existence in that members establish formal institutional bureaucratic relations under the roof of alliance organizations.

The existence of formal organizational structure is what separates hard-balancing attempts from soft-balancing exercises. In the case of the latter, a group of countries strategically cooperate among each other to deal with common security threats and challenges more effectively, yet they shun away from forming formal alliance organizations (Paul, 2005, 46-71). It is not sure that they would come to their aid should any of them be attacked by third countries. Countries that form soft-balancing exercises tend to have similar threat perceptions, values, and international vision, yet they also want to preserve their maneuvering capability in relations with other countries. The growing strategic cooperation between Russia and China within the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or BRICS is an example of soft balancing in international relations. Both countries are discontent with the primacy of western powers, particularly the United States, in global politics and question the underlying principles of liberal international order. They support a multipolar international order in which great powers would have equal say in the administration of global politics. They join forces with a view to resisting western powers within established international organizations as well as ensuring that their views are taken into account more frequently. Should they fail to dent the primacy of established western powers in existing international platforms, they would likely intensify their efforts to help bring into existence rival institutional platforms. Transforming existing institutions in their favor, spoiling them from within should they fail in their efforts to transform them, or bring into existence alternative institutional platforms define their boundaries of their strategic cooperation. None of these cooperative actions would though signify the formation of a NATO-like collective defense alliance between one another.
The question of whether alliances are built on the basis of distribution of material power capabilities, common threat perceptions, or common values is an ongoing debate in the academic discipline of International Relations. Structural realists mainly argue that alliances would come into existence somehow automatically if one particular country develops immense material power capabilities over others and the latter were not in a position to deal with the former individually. Claims to global and regional hegemony in the past caused the formation of collective defense alliances. When Napoleon wanted to put European continent under French hegemony in the first half of the 19th century, the other European powers joined their forces to resist this challenge. When Hitler's Germany increased its material power capability spectacularly during the 1930s and began pursuing hegemonic policies in Europe, other major European powers formed a defensive alliance among each other. The ones who argue that alliance would come into existence automatically have a mechanical conceptualization of states. If one particular state disrupts the existing balance of powers, other would join their forces to rebalance it.

On the other hand, some scholars such as Stephen Walt (1987) contend that alliances do not come automatically on the basis of shifting material power capabilities. Some other motivating reasons are needed. He argues that states would form alliance should they all perceive the challenger state as a threat that needs to be contained or defeated. Members of alliances should share common threat perceptions. The argument here is that states balance against threats, not pure shifts in the distribution of material power capabilities within the system at any given time.

Membership in alliances offers its members various benefits. The first and the most important is an iron-clad commitment to their survival and territorial integrity. The security protection provided by the most powerful members of the alliance might also enable the junior members to divert their limited material power capabilities to other tasks, such as economic development and social welfare. NATO seems to be the ideal example to this function. Of all the reasons why the European members of the alliance could deepen their economic and political integration among each other within the framework of the European Union, the security protection provided by the United States seems to be the most vital (Croft, 2000, 1-20). Rather than spending on military capabilities, the American security guarantee seems to have relieved the European allies of financial resources to channel to economic needs. Second, membership in alliances might also serve as ideational glue tying all members to each other. Feeling as part of the same family of nations might provide its members with status. For example, Turkey has long taken comfort of its membership in NATO with respect to its claim that she was a legitimate member of the western international community.

Another question concerning alliances is when alliances end. The consensus view in the literature is that when the existential threat posed to the survival and territorial integrity of members ceases to exist, the alliance dissolves. Yet, this is not always
what happens. For example, even though the Cold War ended with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO has continued to exist. Despite all kinds of intra-alliance ruptures and points of disagreements, NATO members have continued to value their membership in NATO. Rather than parting ways with each other and pursuing unilateral or bilateral security strategies, NATO members have taken great pains at maintaining NATO’s cohesion through the adoption of new tasks. By enlarging the alliance towards the former communist countries of central and eastern Europe, prioritizing crisis-management tasks outside the scope of Article 5 missions and adopting a global strategy of defeating transnational terrorism, NATO has proved its relevance during the post-Cold war era (Berdal and Ucko, 2009, 55-76).

**Neutrality**

Another foreign policy preference that states could potentially adopt is neutrality (Goetschel, 1999, 115-139). Neither isolationism nor internationalism precludes the possibility of adopting neutrality as a foreign policy preference. Neutral states do not take sides in regional or international power competitions. They can achieve this through either isolating themselves from the outside world or trying to develop sustainable functional relations with many states. However, one need to underline that remaining neutral would not always be left to the unilateral discretion of the concerned country. States might declare that they would from now on maintain neutrality. Yet, for such intentions to be respected by others, other states should also give their approval. Neutrality is a risky decision to take because if other states do not recognize the neutrality claims of the party concerned, the latter might lie in the middle of geopolitical confrontations between rival power blocks. Despite all intentions to remain neutral, such states might be targeted by other states during times of war. For example, the Netherlands had claimed to remain neutral on the eve of the First and Second World Wars, yet it could not escape the German aggression on both occasions. The best would arise if the neutrality claims of states were recognized by international agreements. Austria offers the best example in this regard. Neutrality claims being recognized by international agreements and sanctified by international law would likely prove more resilient than unilateral decisions to that matter.
Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War can also be seen as an example of adopting neutrality as a foreign policy preference. During the course of the war Turkish decision makers did their best to avoid the possibility of being attacked by either side. Turkey took side of neither the axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan nor the allied powers of the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. However, Turkey’s success in this regard did not emanate from an international agreement signed by both sides as recognizing Turkey’s neutrality. Turkey achieved this by pursuing an ‘active neutrality’ policy in that Turkey resisted the demands of both sides that it join the war on their side. Turkey also signed a security agreement with the United Kingdom and France in 1939 in order to ensure the support of western European powers should it come under attack by revisionist powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. Simultaneously Turkey underlined that this security treaty with western European powers would not put it under any obligation to declare war on Germany or the Soviet Union should the United Kingdom and France fight with these countries. Turkey also tried to maintain its relations with Germany on good terms throughout the course of the war lest it come under any German attack.

Comment on the dynamics of Turkey’s active neutrality foreign policy during the Second World War

Hard-Power Versus Soft-Power

The discussion on foreign policy preferences is also closely related with the way how one state might try to influence foreign policy choices and behaviors of another. The tools to be employed in the implementation of foreign policy choices closely vary with the question of from which sources states think their influence emanates.

The concept of power is one of the most popular and elusive concepts in the academic discipline of International Relations. Recent years have seen an increase in the number of scholarly and journalistic studies concerning power taxonomies and how states of different sorts try to materialize their foreign policy preferences through the power capabilities at their disposal. A group of academics, nested in different disciplines and inspired by the pioneering works of Joseph Nye (2004), have popularized the concept of soft power in their attempts at explaining the internal character and foreign policies of such global powers as the United States and the European Union. Robert Kagan (2003) is one of those intellectuals who contributed to the growing salience of academic studies on power. He compared the United States to the European Union and came to the conclusion that the former is a typical hard power whereas the latter can be better defined as a soft power. In his categorization, its immense material power capabilities put the United States in a unique place in power hierarchy and lead Americans to see foreign and security policies from the perspective of military power. Carrying a big hammer pushes the United States to view potential challenges to its foreign and security interests as nails. On the other hand, he argues that the European Union is a text-book example of soft power actor because its reliance on soft power emanates from its weakness in military capabilities as well as great economic potential, decades-long success in regional integration and positive perception of its values and material achievements abroad. Kagan says that the Americans are coming from Mars whereas the Europeans from Venus. Compared to the United States, the European Union has been alleged to pursue soft power strategies vis-à-vis the countries that lay outside the EU, particularly those that aspire to join the club one day in future.
Some other scholars who study the concept of power make a comparison between the EU on the one hand and other great powers on the other, particularly the United States, Russia and China, in that whereas the EU is predisposed to use soft power tools abroad, the latter tend to employ traditional hard power capabilities (Laidi, 2008).

Soft power has become more relevant in foreign policy preferences of states as the realpolitik mentality of the Cold War times has been replaced by the logic of integration, interdependence, and globalization following the demise of the Soviet Union and the projected triumph of liberal democracy. The increasing interconnectedness among different nations, the rise of non-state actors in global politics, the growing attempts at regional and international integration, and the decreasing appeal of traditional hard power instruments appear to have led many pundits to argue that soft power has now become the new lingua franca of global power politics. That the United States has failed to transform Iraq and Afghanistan into functioning and well-governed polities through military means in a top-down manner or that the European Union has continued to enlarge by encompassing many former communist countries in central and eastern Europe seems to have bolstered the appeal of the ‘soft power’ concept among IR scholars and foreign policy practitioners alike. The rise of identity politics on the one hand and the empowerment of human beings through technological innovations on the other have also undoubtedly made it clear that real victories on the part of states and individuals would increasingly come through winning the hearts and minds of others. In essence, soft power refers to the purchasing power of narratives. Today’s world appears to be an arena of alternative narratives across different policy realms and those who succeed in convincing others as to the legitimacy of their own narratives emerge from this competition as victors.

However, shedding light on the conceptual discussion on power and ascertaining the degree to which hard power is witnessing a revival given the rejuvenation of the realpolitik mindset in recent years across different places such as the Ukraine, Middle East, and East Asia is important. It remains to be seen how the rising competition between established powers of the West and the rising powers of the non-Western world will affect the credibility of soft power.

Discussions on soft power also relate to Turkey for recent years have seen a growing number of analysts define Turkey as a soft power foreign policy actor (Oguzlu, 2007, 81-97). This has particularly been the case since the outbreak of the popular uprisings across the Middle East in late 2010. The more Turkey was considered a source of inspiration, if not a direct role model, for the emerging regimes in the region, the more Turkey’s soft power label appeared to strike sympathetic chords. However, this brief contends that it is still too early to define Turkey as a soft power actor. This is not due to the lack of Turkey’s potential in this regard, but because of the unenviable political situation of the country today. It now appears that neither the developments around Turkey nor the evolving dynamics of Turkey’s internal politics would lead anyone to convincingly argue that Turkey has unequivocally proved its soft power identity. Soft power is something more than the perception of a particular country at home and abroad. For example, Turkey’s regional and global ratings might be on the rise and Turkish culture might be in circulation in the former Ottoman territories for some time. Besides, the social and cultural aspects of contemporary Turkish life might seem to attract numerous young people from across the regions around Turkey, and there might be a growing interest in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. However, this does not mean that Turkey has now become a soft power in the sense of having the ability to affect choices of others through the
use of soft power instruments. Having soft power is not the same thing as being a soft power.

Power is the ability of one actor to influence the behavior, interest, and identity of other actors in the image of its own priorities, preferences, and values. This means that power has both residual and relational aspects. It is residual because being powerful means that a particular state possesses some capabilities, of both tangible and intangible sorts, that would enable it to have an impact on the choices and actions of others. Without those capabilities at the first instance, it is nearly impossible to influence others. Power defined in terms of capabilities might derive from tangible and intangible sources. Tangible sources are those that can be quantified, measured, observed, and categorized. Such sources are military capability, economic might, geographical location, population, environmental factors, technological prowess, and etc. Intangible sources of power are those that cannot be easily observed, tested or measured. Values, norms, societal cohesion, culture, image, and identity are typical examples of intangible power capabilities.

However, power can also be defined as relational in the sense that ‘being powerful’ or ‘having power’ means that there are more than one actor in the power relationship and for the state A to have an influence on the choices of the state B what is required more is the way how the state B would respond to the demands of the state A than the mere power capabilities the state A has at its disposal. Stated somewhat differently, if the state B does not meet the demands of the state A or change its behaviors along the expectations of the State A, the state A does not have power over the state B. That said, one could argue that having power capabilities does not automatically translate into being powerful. Being powerful requires the compliance of others with the demands of the state that tries to have an impact on their choices.

Three different variables matter with respect to meaning and relevancy of the concept of power. One variable concerns the will of actors to be powerful and influence the choices of others. The second variable is the capabilities of actors at their disposal. The third variable is the perception of the power seeker actor in the eyes of the actors that stand at the receiving end of this relationship.

The will dimension of power concerns the motivations, aspirations, and national-images of actors that aspire to have a say on the choices of others. The capability dimension concerns the sources of power, both tangible and intangible in kind. The relational dimension pertains to the perceptual attributes of power. For a particular actor to be considered as powerful, all of the three dimensions mentioned above need to be taken into account.

The Will Dimension

Not all states are willing to have an influence on the choices of others. Some states are defined as status-quo oriented powers whereas some others are considered as status-seekers or status-quo challengers. Status-quo oriented states are those that are content with the current power configuration in the system and they do not aspire to change it. They are merely concerned with their existing status within the system and want to make sure that it continues. Their foreign policies most of the time begin and end at their national borders. They do not have an intention to see a new system emerge so that they would be in a much better, prestigious, or powerful status. They are generally risk-averse states. Rather than act, they react to external developments.

Analyses of their foreign policies would focus on how they try to adapt to new external realities at regional or systemic levels. They are not concerned with the way how other states are ruled internally. The values they cherish at home are unlikely to have an impact on their interactions and dealings with other states. Rather than maximizing their power capabilities, they are predisposed to preserve what they possess at a given moment. In their imaginations, the number one foreign policy interest/priority is to make sure that external developments do not affect their internal order and material capabilities negatively. Even though many of such states can be found at the fringes of international politics, it is extremely difficult to put a particular state into this category because even the goal of preserving status-quo requires a strong will to play by the rules of politics and engaging others in instrumental ways.

On the other hand, some states have much broader definition of what their national foreign policy preferences are. Such states tend to have...
aspirations transcending their national orders. They are risk takers in that they try to help bring into existence a new power configuration within the existing system so that they find themselves in a much better and prestigious position than before. To many of such states, foreign policy is something more than the preservation of existing national borders. They tend to identify with the regions that surround them and some define their priorities globally. Such status-quo challenger states can also be divided into sub-categories. Some of them are only concerned with the material gains that would accrue to them once the existing regional and systemic orders gave way to new ones. Put another way, they would only value the material gains they hope to extract from their interactions with other actors within the system. Their only concern would be how they might produce an impact on the behaviors and strategic actions of other states. On the other hand, a different kind of status-quo challenger states would be very much preoccupied with the protection and promotion of their values and norms onto others. They would be concerned with the way how others are ruled internally and to what extent their norms and values resonate with those of others. Such states would put their identity and national role conceptualization at the center of their foreign policy undertakings. Norm projection would be a characteristic feature of their foreign policy exercises abroad.

The discussions on the rising powers make it explicitly clear that the rise of the Rest (vis-à-vis the West) can be seen, among others, as a direct challenge posed to the privileged position of the western actors within the existing global order. What are at stake here are not only the changing power capabilities within the system but also the way how the emergent global values, norms, and principles would be defined. Transformation of others in their own image would be the most important foreign policy interest of such aspirational states. In this regard, all status-quo challengers and status-seekers are normative powers in that they try to achieve their goals by projecting and expanding their norms onto others. Norm projection turns out to become a strategy at the disposal of those states which are willing to help bring into existence a new regional or global order in which their priorities and choices would be reflected much better than before. The typical example of such states is the United States because following its ascendance to the top position in the ladder of power hierarchy, the United States has been defining its national interests globally by putting the emergence of a global order that reflects its values and norms at the center of its interactions with other actors. All other great powers can also be seen in this category. The countries that wish to have regional spheres of influences are also within this category. As a recent example of such countries, one can also mention Turkey because Turkey under the leadership of the Justice and Development Party has been trying to bring into existence a new regional order in the greater Middle Eastern region in the images of its values, norms, and material interests.

The Capability Dimension of Power

The capability dimension of power puts the focus on power capabilities of actors in a non-relational fashion. Rather than how other states within the system perceive the power capabilities of the actor in question, what is important here is the way how the state that wants to have an impact on the choices and values of others thinks from which sources its power capabilities emanate. In this sense, some states are defined as hard powers, meaning that the tangible power capabilities at their disposal would enable them to influence the choices and values of others thinks from which sources its power capabilities emanate. After all, economic power capabilities are also hard. Even though they are more of a civilian than military character, hard powers can equally employ economic power instruments in such a way to change the calculations of others. Therefore, a much better categorization would take place if one puts the potential hard powers into two main groups, coercive powers and inducing/enticing/coaxing powers. Coercive powers are those that try to get what they want from others by coercing them to meet their choices. They simply offer others two alternative choices. Others would either agree to their terms or get punished severely for their non-compliance. Stated somewhat differently, coercive powers would put an ultimatum on others. Others would either take
it or leave their destiny at the mercy of the coercer. Coercive powers would frighten their opponents and threaten them with the negative consequences of their non-cooperation.

On the other hand, inducing/enticing/coaxing powers are those that would try to get what they want from others by asking others to make materially construed cost-benefit calculations. Their hope is that others would be induced if they saw that their cooperation with the inducer would yield to them more benefits than costs. These powers would employ both carrots and sticks in their dealings with others. Rather than imposing their will on others through the employment of coercive strategies in a unilateral fashion, they would endeavor to buy their cooperation by pushing others to engage in a cost-benefit calculation. The actors that lay at the receiving end of this interaction would not fear their existence or integrity. Their decision as to whether or not to cooperate with the inducer would stem from the instrumental calculations they undertake. The crux of the issue here is that both coercive and inducing powers can employ hard power capabilities.

Soft powers lay at the opposite end of the power-capability dimension. Soft powers rely on intangible capabilities, such as identity, culture, norms, values, the legitimacy of their internal and external policies, and disinformation capability. Their ability to help shape the choices of others originate from their power capabilities that cannot easily be quantified or subjected to objective measurement. Soft powers can also be divided among each other into three sub-categories. On the one hand exist attractive soft powers which do not need to do something specific in order to influence others because others are simply attracted by their values, norms, cultures, and political achievements. Attractive soft powers are so much confident of their values, cultures, and policies that they do not undertake costly strategies to influence others. They neither coerce, nor induce nor entice others. They deem themselves as shining stars over hills and think that they constitute ideal role models for others to emulate in their efforts to get successful. Their economic, military, and political achievements at home would constitute the most important arsenal at their disposal.

Attractive soft powers are also normative powers. However, what is meant by normative powers in this context is quite different from the normative powers defined as particular actors that try to have an impact abroad by endeavoring to project their norms and values in a realpolitik fashion. In the context of defining normative powers as soft powers, what normative powers do is simply set the normative standards of interstate relations. What goes for normal can be deduced from their values and practices.

The confinements of appropriateness/normalcy can be observed through their values and behaviors. Ian Manners defines normative powers in this way and points out to the European Union as a prime example of this power category because the enlargement history of the European Union demonstrates a textbook example of how interstate behaviors inside the EU area can be seen as constituting appropriate standards for others. The depiction of the EU integration process as a source of inspiration for other regional integration processes across the globe would also fit to this category.

Soft powers can also be defined as persuasive soft powers, which are those that think they need to invest some capital in order to help create legitimacy and attraction in the eyes of others. They develop specific strategies not only to brandish their achievements but also persuade others that their behaviors and policies are legitimate and other-regarding. Their ability to influence others stem from their specific efforts to improve their attraction. In this regard, persuasive soft powers pay a great amount of attention to manufacture attraction through public diplomacy efforts, development aids, and adoption of facilitative diplomacy at interstate and intrastate disputes.

The foreign policy understanding of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party constitutes a good example of persuasive powers. Turkey has not only been investing good amount of money in public diplomacy and developmental aid projects but also acting as a facilitator and mediator country in interstate and intrastate conflicts across the globe.

The least soft and the most illegitimate form of soft power is sharp power. Sharp powers can also be defined as manipulative soft powers. Unlike persuasive powers which try to invest in their image and attraction abroad with benign intentions, manipulative soft powers try to manipulate and deceive the public opinion of other states through the adoption of deceitful disinformation strategies. Their efforts to help build positive image about themselves are overshadowed by their efforts to fabricate negative images about their rivals and competitors.
The Relational Dimension of Power

Being powerful requires the interaction of at least two different actors, one side trying to influence the choices of others whereas the other thinking/calculating whether or not to comply with demands of the one. In this regard one can talk about different power relationships. One is the coercive power relationship. Here, one needs to demonstrate that the state B changes its decisions and meets the demands of the state A, if and only if the former feels frightened of the coercive capabilities of the latter. The existence of fear needs to be demonstrated in its all clarity. In the case of inducing power relationship, the state B needs to comply with the demands of the state A out of material calculations. Analysts need to prove that the state B undertake a cost-benefit calculation and come to the conclusion that complying with the demands of the state A would be more beneficial than non-cooperation. In the case of attractive power relationship, the state B does not need to engage in cost-benefit calculations before deciding as to whether to comply with the demands of the state A. Compliance should emerge automatically and emanate from the attraction and legitimacy that the state A has in the eyes of the state B. The state B should view the choices of the state A legitimate and in accordance with its own values, norms, and identity. Here the state A does not need to convince the state B to change its policies. In the case of persuasive power relationship, what matters is that any change in the behaviors of the state B needs to take place through the successes of the persuasive strategies that the state A employs. Analysts need to demonstrate that all formal and public diplomatic efforts of the state A have produced legitimacy and attraction in the eyes of the state B, so the latter complied with the demands of the state A. Here, country A invests purposefully and intentionally in image-making to ensure that others will be attracted to its choices and actions. You do not engage others directly or expect them to follow your leadership automatically, but you invest heavily in image-making with an intention to improve your attractiveness in the eyes of others. If your efforts bear fruit, meaning others towing your line, then you might be considered to have the power of manufactured attraction. Here, you engage others directly with the intention of winning them over by underlining the features and attributes that make you unique. You have a vision and worldview and think they are superior to the visions of other actors. Your foreign policy revolves around this particular vision. Here, you purposefully try to project your worldview and norms onto others. Your number-one foreign policy goal is to help bring into existence a particular global or regional order that reflects your values and preferences. You engage others directly through convincing strategies. Diplomacy, particularly public diplomacy, and deliberate argumentation are the most commonly used tools in this process. Mediation and good offices efforts would also fall under this category. Securing legitimacy in the eyes of others through the use of persuasive strategies is the prime goal. You act as a normative power. If you are finally able to change the preferences of others, then you deserve to be considered as having the power of persuasion.

Against this background, it seems to be extremely difficult to categorize countries and put them under one particular title. Depending on the occasion under consideration, countries might sometimes want to influence others’ decisions through the power of coercion, sometimes power of persuasion, sometimes power of enticement etc. For example, the United States is both a hard power and a soft power. Sometimes, it tries to influence others’ decision through the employment of immense hard power capabilities at its disposal, sometimes through the power of attraction it has in the eyes of others. Similarly, it is not that easy to define the EU as a foreign policy actor that mainly taps into its soft power of attraction because the EU has already proved that it is adept in instrumentality using its material power capabilities vis-a-vis EU-candidate countries on the one hand and global actors on the other. It is not certain that would-be members adopt EU’s norms and values automatically, voluntarily or out of legitimacy concerns. The expected economic gains and other advantages loom large in their decision to internalize the European way of doing things. As long as the logic of conditionality appears to drive EU’s engagement with third countries, it would be more appropriate to characterize the EU as a civilian power trying to have an impact on others through the power of enticement.
Turning to Turkey, one can confidently argue that Turkey has left behind for some time the mentality of the power of coercion, and has partially succeeded in reconstructing itself as a civilian, normative, and diplomatic power. Turkey’s mediation efforts in the greater Middle East and increasing attempts at forging closer economic interdependent relationships with neighbors in all directions speak volumes. The elevation of relations with the Kurds of Iraq from enmity and rivalry into partnership and strategic cooperation bears witness to this transformation. Turkey has become one of the favorite countries of its neighbors with which to develop closer economic and trade relations. It is also certain that Turkey has been increasingly employing persuasive and coaxing tools in its foreign policy. Turkey is already a soft power actor in terms of its foreign policy instruments and the degree of attraction it has in the eyes of others; however, it is still too early to unquestionably argue that it has the power of persuasion. More evidence is needed to prove that Turkey’s increasing use of soft power instruments have yielded foreign policy preferences and actions on the part of others that are in accordance with Turkey’s interests, values, and choices.

The main reason why Turkey’s soft power identity still remains dubious relates to the ongoing socio-political turmoil engulfing the country. So long as Turkey suffers from internal instability and chaos, there is no way for Turkey to become a foreign policy actor that impacts others’ decisions through the power of attraction, power of manufactured attraction, or power of persuasion. Turkey’s potential in this regard seems to have decreased in recent years despite the initial euphoria in the early days of the Arab Spring. The employment of economic and diplomatic instruments abroad does not guarantee that countries would have a soft power of attraction or persuasion. Turkey is not an exception in this regard.

It is likely that the years ahead will demonstrate increasing difficulties concerning the idea of soft power. The changing security environments in the Middle East, East Asia, and the wider Black Sea regions seem to suggest that realpolitik is returning. The manner in which the latest Ukrainian crisis took place, the role Russia played and the manner in which the western countries and China responded to it speaks volumes.
CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed alternative foreign policy preferences of states such as isolationism, internationalism, alliance formation, balancing, neutrality, hard power and soft power. This is not a comprehensive list of all foreign policy preferences that states could potentially employ. However, many states across the globe are predisposed to embrace a mixture of such foreign policy preferences at different times. Their physical capabilities, geographical location, geopolitical environment, strategic culture, historical experiences, and internal characteristics would likely determine which preferences they would embrace in their foreign policy.

Comment on the residual and relational aspects of power
Foreign policy preferences of states are not the same as foreign policy behaviors of states. While the former mainly refers to foreign policy predispositions and interests of states defined in a general and long-term perspective, the latter denotes the implementation of those preferences by dint of particular policy behaviors on the ground. While the former are more abstract and long-term oriented, the latter are more concrete and reflect short-term calculations. Foreign policy preferences are about how states think they could achieve their national interests abroad in long-term perspective. Behaviors are particular policies to be implemented in the field. Preferences are about what those foreign policy interests are, whereas behaviors are about how those interests can be achieved. Alternative foreign policy preferences that states could potentially employ in their external relations are isolationism, internationalism, alliances and balancing, neutrality and soft power. Other foreign policy strategies are derivative of these main categories.

Power is in general the ability to get what one wants through different strategies. Having an influence on identity, preferences, and behaviors of other actors is what power is about. Power has will, capability, and relational aspects. Having power capabilities does not mean that the actor is powerful. To be powerful and having power over others requires a strong degree of determination/will to make use of those capabilities as well as the decision of other parties to change their identities, interests, or behaviors in line with the preferences of the power holder. In this sense, power is very much related with having influence over others. Influence can emanate from different power relationships. Power of coercion, power of enticement/inducement/coaxing, power of manipulation, power of persuasion, power of manufactured attraction, and power of attraction are the most important power relationships.
1. Trying to achieve national foreign policy interests through self-sufficiency is an example of Global powers trying to:
   A. Alliance formation  B. Neutrality  C. Isolationism  D. Soft power  E. Internationalism

2. Countries that tend to pursue isolationist foreign policies are predisposed to believe that
   A. They need to pursue neutrality foreign policy at all times
   B. They need to forge long term alliance relationships with other countries
   C. They are always more powerful than other states and they do not need the protection of others
   D. They are inherently different from other countries in terms of historical experiences, regime type and national values.
   E. They are more peace-loving states than others.

3. A good example of countries that have historically pursued isolationist foreign policy is:
   A. The United States  B. China  C. Turkey  D. Germany  E. South Korea

4. Countries which pursue internationalism as a foreign policy course tend to believe that
   A. Imposing their values onto others through coercive strategies is the best course of action in foreign policy
   B. Trying to shape international developments in line with their identity and interest is the best strategy to follow
   C. Keeping themselves outside the external environment is the best strategy to follow
   D. Realism always explains foreign policy preferences much better than liberalism
   E. Countries should not put internationalism at the center of their foreign policies if they are not major/great powers.

5. Neo-conservatives in the United States are in favor of
   A. Making use of soft power instruments in foreign policy
   B. Pursing isolationist foreign policies in pursuit of national interests
   C. Cooperating with allies within security organizations to defend national interests
   D. Utilizing multilateral international organizations in liberalizing international politics
   E. Imposing American values and interests onto others through coercive strategies.

6. A typical example of collective security organizations is
   A. United Nations  B. European Union  C. Shanghai Cooperation Organization  D. Arab League  E. Eurasian Economic Union

7. The most important requirement for neutrality as a foreign policy preference to succeed is:
   A. That neutrality claims should be bolstered by strong power capabilities
   B. That the country which wants to remain neutral should be located in a relatively peaceful and stable geopolitical location.
   C. That neutral states should join as many international organizations as possible.
   D. That other states recognize the neutrality claims of the country under consideration
   E. That countries which want to remain neutral in geopolitical confrontations between rival power blocks would do well to sign security agreements with all.

8. The ability to get what one wants from others through persuasive strategies requires first and foremost
   A. A strong defense infrastructure  B. Membership in international organizations  C. Economic power capabilities  D. Coercive power capabilities  E. Talented diplomatic cadres
9. In the context of defining normative powers as soft powers, what normative powers do is simply
   A. Impose their values onto others
   B. Set the normative appropriate standards of interstate relations
   C. Transform the others through available power capabilities at their disposal
   D. Induce others through offering lucrative trade deals
   E. Punish others if they breach international law and rules

10. Soft powers rely on intangible capabilities such as
    A. The number of nuclear submarines
    B. Financial asset at their disposal
    C. Identity and culture
    D. The size of population
    E. Geographical location
Comment on the reasons why states adopt isolationism as a foreign policy preference

Isolationism suggests that states would not want to get involved in political developments taking place outside their territorial borders. They might think that they have the power capability to protect their territorial integrity and other key national interests by isolating themselves from the external environment. Isolationist states tend to believe that their geographical location, power capabilities, and the nature of the terrain on which they sit would protect them against external threats. Countries which tend to pursue isolationist foreign policies generally believe that they are self-sufficient and capable of meeting all their needs on their own. On the other hand, the feeling of weakness might also equally lead to isolationist thinking in that the more active they become outside their borders, the more they would be exposed to external challenges and their interests would come under danger. Countries which think they are extremely fragile in terms of their internal characteristics might decide to stay as far away as possible from international developments and entering long term interactions with other states. Pursuing internationalist policies might incur unbearable costs in their internal affairs. The more relations they establish with other countries and the more active they become in the internal affairs of others, the more likely others might also interfere in their internal affairs.
Comment on the differences between liberal internationalism and realist internationalism

Liberal and realist impulses can simultaneously shape the tone of internationalism. Whereas liberal internationalism preaches for the formation of a community of states united around common liberal identities, values, and interests, realist internationalism is mainly about interstate cooperation on the ground of common foreign and security policy interests. Realist internationalists do not argue in favor of regime or nation building attempts abroad. Cooperating with illiberal non-democratic regimes in other countries in the name of stability and material national interests would be a typical foreign policy course of action sanctified by realist internationalism. Another difference between the two is that realist internationalists would define foreign policy as an exercise in the name of producing an impact only on the foreign policy behaviors of other states whereas liberal internationalism would go much further than this by putting the transformation of identities and values of other states at the center of foreign policy. Realist internationalists preach the formation of strategic alliances with other states within the framework of collective defense organizations whereas liberal internationalists would support the formation of security communities within the framework of collective security organizations at regional or global levels.

What are the reasons that lead states to establish security alliance among each other?

The question of whether alliances are built on the basis of distribution of material power capabilities, common threat perceptions, or common values is an ongoing debate in the academic discipline of International Relations. Structural realists mainly argue that alliances would come into existence somehow automatically if one particular country develops immense material power capabilities over others and the latter were not in a position to deal with the former individually. Claims to global and regional hegemony in the past caused the formation of collective defense alliances. When Napoleon wanted to put European continent under French hegemony in the first half of the 19th century, the other European powers joined their forces to resist this challenge. When Hitler’s Germany increased its material power capability spectacularly during the 1930s and began pursuing hegemonic policies in Europe, other major European powers formed a defensive alliance among each other. The ones who argue that alliance would come into existence automatically have a mechanical conceptualization of states. If one particular state disrupts the existing balance of powers, others would join their forces to rebalance it. On the other hand, some scholars such as Stephen Walt, contend that alliances do not come automatically on the basis of shifting material power capabilities. Some other motivating reasons are needed. He argues that states would form alliance should they all perceive the challenger state as a threat that needs to be contained or defeated. Members of alliances should share common threat perceptions. The argument here is that states balance against threats, not pure shifts in the distribution of material power capabilities within the system at any given time.
Comment on the dynamics of Turkey’s active neutrality foreign policy during the Second World War

Turkish foreign policy during the Second World War can also be seen as an example of adopting neutrality as a foreign policy preference. During the course of the war Turkish decision makers did their best to avoid the possibility of being attacked by either side. Turkey took side of neither the axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan nor the allied powers of the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. However, Turkey’s success in this regard did not emanate from an international agreement signed by both sides as recognizing Turkey’s neutrality. Turkey achieved this by pursuing an ‘active neutrality’ policy in that Turkey resisted the demands of both sides that it join the war on their side. Turkey also signed a security agreement with the United Kingdom and France in 1939 in order to ensure the support of western European powers should it come under attack by revisionist powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. Simultaneously, Turkey underlined that this security treaty with western European powers would not put it under any obligation to declare war on Germany or the Soviet Union should the United Kingdom and France fight with these countries. Turkey also tried to maintain its relations with Germany on good terms throughout the course of the war lest it come under any German attack.

Comment on the residual and relational aspects of power

Power is the ability of one actor to influence the behavior, interest, and identity of other actors in the image of its own priorities, preferences, and values. This means that power has both residual and relational aspects. It is residual because being powerful means that a particular state possesses some capabilities, of both tangible and intangible sorts, that would enable it to have an impact on the choices and actions of others. Without those capabilities at the first instance, it is nearly impossible to influence others. Power defined in terms of capabilities might derive from tangible and intangible sources. Tangible sources are those that can be quantified, measured, observed, and categorized. Such sources are military capability, economic might, geographical location, population, environmental factors, technological prowess, and etc. Intangible sources of power are those that cannot be easily observed, tested, or measured. Values, norms, societal cohesion, culture, image, and identity are typical examples of intangible power capabilities. However, power can also be defined as relational in the sense that ‘being powerful’ or ‘having power’ means that there are more than one actor in the power relationship and for the state A to have an influence on the choices of the state B what is required more is the way how the state B would respond to the demands of the state A than the mere power capabilities the state A has at its disposal. Stated somewhat differently, if the state B does not meet the demands of the state A or change its behaviors along the expectations of the State A, the state A does not have power over the state B. That said, one could argue that having power capabilities does not automatically translate into being powerful. Being powerful requires the compliance of others with the demands of the state that tries to have an impact on their choices.
References


Chapter 7

Foreign Policy Instruments of States (Diplomacy, Propaganda, Economic Methods)

After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

1. Distinguish the different types of diplomacy and able to understand diplomatic forms and practices

2. Understand the differences between the types of economic instruments of foreign policy that the states use in their international relations

3. Know the distinctive levels and ways of implementation of propaganda in the international relations

Learning Outcomes

Chapter Outline
- Introduction
- Diplomacy
- Propaganda
- Economic Measures

Key Terms
- Diplomacy
- Protocol
- Recognition
- Diplomatic Immunity
- Suspension
- Persona non Grata
- Propaganda
- Public Diplomacy
- Foreign Aid
- Boycott
- Embargo
- Blockade
- Tariff
- Quota

Reception of an Ambassador at Versailles: After Parrocel
INTRODUCTION

Among the various instruments that states use in their foreign policy implementation, diplomacy, propaganda and economic tools are in general classified as non-violent instruments of foreign policy, though some of them can occasionally be used coercively. While diplomacy is a non-violent and non-coercive instrument, propaganda could be used coercively when especially coupled with covert actions of state, and some of the economic instruments, such as blockade, can be used both coercively and non-coercively.

The aim of this chapter is to explain different types of diplomacy, propaganda, and economic measures that states employ in their international dealings. Moreover, various forms of diplomacy and diplomatic practices will be defined, as well as types of economic instruments and the levels and ways of international propaganda will be described.

DIPLOMACY

One of the oldest instruments of foreign policy, diplomacy is a tool with which the states address the other states and communicate with them in order to explain their national goals, policies, and views on current affairs, and try to influence their interlocutors’ views and positions on issues that are important to them. Sometimes being defined as an art, diplomacy traditionally meant the way to manage one sovereign state’s relations with other mutually recognized states.

Recognition

Recognition is a political act of a state to acknowledge an act or government or status of another state. Recognition could be either de jure or de facto. De jure (from Latin, meaning “of law” or “by law”) recognition is the formal way of recognizing a state or a government by fulfilling the requirements stipulated in international law. De facto (from Latin, meaning “of fact” or “in fact”) recognition refers to the recognizing a state or a government through practice rather than official statement or declaration to that effect.

Recognition can either be explicit or implicit. Explicit recognition means that a state recognizes an act or status or government of another state by releasing a public statement or a declaration. In the cases where a state implies that it recognizes a state or a government by some of its acts, such as sending a diplomatic envoy, arranging a talk or summit with a head of state, entering into an agreement, etc., instead of releasing any official statement or declaration, this constitutes implicit recognition.

Since recognition of a state or a government essentially emerges as a result of political evaluations of a state, its prerequisites vary from state to state. However, from a legal point of view, states generally observe when recognizing other states that an entity to have, at the minimum, a defined territory, over which it has an effective control and centralized authority; a population that is granted citizenship of the entity; and a legitimate government that has a capability of exercising independent and effective authority over the population and the territory.

Moreover, although it is not considered as a requirement to form a state, it is clear that an entity that does not have the capacity to enter into relations with other states cannot by definition achieve statehood. However, it has to be emphasized that these are only generally accepted norms, and states can either add new conditions or dispense with them altogether.
The origins of diplomacy could be traced back to antiquity. However, modern understanding of organized diplomacy dates from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, where the practices of diplomatic services and diplomatic rank, as well as rules of protocol were agreed upon by the attendees. Initially confined to relations between states in Europe, the rules of diplomacy gradually adopted by the other states, and came to be applied globally by the 20th century.

**Diplomacy**


Diplomacy is (1) the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations; (2) skill in handling affairs without arousing hostility. (Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/diplomacy).

Diplomacy is the profession, activity, or skill of managing international relations, typically by a country’s representatives abroad. (The Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/diplomacy).

Diplomacy is (1) the management of relationships between countries; (2) skill in dealing with people without offending or upsetting them. (Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/diplomacy).

**History of Diplomacy**

There are indications that diplomacy, in its primitive form, was employed in ancient China and Greece, the latter of which inspired the modern diplomacy in Europe. Seminal literary works of ancient Greece, Homer’s *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, present examples of Greek diplomacy between the Greek city-states. We learn from them that maintaining communication between the kings (rulers of a state) during war was a crucial practice. Similarly, the *amphictyonic leagues* (league of neighbours), initially created around a religious
site or temple, were associations of Greek city-states, usually with a common origin and close to each other, joined together to form a cultural and political union, and ruled by a council, introduced interstate assemblies and extraterritorial rights in modern diplomacy in the 6th century BCE.

After the decline of the Roman Empire, which used diplomacy mainly for legal and commercial purposes rather than territorial expansion, diplomacy has essentially become a survival tool for the Byzantine (or Eastern Roman) Empire, which had weaker military capacity in comparison to its neighbours; and as a result, it was not able to establish its hegemonic influence in its surrounding regions. Thus, while one of the goals of diplomacy in the Byzantine Empire was to impress its neighbours, another goal was to prevent cooperation of neighbours against the Byzantine Empire by keeping them in conflict with each other. As a consequence of this policy, the Byzantine Empire, despite its weak military power, managed to survive until 1453.

**Hegemony**

- “Hegemony is the political, economic, or military predominance or control of one state over others.” ([Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hegemony)).

- “Hegemony, the dominance of one group over another, often supported by legitimating norms and ideas.” ([Britannica](https://www.britannica.com/search?query=hegemony)).

**Hegemonic Power**

The concept of hegemonic power signifies a state that has capability to lead global political and economic order. Traditional use of hegemony refers to the capacity of coercion and hard politics. Throughout the history, hegemonic power has been considered as a state that has military, political and economic supremacy.

Meanwhile, the term of “ambassador” appeared at in the 12th century in Italy. *Ambactiare, meaning “to go on a mission” in medieval Italian, was used for the envoys who kept the conversation running between the Italian city-states.* The leading Italian city-state of the time, Venice, had close ties with the Eastern Roman Empire and, in order to conduct diplomatic relations with its bigger and more powerful neighbour, sent envoys to Rome with written instructions, which were systematically archived. By the beginning of 15th century, these envoys started to present their *relazione* (final report) in written forms to their hometowns city. This Venetian diplomatic model and style, largely influenced by Byzantine system, were also adopted by other Italian city-states.

Later on, from late Middle Ages onwards, sending temporary envoys to each other to conduct state business became a common practice for all the Italian city-states. Moreover, leading city-states such as Milan, Venice, and Mantua started to send resident representatives to each other, as well as to popes and the Roman emperors from the 15th century onwards, which in time became the norm for all the Italian city-states. The first recorded permanent representative was sent by Milan city-state under Francesco Sforza in 1463 to the court of France.

The continuous state of warfare between the Italian city-states and their search for a balance of power, as well as the challenge posed by the rising Ottoman Empire after the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, necessitated regular diplomatic interaction during the 16th century. As a result, with the presence of Pope receiving a number of representatives from different Christian states, Rome at this time became the centre of Italian diplomacy. Nevertheless, with the emergence of Protestantism and following Thirty Years’ War in Europe (1618-1648), a more institutionalized form of international law and diplomacy slowly emerged in Europe. Many concepts that are still in use today with regard to international relations, international law, and diplomacy, as well as principles of diplomatic practise, developed in this century. While the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius laid the foundations of international law with his book *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (‘On the Law of War and Peace’), Cardinal Richelieu of France, who was appointed as the Secretary of State for War and Foreign Affairs in 1616 and was later appointed as the Chief Minister in 1624 by Louis XIII, established the first modern foreign ministry and directed it to pursue state interests rather than dynastic priorities.
Hugo Grotius
Hugo Grotius (born on April 10, 1583 and died on August 28, 1645) was a Dutch jurist and scholar, who is considered as the “father of international law”. His masterpiece was published in 1625; *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (On the Law of War and Peace). Violent political struggles in Europe, in particular the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), had strong impact on him and his work. His arguments were based on natural law. According to him, it was important to regulate wars in Europe and these regulations should be applied to all people regardless of their religious beliefs.

Cardinal Richelieu
Armand Jean du Plessis (born on September 9, 1585 and died on December 4, 1642) was the Cardinal and the First Duke of Richelieu and Fronsac. His fame comes from his service as the First Minister of France between 1624 and 1642, and from his skilful usage of diplomacy as a statesman. His main goals during his time in office were centralization of power in France and ending the Spanish-Habsburg dominance in Europe. To achieve his first goal and to establish the absolute monarchy in France, he tried to suppress the influence of the noble class. To ensure French dominance in Europe, he entered into alliances with Protestant rulers during the Thirty Years’ War against the Habsburgs. Although having Protestant allies resulted his denunciation as a traitor to the Roman Catholic Church, his strategy brought a great advantage to France in defeating the Habsburg Empire.

There were further improvements in diplomatic practices during the 17th century, such as diplomatic immunity and equal treatment for the ambassadors as they were representing the monarchs who were equals in theory, if not in practice. When the Thirty Years’ War ended with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, it contained two major principles of diplomacy and the following international system that survived up until the 21st century: Sovereign equality of all states and non-interference to domestic politics of each other.
Thirty Years’ War and the Treaty of Westphalia

Thirty Years’ War began in 1618 and ended in 1648 was a series of wars among various nations and resulted in drastic changes in Europe. Dynastic and commercial rivalries, as well as religious conflicts were the main reasons for the wars. It finally ended with the defeat of Habsburg Dynasty and its allies in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia. As a result, Hapsburg and Roman Catholic dominance over Western Europe were broken and, while the Holy Roman Empire decentralized, Calvinism and Lutheranism, alongside Catholicism, became main religions in the West.

As Protestant princes were allowed to practice their religion within the boundaries of their principalities with the Treaty of Westphalia, one of the main principles of today’s international political system, i.e. the concept of state sovereignty, was thus emerged as a result. Moreover, with the Peace of Westphalia, a new system of political order (balance of power) started to emerge in Europe to replace the declining feudal system. As sovereign states needed to co-exist within the new system, a new norm of non-interference to other states’ internal affairs also emerged as a governing principle of international relations.

While practices of diplomacy were experimented and developed in various European states, the Ottoman Empire, as an important actor in the region, was mostly engaged with what could be termed today as ad hoc diplomacy to conduct its relations with other states from the middle of 16th century to the end of the 18th century. The early Ottoman diplomacy was mainly based on Islamic law and its supremacy against the Christian powers of Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries. The Sublime Port (Bâb-ı Âli – the Ottoman Government) received its first residential ambassador (bailo) from Venice in 1454, but did not send his first permanent representative abroad until 1793. At this time, the Ottoman state preferred sending its representatives based on the necessity rather than permanent residential capacity. The main reason of this choice was the fact of Ottoman military supremacy over other states, and also due to the belief that the Ottoman Sultan was supreme to other foreign rulers. Additionally, as the state of peace with infidels could not be conceived under the Islamic Law, peace arrangements with Christian powers of Europe were seen as transitional nature, rather than permanent agreements, and thus permanent representatives could not be sent to states with which the Ottoman Empire was in war in theory if not in reality.

However, when Ottoman Empire’s military might start to wane in comparison to its neighbours, after the reforms initiated by Selim III from 1789 onwards to modernize the state, ad hoc diplomacy gradually gave way to continuous diplomacy and the first Ottoman permanent ambassador, Yusuf Agah Efendi, was appointed in 1793 to the Court of St James’s, London. As very few of Ottoman Ambassadors knew European languages, the role of translators were very important in the Ottoman diplomatic system, and the establishment of the Translation Office (Terçüme Odası) in 1821 is considered as the first step of institutionalization of diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire. It then led to creation of Haricîye Nezareti (Foreign Ministry) in 1836 and Akif Efendi was appointed as the first Foreign Minister (Umur-ı Haricîye Nazırı) of the Empire.


In the meantime, following a series of wars among the European states during the 17th and 18th centuries, European diplomacy came to believe that main way to prevent further warfare was to preserve the balance of power between among the five major powers of the time: Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. This led to the Concert of Europe, which, through various congresses and treaties, kept peace in the European continent. Among the various congresses of the time, the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which brought European powers together following Napoleon’s defeat, was important for diplomacy in general as it codified the modern diplomatic practices and determined the hierarchical categories of diplomatic representatives that lasted until today.
Concert of Europe

Also known as the Vienna System, the Concert of Europe was established in 1815 with the Congress of Vienna and collapsed with the beginning of the First World War in 1914. Concert of Europe refers to a particular international system based on balance of power in Europe in the post-Napoleonic era. In running the system, the five major powers of the time (Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and France) had periodical meetings in order to maintain peace in Europe. These meetings were also important in developing the concept of congress diplomacy.

Development of Various Forms of Diplomacy

Bilateral Diplomacy

In order to bilateral diplomacy to take place, recognition by states of each other as legally established states is a prerequisite. Once that happens according to each state’s practices, then exchange of diplomats take place and diplomatic communication starts. However, in certain cases, states may decide either to withhold recognition of other states or not complete exchange of diplomatic representatives. Diplomacy can still occur in these cases between state representatives but in a non-formal way. An example for the former is non-recognition of the “Republic of Cyprus” by Turkey as the legal representative of the island of Cyprus and both Turkish and Greek communities living on the Island. On the other hand, Turkey recognizes the Republic of Armenia as a state, but decided in 1991 not to establish bilateral diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors.

Multilateral Diplomacy

With the establishment of the United Nations (UN) after the Second World War, the multilateral diplomacy, involving more than two nations or parties to seek diplomatic solution to transnational problems, gained importance in international relations. The most important issues in international relations today are discussed in different summits, conferences or institutions of the international organizations. In particular, the UN promotes the multilateral diplomatic talks between its members.

Diplomatic conferences are the most common instrument for multilateral diplomacy. They have been playing important role in the international politics since the 1815 Vienna Congress, which also prompted the concept of “Conference Diplomacy”. The content of diplomatic conferences may vary from conflict resolution to disarmament or migration. The UN system has larger regular conferences to address specific problems in international arena. Various regional organizations also encourage similar diplomatic conferences on issues that go beyond bilateral relations. The European Union (EU) can be considered as a good example for multilateral diplomacy.

Summit Diplomacy

Summit diplomacy is a form of conference diplomacy in which the heads of state or government come together to conduct negotiations. Even though there were earlier forms of summit diplomacy, it was Winston Churchill who used the word “summit” for the first time in 1950 to describe the meeting of leaders of major powers of the time. Summits can be formed in many sizes and different ways depending on the purpose of negotiations. It should be noted that Summit Diplomacy is different from the direct or personal diplomacy among political figures through correspondence, telephone conversations or tête-à-tête (face-to-face) talks. Summits require specific time and location of a meeting. A good example involving two countries is the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit of 1987 in Reykjavik, Island, which was concluded with an agreement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. A good example of multilateral summit diplomacy is the regular meetings of G-7 countries’ heads of state or government.

Ad Hoc Diplomacy

Ad hoc diplomacy is the oldest form of diplomacy that aims to conduct diplomatic relations by sending a special and/or temporary envoy on mission. It was the common practice of diplomacy during the Middle Ages in Europe and during the classical age of the Ottoman Empire. Although diplomatic relations today are mostly conducted...
through permanent missions, in some cases, states might still prefer sending special envoys, usually to conduct diplomatic negotiations on specific issues or create a non-permanent representation or an additional channel for diplomacy with a state or government.

Parliamentary Diplomacy

Although there is no clear definition of parliamentary diplomacy, it can be considered as the sum of duties and actions of parliaments in foreign affairs. There are mainly two types of parliamentary diplomacy: Institutional and diplomatic. The first type of parliamentary diplomacy can be occurred in three particular contexts; 1) Legislative process in which ratification of international treaties and execution of laws take place; 2) Parliamentary monitoring of international affairs through committees; and 3) Political role of parliaments directly related to discussions of foreign affairs of the country and approval of budget of the ministry of foreign affairs.

The second type of parliamentary diplomacy has four domains; 1) Bilateral diplomacy in which parliaments aim to cooperate with other parliaments with a view to develop strong relations; 2) Multilateral diplomacy that takes place through parliamentary delegations, which could be in the form of parliamentary meetings of international organizations such as Council of Europe and NATO; 3) Different forms of associations of the parliamentarians around the world (e.g. Inter-Parliamentary Union); and 4) Specific case of the European Union, where the members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the member countries and it has specific institutionalized practices, procedures, and roles within the EU system.

Quiet Diplomacy

Quiet diplomacy is often used by international organizations, especially the UN or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to discuss a particular situation away from international and domestic scrutiny. Within the context of quiet diplomacy, instead of publicizing the statements on the concerned topics, the involved countries and organizational representatives keep silent until a solution is found in order to prevent fouling effects of third party, domestic, or international involvements. For example, the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities is one of the institutions that use quiet diplomacy regularly to prevent conflicts between member countries. It is almost always difficult to track and monitor the cases of quiet diplomacy, as the wider international community cannot learn its specifics unless one of the parties announces them publicly. In this sense, it is often confused with secret diplomacy.

Picture 7.2 OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Lamberto Zannier launches the Graz Recommendations on Access to Justice and National Minorities, Graz, Austria, 14 November 2017.

Source: www.osce.org/hcnm/graz-recommendations
Open/Secret Diplomacy

Open diplomacy is a term developed by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in his famous Fourteen Points, published at the end the World War I as a reaction to the secret diplomacy conducted between colonising European powers prior to the war. The main characteristic of the open diplomacy is that all the negotiations between countries should proceed openly in the public view, as secret talks and agreements reached before the First World War between the major powers were partly blamed for the start of the war. The expectation is that, should the public in general, but especially in the liberal countries, know about the details of the secret talks and/or agreements between states, they would oppose more unfair aspects of these agreements, thereby reducing the possibility of conflicts emerging over them.

Woodrow Wilson and His Fourteen Points

The President of the United States Woodrow Wilson declared his during his principles (The Fourteen Points) for peace at the end of the First World War in a speech delivered at the United States Congress on January 8, 1918. While some points dealt with border issues of the time, others put forward principles to govern the international system and the way the diplomacy was conducted at the time. These were:

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.
2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.
3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.
4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.
5. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty, the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable government whose title is to be determined.

... 

14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.
Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy refers to the usage of threat of force by a state or group of state to achieve its/their objectives in international relations. Coercive diplomacy usually involves the military strategy to force other states or non-state actors to behave in certain manner. Difference from the use of military force is that in coercive diplomacy, it is the “threat” of using military force rather than the “actual” use of military force that is used to achieve the intended result. According to George (1974), there are different variants of coercive diplomacy including ultimatum, tacit ultimatum, try-and-see, and gradual turning of the screw. One of the most important examples of the use of coercive diplomacy in history is the strategy followed by US President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. He decided to place a naval blockade around Cuba to prevent the Soviet Union from delivering military supplies to Cuba and also demanded the removal of the missiles, which were already brought to Cuba covertly. As a result of the threat to use force, as well as the US promise to remove Jupiter missiles from Turkey, the Soviet Union decided to remove its missiles from Cuba.

Diplomatic Protocol

Diplomatic protocol essentially defines how diplomatic personnel and other state officials should behave towards each other in international arena under specific circumstances. In general it covers guidelines, etiquette and accepted behaviours in diplomacy. The protocol and the ceremonial activities are important ways of expression for states in international affairs. It establishes the framework to develop relationships between states.

The beginning of diplomatic protocol can be traced back to the first residential envoy accredited by the Duke of Milan in 15th century that inspired other city-states in Europe. With the institutionalization of diplomatic representation from 17th century onwards, diplomatic protocol also expanded to become more accurate, exacting and hierarchical. The major step regarding the implementation of the diplomatic protocol practices was taken with the recognition of the principle of equality between states at the Vienna Congress in 1815. Modern day diplomatic and consular activities are pursued according to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, as well as many other unwritten customs.

Basic elements of diplomatic protocol consist of the rules regarding to ceremony, etiquette, titles, correspondence, wardrobe, and dining. A ceremony could have various forms depending on the context such as state funerals, opening of a public building, presentation of awards, etc. For each ceremony, there are different sets of rules and procedures to follow. However, there is typically a public speech to welcome the guests and deliver the aim of the ceremony. Etiquette is a set of rules based on politeness and respectfulness including greetings, the order of greeting, the order of entering and/or leaving a room, being punctual, etc. Titles are the most important codes of diplomatic protocol, and define how a person should be addressed with a particular honorific depending on the position s/he represents (e.g. royalty, government, diplomatic, military, religious, etc.). Correspondence refers to the formal language and style while writing a message in diplomatic occasions. Finally, wardrobe or the dress code is an important part of the diplomatic protocol, and varies depending on the situation and activity. However, elegance and diligence are the constant requirements from the invitees in diplomatic invitation.
Responsibilities of Diplomats and Diplomatic Immunity

Diplomacy is conducted by diplomatic staff and other personal attached to a state’s diplomatic representations abroad. Any state’s diplomatic institutions have three types of representation abroad: symbolic, legal, and political. Symbolically, they are the representatives of their countries in the host country, and talk on behalf of their home-countries. Legally, their properly authorized actions would be binding for the countries they represent. Politically, they are conveyors of policies and principles of their countries in foreign policy area.

In general, they collect and report information to their home country while they are in posts. The principal role of the diplomats is to keep peaceful relations between states. In addition, they are required to give advice to their home-country how to respond to certain development in their host country. In principle, diplomats should not act autonomously but according to the instructions they receive from their home country. But, they also should not be required to seek instruction in every case they face, but behave according to the foreign policy of his home country and the general framework determined by the government.

Since diplomats are expected to conduct good relations with other diplomats and representatives of other states, they should be excellent interlocutors and negotiators. Due to the importance of their duty and the prestigious reputation of the profession, it requires high qualifications to be a diplomat. Alongside their education and training, ability to behave according to a certain etiquette and excellent knowledge of foreign language(s) are the main skills required for the selection.

While doing their job in abroad, diplomats enjoy legal diplomatic immunity, ensuring that diplomats, while pursuing their diplomatic duties, are not subject to the jurisdiction of the host countries. Even though there were different forms of the diplomatic immunity throughout the history, the modern diplomatic immunity was codified by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1861 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1863. Many principles of diplomatic immunity have also become a part of the customary law.

The principle idea of the diplomatic immunity is to ensure the continuation of communication and the exchanges of information between the states even in difficult times, including armed conflict. Together with the traditional mechanisms in the customary law, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 regulates the diplomatic immunity in Articles 29 to 36. According to the Convention, a diplomatic agent and his/her family enjoy immunity from the criminal, civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state. They are also exempt from all dues and taxes. However, diplomatic immunity does not give to diplomats and their families right to break the rules and regulations of host country at will. In cases of committing a serious crime unrelated with their diplomatic mission or witnessing such a crime, the immunity can be waived by the official’s home country.

According to the principle of the reciprocity, all diplomats from any country in the world benefit equally from diplomatic immunity. Although Vienna Convention originally did not cover the staffs of international organizations, certain privileges for the international organizations’ staffs have been granted in time with the founding treaties of such organizations. For example, the UN and its agencies have standard implementations such as the UN laissez-passer and diplomatic immunity for the highest-ranking officials.

The United Nations Laissez-Passer (UNLP) is a travel document issued under the Article VII of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (1946). It can be used like a national passport during the travels for official missions.
Another exceptional category is the government officials who travel frequently to other countries for diplomatic reasons. Government officials do not have diplomatic passport but they usually have different types of travel documents such as special passports or service passports, which might allow them easier travel free from restrictions, but do not attest diplomatic immunity to its bearer.

In many cases, diplomats and their families obey the rules and regulations of the host countries. Nevertheless, there are rare occasions where the diplomats or their family members violate laws. In those situations, the host country informs the country of origin about the violation and the diplomat may be announced as persona non grata. In addition to this, diplomats are not excluded from their national law; so if necessary, the prosecution or the administrative procedures may be conducted by the home country.

Diplomatic Practices and Method

Talks and negotiations between diplomats and/or other representatives of states are the essential activities of diplomacy. Talks and negotiations can have different purposes such as providing routine communication, conflict resolution, creating or enhancing cooperation, etc. Diplomatic talks generally refer to exchange of views and/or information between states, whereas negotiations aim at reaching an agreement. From this perspective, negotiations are usually the continuation of preliminary diplomatic talks.

Diplomatic talks aim at providing information to one's interlocutor about the current events, problems, and achievements of diplomat's country. In this sense, the information about the sending state can be given to the host country and vice versa.

Diplomatic talks are often started with an official document such as diplomatic note or a letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, or the Head of State. Diplomatic notes are basically messages in a formal way between the states. It can take various forms, such as simple aide-mémoire (memory aid or non-paper), note verbale (verbal note), note (letter of protest), ultimatum, etc. They can have various contents, including general information about one’s country, developments in international affairs, recognition of a new country or a government, information about a blockade or even the suspension of diplomatic relations and declaration of war.

Persona non grata

A person who is not wanted or welcome in a particular country, because s/he is unacceptable to its government (Cambridge Dictionary. https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/persona-non-grata?q=persona%2Bnon%2BgrATA).

One of the most famous examples of reciprocal announcement of persona non grata took place between Russia and the UK in 2018. Following the poisoning of a former Russian military officer and British spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury on 4 March 2018, the UK accused Russia of breaking its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and, together with 14 other EU member states, expelled several Russian diplomats. Moreover, the US, Canada, Australia, 18 EU member states and seven non-EU states joined the UK in solidarity, and at the end 123 Russian diplomats in total were expelled from the UK and its allies and partners. In response, Russia first announced 23 British diplomats as persona non grata in Russia on 24 March 2018, and finally expelled 59 diplomats belonging to states that had expelled Russian diplomats in solidarity with the UK.

Note verbale (verbal note) is a piece of diplomatic correspondence prepared in the third person and unsigned. It is less formal than a note but more formal than an aide-mémoire, which is an unsigned informal diplomatic message given to start discussion without committing one’s own state to the contents.
Diplomatic talks can occur in the frame of bilateral diplomacy and/or multilateral diplomacy such as talks at international conferences or in international organizations. Negotiations, too, can be seen as a continuation of diplomatic talks in the form of bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Differently from the diplomatic talks, negotiations have objective to conclude with a consensus, an agreement or an international treaty. Barston (1988, p. 79) categorizes the negotiations based on their contents: Political (e.g. border issues), development (e.g. humanitarian aid), economic (e.g. economic embargoes or sanctions), security (e.g. terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons), and regulatory (e.g. international treaties, GATT, etc.). The composition of the delegation to attend the process of negotiation is determined based on the topic. Head of State, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister who are authorized by the international law to represent their state may take place in the negotiation delegation.

Most bilateral negotiations aim to achieve an agreement to resolve a dispute or to establish cooperation. Accordingly, both sides should compromise in the frame of basic expectations and interests. Otherwise, it would be difficult to ensure the continuity of the negotiation or the sustainability of the agreement reached at the end of the negotiations, which can cause further problems in bilateral relations.

Another important issue is the style of the states during the negotiation process. They can follow ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ approaches depending on the content and the relations between the negotiating parties. A soft approach would mean bargaining characterized by trust, transparency, and cooperation. For example, the negotiations conducted by the EU for the enlargement process with the candidate countries can be classified as soft approach negotiations. On the other hand, examples of hard approach could include aggressive tactics, bluffing and even threats, such as negotiations for various disarmament agreements concluded during the Cold War between the USA and the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, wider international or regional issues can be settled within the multilateral negotiations, which usually take more time and effort to reach a decision. In case that there is a multilateral treaty at the end of the negotiations, it should be ratified by states. Each treaty has a number of ratification required in order to enter into force. Therefore, until that number is reached, the treaty cannot be binding on other countries that have already ratified. Since the multilateral treaties are more complex than the bilateral agreements in the sense of containing more countries, it might be hard to find consensus on the agreements. In those cases, establishment of the general rules of conduct for the widest range of countries is still important even though there are few provisions difficult to compromise. There, the states have opportunity to specify their ‘reservations’ or ‘objections’.

**Reservation** means a unilateral statement made by a state to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty, while **objection** to a reservation means that the objecting state finds the reservation incompatible with the purpose of the treaty. The objection may have effect to prevent the entry into force of the treaty between the objecting and reserving states (Articles 19 and 20, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969).

One of the prominent examples of reservation is the reservation attached by the US on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. When the US became party to the Covenant in 1992, it ratified the Covenant with reservations including non-applicability of its clauses to the US citizens on the capital punishment, restriction of right to free speech and association, and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Ratification:
Ratification is a legal act whereby a state indicates its consent to be bound by a treaty. It requires approval of the treaty on the domestic level by the legally authorized body through enactment of necessary legislation to give domestic effect to that treaty (Articles 2/1(b), 14/1 and 16, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969).

Countries have different procedures for ratification of treaties according to their legal and political system. In Turkey, according to article 90 of the Constitution, the ratification of treaties are subject to adoption by the Turkish Grand National Assembly with a law approving the ratification. However, agreements regulating economic, commercial and technical relations that cover a period of no more than a year could be put into effect through promulgation. In such cases the Turkish Grand National Assembly should be informed within two months of their promulgation.

Recall and Suspension of Diplomatic Relations
Alongside with the bilateral or multilateral diplomatic activities, there are also one-sided forms of diplomatic communication such as recall or expulsion of diplomats or suspension of diplomatic relations.

The states can recall their diplomats in response to general circumstances or to a particular activity of the host country that dissatisfy their expectations. A head of a diplomatic or a consular mission can be called back to the country of origin for many reasons, but mainly to convey recalling state’s displeasure to the host country. The recall could be just for consultations (which imply that the diplomat might return to hosting country after relatively short period) or for an indefinite period, which could then necessitate further negotiations between the countries to resolve their dispute. For example, when the Israeli security forces killed dozens of Palestinian protesters and wounded more than 2,000 in May 2018 during demonstrations against the US move to relocate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, Turkey recalled its ambassador to from Israel and the US for consultations for two weeks. Then the ambassadors returned to their missions. However, when Turkey recalled its ambassador to from Israel (and expelled the Israeli Ambassador to from Turkey) after the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, a new Turkish ambassador was only sent to Israel after 6 years, following an agreement between the two countries regarding the conditions for re-posting the ambassadors reciprocally.

The receiving country can also make a formal or informal request to the sending country to recall its diplomat/s. This act is closer to but different than the declaration of a diplomat as persona non grata, which is reserved in general to unauthorized activities of diplomats, such as espionage. For example, in 2002, Sweden declared two Russian diplomats persona non grata because of their connection with an espionage case known as the Ericsson case.

More serious disputes in relations between states may result in suspension of diplomatic and/or consular representation either unilaterally or reciprocally. Duration of the suspension may vary depending on the seriousness of the dispute and/or its resolution, and may take for months or decades. For example, the US recalled its ambassador from Iran after the hostage taking at their embassy in Tehran in November 1979. Since then, “the U.S. Interests Section of the Embassy of Switzerland” has represented the US in Tehran. Another example for long-term suspension of diplomatic representation was between the US and Cuba. Following the Cuban Revolution in 1959, bilateral relations between the two countries were suspended for several years. Moreover, the US withdrew its diplomatic recognition of the Cuban government in 1961 and closed its embassy in Havana. However, after Cuban President Fidel Castro left his place to his brother Raul Castro in 2006 and Barack Obama was elected to the presidency of US in 2009 the two countries started to negotiate with a view to re-establish their bilateral relations. Finally, the framework agreement to normalize the relations between the two countries was announced on 17 December 2014, and their respective embassies re-opened accordingly.

Although the Trump administration suspended the normalization process with Cuba in November 2017, the embassies are still open in both countries.
Since the aim of foreign policy of any country is in general to realize its national interests by changing or influencing other countries’ opinions, actions, and/or policies, propaganda has an important role to play among the foreign policy instruments of states.

In more general terms, propaganda could be defined as the “more or less systematic effort” to influence other people’s “beliefs, attitudes, or actions by means of symbols”, such as “words, gestures, banners, monuments, music, clothing, insignia, hairstyles, stamps”, etc. (https://www.britannica.com/topic/propaganda). Although various definitions of propaganda have acquired negative connotations in the twentieth century, it had more neutral meaning during much of the history. Since propaganda was especially effective tool of foreign policy during the war and pre-war times in the 20th century (Both the First and Second World Wars as well as the Cold War), it came to be associated closely in the view of the general public with manipulating populations at home and abroad.
In the early 20th century, Lenin (1902) made a differentiation between **propaganda** and **agitation**, defining propaganda as “the reasoned use of historical and scientific arguments to indoctrinate the educated and enlightened”, and agitation as “the use of slogans, parables, and half-truths to exploit the grievances of the uneducated and the unreasonable” (https://www.britannica.com/topic/propaganda). During the 1930s, effective use of symbols, catchy slogans, repeated messages and biased information became trademarks of Nazi propaganda machine both at home and abroad. German Nazi politician and Reich Minister of Propaganda between 1933 and 1945, Paul Joseph Goebbels, especially became infamous in his successful manipulation of information and usage of carefully organized rallies, parades, posters, cinema, books and other common media instruments for propaganda purposes.

The Cold War was another period, during which the propaganda had special importance and role in foreign policy of various countries, but especially for the US and the USSR. Both the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc used extensively organized form of propaganda activity with one-sided and distorted messages mostly based on their respective ideologies. While the Western Bloc, especially the US, was focusing on the material prosperity of the Western world and the individual freedoms in comparison with the human rights violations under socialism, the USSR was showing the evil sides of capitalism. This kind of propaganda does not only emphasize the positive side of one’s own country but also demonize the other side, focusing on specific issues or grievances of people.

These kinds of propaganda are sometimes called **psychological warfare**, which is defined as the usage of propaganda tools against an enemy, usually in conjunction with military, economic and political tools to demoralize and break its’ population’s will to fight or resists (https://www.britannica.com/topic/psychological-warfare). Same tools could also be used to strengthen the resolve of one’s own fighters. For example, during the Second World War, fighting countries widely used posters, leaflets, comic books, broadcasts in radio and movies to present positive message of their war effort and negative image of their enemy’s intentions.

*Picture 7.5 Joseph Goebbels, the head of Nazi Germany’s Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda*

Propaganda Posters

Picture 7.6

Picture 7.7

Picture 7.8 Hanoi, Vietnam - January 27, 2010. A Government propaganda poster is used to remind the Vietnamese people of their military heroes.

Picture 7.9 North Korea, Pyongyang, 12th April 2018. A propaganda poster in one of the streets of the city showing Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il with the DPRK and WPK flags.

Besides the negative aspects, all states feel the need to explain themselves to wider populations of other states, and more recently to their own citizens. What is came to be called public diplomacy (or people’s diplomacy) since the end of the Cold War is essentially dissemination of information to or communication with the general public of foreign nations to inform them on certain topics in order to create a dialogue atmosphere with a view to influence them favourably towards one’s position. Public diplomacy is also used sometimes to disseminate information to one’s own country in order to garner or enhance public support for certain policies of the government.

Aspects of International Propaganda

International propaganda is very seldom comprised of the whole truth, but it is not always full of lies either. A propaganda that is far from reality and without strong background information supporting it could not become believable, and thus fail to achieve its intended consequences.
Propaganda will obviously be more successful among groups that already share part of the ideas that are being disseminated. In other words, propaganda would be more successful in strengthening the coherence of similar thinking states or allies, rather than weakening resolve of opposite states or enemies. Specifically, it would achieve more results in environments where there is no locally generated counter information there are not any strong believes or ideas. Similarly, propaganda would be more successful if it targets uninformed public, who is not closely interested in international affairs or do not already have form an opinion about them.

Propaganda would be more successful if the disseminated messages do not appear as propaganda (direct messaging) but part of the general news or believable reality (indirect messaging). As such, in that case using national or domestic sources of information dissemination would be more successful than sharing information from abroad. Since the public in general would be receptive towards news sources that they already know or could affiliate with, many states use local news outlets to broadcast their points of views in the language of targeted country.

Successful examples from the Cold War days include the Radio Liberty (RL) of the United States that broadcasted towards the Soviet Union and the Radio Free Europe (RFE) towards Eastern Bloc countries in their languages with anti-communist propaganda. Founded in 1951 and 1949 respectively, the two radios were separately operated from Germany until 1976 and received covert funding from the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States until 1972. After the end of the Cold War, the headquarters of the RFE/RL moved to Prague, the Czech Republic, in 1995 and its coverage extended to former Soviet countries of Eurasia with broadcasts in 25 languages.

More recent attempts to create “friendly” broadcasts in target countries include RT (formerly Russia Today) network, launched in 2005 as part of a wider public relations effort of the Russian government and funded by it to broadcast in five languages to audiences outside Russia. It is often accused by the Western governments as being propaganda outlet of the Russian government and of spreading disinformation and “fake news” through its reporters.

Fake News and Post-Truth

Fake news is false stories that appear as news and are spread on the Internet or using other media. It is usually created with an aim to influence political views or sometimes as a joke (Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/fake-news). It could be seen as a type of propaganda “that consists of deliberate misinformation or hoaxes spread via traditional print or broadcast news media or online social media” (Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fake_news).

Post-truth, on the other hand, relates to or denotes circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief (Oxford Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/post-truth). As such, it is based on the understanding that “people are more likely to accept an argument based on their emotions and beliefs, rather than one based on facts” (Cambridge Dictionary, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/post-truth).

The relationship between the truth and news has become a more frequently discussed topic recently worldwide, particularly in relation with politics and politicians. The announcement of ‘post-truth’ as “the word of the year” by Oxford Dictionaries in 2016 was a recognition of an increasing phenomenon, as with the increasing use of social media, there emerged a widespread tendency to replace facts and evidences with personal thoughts and beliefs. As the news spread on social media platforms mostly target emotions or already existing beliefs, instead of the truth of story or its neutrality, sentiment has become prominent in most disseminated news. Although, it was used by Steve Tesich (1992) for the first time in an essay, it has become popular following the rise of right-wing populist politicians in Europe and in the US.
Targets of International Propaganda

The main aim of the propaganda is to influence thinking and behaviour of its targeted audience. As such it could target five different groups of people:

1) **Citizens of the state managing the propaganda.** The aim in here is to reinforce already existing beliefs, dissemination of information, communicating government’s views on certain issues, thus creating wider public consensus on national issues. For example, the famous “We Can Do It!” poster produced by J. Howard Miller in 1943 for American propaganda during the Second World War was targeting mainly American women to encourage them to work for their country. The poster was later used in feminist movement as well, though its main aim originally was to motivate women to join the war effort.

2) **Citizens of friendly nations.** The aim in here is to reinforce and if possible enhance the already existing favourable opinions of public in friendly countries, thus ensuring the continuation of state-to-state friendship. For example, during the First World War, propaganda among the Allied Forces was largely used to establish friendship between the countries against the enemy. Therefore, the friendship between the countries and the strength of the ‘togetherness’ were often highlighted.

3) **Citizens of neutral or unrelated countries** in order to gain their favour in the longer term or prevent them from gravitating towards other states. For example, even though Switzerland was a neutral state during the first world war, the cultural division between German-speaking Switzerland and the rest of the country was manipulated by propaganda.

4) **Citizens of the enemy states** or the state that has already initiated an unsolicited propaganda against one’s own country. The aim in here is either to counter the propaganda that has already started, and thus diminish its influence on state’s citizens, or to weaken the resolve of the enemy population, and as a destroy the state. As final aim exemplified in the latter case is the destruction of the enemy state, so these kinds of propaganda actions are usually combined with covert military and/or intelligence operations. For example, the Soviet Union widely used its propaganda tools against Germany during the Second World War. Showing the power and the courage of Soviet soldiers, as well as the cruelty of Nazis, were the main themes used on the various posters produced by the Soviets and distributed both in USSR and also throughout the German occupied territories.
5) Wider general international and domestic public. The aim in here is to enhance the general image and prestige of the country or its government in the eyes of its own population and internationally. As since the prestige of a country is an important component of its international influence, many countries engage in cultural enhancement propaganda activities such as sponsoring tours of folk-dance groups, classical music orchestras, art exhibitions etc., and hosting sports and cultural events as well as diplomatic summits, supporting production of nationally produced movies or translation of novels and other national literature, etc. For example, Azerbaijan has in recent years hosted and sponsored many international cultural and sports events, such as Eurovision Song Contest in 2012, the First European Games in 2015, Formula 1 Grand Prix since 2016, in an attempt to improve country’s image worldwide.

Compare propaganda with psychological warfare and public diplomacy. Which aspects of psychological warfare distinguish are totally different from propaganda and public diplomacy activities?
ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS

The value of economic methods as foreign policy instrument arises from the fact that economically all states are, in varying degrees, dependent one another. There is no country in the world that has achieved 100 per cent self-sufficiency in various sectors of economy, including food and manufacturing. The states have to buy those products that they cannot produce at home adequately or economically from other states. These needs produce dependencies for states in international relations; and dependencies, in return, create vulnerabilities that other states might exploit for their political benefits.

The use of economic vulnerabilities for political gains is not only limited to developed countries; developing countries, too, could turn their natural resources into strategic assets. A very good example of this is what it known as the oil crises of 1970s. In this case, the oil-rich but economically underdeveloped Arab countries were able to join force to use their oil production as a bargaining chip to obtain political results from countries that supported Israel during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. In effect, they turned their abundant natural resource into a strategic asset, control of which provided political and strategic leverage (Yergin, 2008).

The usage of economic methods as foreign policy instrument by states have become more important and varied in style since 1970s when level of economic interdependence started to deepen globally, and reached its zenith with the globalization of the 1990s.

Interdependence - dependence

While interdependence is the mutual reliance between two or more states, in a dependent relationship there are some states that are dependent on others and some states that are not dependent on others. Traditionally, integration theories address the importance of intraregional or interregional economic interdependence for the development of regional integration projects. In an interdependent relationship, members or participants may have emotional, economical, ecological or moral reliance and responsibility to each other. European integration is one of the major examples of the interregional interdependent relationship.

Richard N. Cooper was the first academic that popularized the concept of “interdependence” in economics during the 1960s. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye adapted the concept to International Relations discipline with their book Transnational Relations and World Politics (1972), and later developed a concept of “complex interdependence” in their book Power and Interdependence (1977), where they argued that the use of force had become costly for major states because of four main reasons: Risks of nuclear escalation, resistance by people in less developed countries, undefined effects on the achievement of economic goals, and public opinion against the use of force. As a result, a ‘complex interdependence’ had emerged between them.

Globalisation

According to Giddens (1990: 64), globalization is “intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.” There are mainly four types of globalization:

Economic globalization refers to the free movement of goods, capital, services, technology and information. According to Shangquan (2000), it is “the increasing interdependence of world economies as a result of the growing scale of cross-border trade of commodities and services, flow of international capital and wide and rapid of technologies”.

Military globalization is “the process which embodies the growing extensity and intensity of military relations among the political units of the world system” (Held, 1999).

Cultural globalization refers to the transmission of ideas, meanings, and values around the World in such a way as to extend and intensify social relations. (Wikipedia- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_globalization)

Political globalization addresses to the multilateralism in which the international organizations and international nongovernmental organizations play an important role and influence the world politics by their activities and their impact on the states.
There are several economic tools used by the states in their international relations to achieve different results with varying degree of effectiveness. While some could be dispatched as ‘award’ to states for compliance with certain type of behaviour, others can be used as ‘punishment’ for non-compliance. While the establishment of cooperation, improving trade relations, granting most favoured nation status, or increasing foreign aid etc. can be considered ‘positive’ economic instruments (i.e. award); embargo, boycott, abolition of the most favoured nation status, imposing quotas, unfavourable taxation, putting a state in the ‘black-list’, or cutting foreign aid etc. would be examples of ‘negative’ economic instruments (i.e. punishment). Still some others could be used to create dependencies and/or economic influence areas. Thus, most economic instruments could either be used as means of coercion, persuasion, or reward depending on the state’s intentions.

One of the peculiarities of the economic instruments of foreign policy is that, unlike diplomacy or war, their impact would not be direct, but indirect. In most cases, the economic instruments generally target whole public in order to generate a reaction against the government or decision makers to force them to behave in a way the instrument-employing country wishes them to do. Although their impacts on the decision-makers are rather indirect, the economic instruments could easily generate widespread public reaction quite easily.

**Foreign and Development Aid**

One of the most frequently used economic instruments of foreign policy is foreign aid and economic assistance in either positive (such as extending foreign aid with favourable terms) or negative (such as refusing, withholding or ending foreign aid or economic assistance) ways. Normally both provider and receiver states expect to benefit from the economic assistance aid. While receivers expect to modernize or grow their economy, achieve economic and political stability, expand their industrial base, etc., grantees, whatever the immediate conditions of the agreement to extend economic aid, usually expect to receive economic, political, and even military benefits in the long-run from the receiving country.

Economic aids could either be given as grants or as loans with low interest and long-term payback structure. They could also be general grants/loans or tied to specific projects. During the Cold War, the US usually preferred grants (and later loans as the receiving countries’ economics developed), while the Soviet Union mainly extended project aids.

Foreign aids could be extended for humanitarian reasons, to ensure survival of certain regime, for military support, as bribes, for prestige, or for economic reasons. Among these, only the humanitarian aids do not carry direct political expectations from the receiving country. They are indirectly help grantee country’s international standing.

In this context, the US has been one of the most successful countries that use the economic assistance as a strategic foreign policy instrument after the Second World War. Marshall Plan of the US for development of Europe after the war is a good example of using economic measures as a rewarding and dependence-creating mechanism in foreign policy. The US initially devised the Marshall Plan to prevent the economic collapse of Western Europe after the end of the war. It also aimed to simulate growth in the US economy by enabling European countries to continue to buy American products with the US assistance. Finally, the plan contributed to the creation of an economic zone of free market countries in Western Europe, which was friendly to the US. The 16 countries that signed the Marshall Plan Agreement with the US established Committee (later Organization) of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948 as requested by the US. It then turned into Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1960, thereby creating one of the cornerstones of the post-war global economic system. Within the framework of the Marshall Plan, 13 billion US Dollars’ worth of economic aid was distributed. Restoring the industrial and agricultural production, establishment of the financial stability and expansion of trade were the major areas of investment. Eventually, the Plan succeeded in raising the gross national products of the participating countries between 15 to 25 per cent.
In a similar vein, the Soviet Union also granted financial support, in addition to military aid, to its allies and partners during the Cold War, establishing Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in 1949 in response to Marshall Plan and the creation of OEEC, and aimed at preventing countries in Soviet sphere of influence from joining the Western Bloc. Its founding members were the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Later, the German Democratic Republic (1950), Mongolian People’s Republic (1962), Yugoslavia (1964), Cuba (1972), and Vietnam (1978) became members. Albania joined in February 1949, but stop participating in 1961. Within the organization, bilateral relations among members and multilateral accords were implemented to coordinate economic activities and to develop economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The organization lost its purpose after 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and held its last meeting on June 28, 1991, in Budapest, deciding to disband it within 90 days.

While foreign aid as an economic instrument of foreign policy was traditionally used extensively by more developed and powerful countries, using “development aid” as an instrument of foreign policy has recently grew in quantity and coverage. Many developing countries are now using development aid to enhance their standing (prestige) in the international arena, to create zones of influence, to develop benefits and connections in various sub-regions of the world, to develop friendly relations in regions where they had no presence before, and to enhance effectiveness of their foreign policies in general. While larger development aid budgets are still used by the developed countries, such as the USAID programs, developing countries also started to use their limited resources more effectively for development aid, such as Turkey’s development aid to other developing countries and its TIKA-run projects.

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**TIKA and Turkey’s Development Aid Programs**

Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) was founded in 1992 as a technical aid organization under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs primarily to provide assistance for the restructuring, adaptation and development needs of the Turkic-speaking countries of the former Soviet Union. It was then attached to the Prime Ministry in 1999, and finally to Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 2018 with the change of government system in Turkey. Its area of coverage has expanded in time to include friendly countries and later global south, and its main focus changed to development assistance operations in line with the priorities of Turkish Foreign Policy (TIKA Website, http://www.tika.gov.tr/en).

According to the latest data provided by the OECD and TIKA, the value of Turkey’s official development assistance has reached to 6.2 billion US Dollars in 2016. The major part of this assistance between 2013 and 2015 was diverted towards project related to the Syrian refugee crisis. Along with the humanitarian aid in Syria and refugee support, Turkey currently conducts bilateral development cooperation with Somalia, Kyrgyzstan, Albania and Afghanistan in domains of good governance, civil society, education, health and population (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/turkeys-official-development-assistanceoda.htm).

Another important aspect of the foreign aid is the conditions attached to the aid by the grantee country. As foreign aids are given to persuade a country, openly or indirectly, to behave in a certain way, these aids would be linked most of the time to various kinds of limitations on their usage. At the least, all the aid agreements include a clause to the effect that the “aids received could only be used for the purpose(s) of their distribution”. Although seemingly rather straightforward, disagreements over understanding the real extend of these clauses usually leads to disputes between grantees and beneficiary countries. An example of this is the disagreement between Turkey and the US in 1960s and 70s over the military aid Turkey received from the US under...
the 12 July 1947 bilateral agreement. When Turkey wished to use the armaments it received under this agreement from the US to intervene in Cyprus as a result of attacks on the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots in late 1963, the President of the US at the time, Lyndon B Johnson, warned the Prime Minister of Turkey İsmet İnönü with a letter that, “Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States’ consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. ...I must tell you in all candour that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances” ([https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d54](https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d54)). When it was made public, the letter caused uproar in Turkey and resulted in re-evaluation of Turkey's foreign policy priorities as well as seeking alternative ways of military procurement including the domestic production.

**Agreement on Aid to Turkey of July 12, 1947**

**Article I:**

…The Government of Turkey will make effective use of any such assistance in accordance with the provisions of this agreement.

**Article II:**

…the terms and conditions upon which specified assistance shall…be furnished under this agreement,…shall be determined…in advance by agreement of the two governments.

…

The Government of Turkey will make use of the assistance furnished for the purposes for which it has been accorded.

**Article IV:**

…The Government of Turkey will not transfer, without the consent of the Government of the United States, title to or possession of any such article or information nor permit, without such consent, the use of any such article or the use or disclosure of any such information by or to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of Turkey or for any purpose other than that for which the article or information is furnished.


**Sanctions**

Economic sanctions take large part in economic instruments of foreign policy with their coercive effects. Economic sanctions can be applied by states and/or international/regional organizations. The economic sanctions that are applied by the international organizations, in particular enforced by the UN Security Council, are more effective and carry more weight in international relations. In cases where individual states impose sanctions but not wider international community or international organizations, such as the American sanctions against Cuba, it creates legitimacy problems.

Boycotts, embargoes, and restrictive quotas are considered as hard/coercive economic instruments of foreign policy. These instruments will be explained below.

**Trade Related Economic Instruments**

Using trade as a foreign policy instrument could be done at least in three ways. First, using a state’s need or dependency on for some goods, to punish or reward it; second, creating economic dependencies abroad; and third trying to limit the economic potential of the enemy and benefits it derives from the international trade. In order to rewarding or punishing measures to work in the international trade, there needs to be a certain level of dependency, whereby the targeted state could not find alternative markets to sell its goods or to buy what it needs.
Punishment through economic instruments is usually done through limiting targeted country’s ability or preventing it entirely to sell its goods internationally. Some of the more well-known of these instruments are imposing tariffs or quotas for export products, boycotting goods, creating black lists, putting embargo on certain goods or to a country’s entire exports, and finally cutting trade relations altogether. On the reward side, such instruments as giving aid or loan with low interest, opening credit lines, starting to trade goods or increasing their quantity, etc. could be given as examples.

In order to be able to use trade as a punishment instrument of foreign policy, a state needs to be fairly flexible in its ability to create markets for its own goods or to find new sellers of goods that it needs. If a country is buying or selling a product exclusively from/to a certain state, then obviously, it cannot impose sanctions or trade-related punishments to that state. Similarly, if a state is able to sell its goods to different markets globally or is able to buy goods/resources it needs from several different sellers, then it would be very difficult to punish that country with trade related instruments.

**Quota, Tariff and Black List**

*Quota* is basically creating a quantitative restriction for a state’s exports or imports. First imposition of quotas on a large scale was used during and immediately after the First World War. Tariffs gradually replaced quotas in the 1920s. However, during the “Great Depression” of the early 1930s, implementation of quotas again became widespread. In particular, France became the leading country in Europe to establish a comprehensive quota system in 1931. Since the trade restrictions were blamed for most of economic problems of pre-war Europe and were thought to contribute to the war, most of the quantitative import restrictions of European countries were gradually abolished after the World War II.
Quotas can also be used to control market prices of specific materials such as oil. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is an intergovernmental organization, established in 1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela to control the global oil prices by regulating production of its members. OPEC currently has 15 member states that account for around 44 per cent of the global oil production and 81.5 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Due to ability of its members to influence the global oil prices, OPEC is often accused of being a cartel and hurting market competition.

OPEC introduced a quota system following the 1979-80 oil crisis, with an overall production limit of 20 million barrel per day (bpd) for its members. As members had difficulty in complying with the overall quota or some wished to produce more than their supposed shares, OPEC started to negotiate national quotas from 1986 onwards. Because of the political turmoil experienced by various oil-producing countries between 2003 and 2011, there was a dramatic rise in global oil prices, much higher than the OPEC had aimed for. As a result, OPEC member states agreed to increase their total production quota to 32.5 million bpd in November 2016.

Another important example of the quota being used as an instrument in international relations was the restrictions imposed by the US and the EU between the early 1960s and 2005 on textile imports from developing countries. The US initiated two multilateral agreements to restrict cotton imports from the developing countries: The Short-Term Cotton Arrangement (1961) and the Long-Term Cotton Arrangement (1962). As a result of these arrangements, the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) related to cotton textiles and clothing was signed in 1973 and came into force in 1974. The MFA negotiated quota restrictions on textile and clothing trade between developed country importers and developing country exporters. Under the quota, the developing country exporters were allowed to supply certain amount of textile production. In 1995, World Trade Organization negotiated the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) that replaced the MFA. With the new rules regulated by the Global Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 2005, the ATC fully integrated into the GATT regulations and the quotas on textile production were eliminated globally.

**Tariff** is a tax or duty to be paid on a particular class of imports or exports. Tariffs are generally used by governments to protect domestic industries from international competition or to create revenue. There are mainly two type of tariffs; specific tariff and *ad valorem* tariff. While specific tariff refers to the fixed charge for each unit, *ad valorem* (on the value) tariff is imposed as a proportion of the value of imported products. In some cases, there are compound tariffs that mean a mixture of specific and *ad valorem* tariffs.

**Black list** is a declaration by a country of a list of people and/or companies of other countries that trade relations would not be allowed with. Normally only the citizens of the country that declared the blacklist would not be allowed to trade with the blacklisted people and/or companies wherever they are in the world. However, in practice, more powerful and/or influential states could persuade, induce, or force citizens of other states to observe its blacklists. Various instances of the US blacklisting several Iranian or Russian citizens/companies since the end of the Cold War and persuading/forcing other countries to join its sanctions are good examples of this instrument. Similarly an international organization such as the EU or the UN could blacklist certain people or companies from specific countries.

**Boycott**

Boycott aims to prevent either importing certain goods from the boycotted country or less frequently exporting certain products into that country. Boycott usually applies as a reaction to some policies of a country against which the boycott is launched. Citizens of a country that feels wronged, rather than states, usually launch boycotts, and it could either be unilateral or applied in cooperation with the citizens of other countries. At times, states could also support boycott that it citizens started. For example, Arab countries advised their citizens for years after its establishment not to buy Israeli products wherever they travel. However this measure has lapsed over the years as the Arab countries started to deal with Israel officially or unofficially.

One of the most famous multilateral boycotts in history was the “Boycott Movement”, also called
as the “Anti-Apartheid Movement”, against the apartheid regime in South Africa. It was started in 1959 as a result of the meeting of South African exiles and their supporters in London and in time captured the attention of students, trade unions, and left wing parties in the UK. Following this, South Africa was first forced to leave the Commonwealth, and then the boycott was expanded with the resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1962, which called to all member states to impose trade boycott against South Africa, and later with the call of the UN Security Council for a partial arm ban against South Africa. The boycott continued successfully until the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994.

Boycotting of Japanese goods by Chinese citizens in 2012 as a reaction to the nationalisation of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by Japan, which controlled the archipelago since 1895 except 1945-72 period under the US administration, could be given as an example for unilateral boycott. China disputes the ownership of the islands since 1970s and when Japanese government purchased three of the disputed islands from their private owners in 2012, large scale protests and boycotts ensued in China against Japan. Mainly as a result of boycotting Japanese goods, in particular the Japanese cars, Japan had to suspend operations at some factories in China. Although the territorial dispute has not been solved yet, Japan’s economy was harmed during the boycott.

However, in today’s globalized world and much integrated trade relations, it has become increasingly difficult for countries to gain benefits from boycotts or achieve its intended results.

**Embargo**

Embargo traditionally and legally meant preventing ships in a certain country’s ports or territorial waters from leaving or transporting that country’s goods. This kind of embargo could be applied both in peacetime and wartime. In practice however, the meaning of embargo has expanded in time to cover goods, and thus, came to be defined as official ban on trade or other commercial activity with a particular country (Oxford Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/embargo). In most cases, embargo is applied for certain items such as weapons, sensitive substances, etc. An embargo can be implemented by individual state or a group of countries or regional and/or international organizations. However, it is usually difficult to have effective results in cases where individual country applies embargo to another country, unless there is a clear dependency of the latter on the former to buy/sell specified product(s).
The US embargo on Cuba has been the longest running embargo in history. It is a commercial, financial, and economic embargo imposed by the US first on the arms sales during the Batista regime in 1958, and then continued with an embargo on all exports except for food and medicine after the Cuban Revolution in 1960. However, other countries continue to trade with Cuba, and Cuba even became a member of the World Trade Organization in 1995. The embargo has been heavily criticized because of its impacts on the essential everyday needs of Cuban people such as food, clean water and medicine. During the Presidency of Barack Obama (2009-2017), with an intention to eventually lift the embargo entirely, he first abolished the travel ban for American citizens and later given permission to the US banks to open accredited accounts in Cuban banks. However, following the election of Donald J. Trump as the President, he reinstated restrictions on Cuba, including the travel restriction of Americans to Cuba and limiting business dealings of military related companies. He also declared that the sanctions on Cuba would not be lifted until the political prisoners would be released and the basic rights and freedoms would be respected (Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-cuba-relations).

Another example of embargo (which could also be classified as global trade restriction) relates to the sensitive materials and trading of illegal weapons. With the general acceptance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a global control on the trading of nuclear fuel and products by the International Atomic Energy Agency has been created with the exception of India, Pakistan, Israel, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In this context, trading of nuclear fuel, technology and products, including the objects of dual use, are kept under control in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

**US Arms Embargo on Turkey (1974-1978)**

Following Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the US Congress imposed an embargo on arms trade to Turkey. Although it was partially lifted at the end of the 1975 and was finally abolished in 1978, there were serious economic and political impacts on Turkey. First of all, while Turkey’s defence expenditures were increased because of its Cyprus intervention, it became difficult for Turkey to find suppliers. Moreover, over 80% of the military equipment Turkish military had in use before the US embargo was either imported from or donated by the US. Therefore, to replace the US in military procurement was both difficult and costly. In addition to the effects of the embargo on Turkish economy and military capacity, Turkish Foreign Ministry had to deal with the repercussions of the embargo on Turkish-American relations for years to come as it damaged the existing trust between the two countries. As a result, Turkey started to develop its domestic weapons production program and also tried to diversify its foreign policy.

As a wartime instrument, blockade means prevention of ships with naval presence from entering or leaving certain parts of enemy state’s territorial waters. As access to open seas is totally prevented from a country’s coastline, this would not only be imposed on the enemy state, but also effects neutral or friendly states. According to international law, in order to be able to apply such a wartime blockade, it must be openly declared and effectively applied. Ships captured during an attempt to break the blockade could legally be impounded by the blockading state under such conditions.

**Blockade**

Blockade is a trade-related economic instrument that can be used both in peacetime and wartime. In peacetime blockade (also known as pacific blockade), a state tries to block entrance and exist of ships carrying the flag of a country that it is blockading into its harbours with its navy. While peacetime blockade is in principle applies only to the ships of the blockaded country, in practice it is also applied to third countries’ ships. For example, when the US started to blockade (although it was technically declared as quarantine) against Cuba on 22 October 1962 to prevent attack-capable missiles entering the country, it was essentially applied against the Soviet ships carrying missiles, which turned back on 5-9 November 1962 before entering the quarantine zone declared by the US. The US declaration of quarantine was lifted on 20 November 1962.

As a wartime instrument, blockade means prevention of ships with naval presence from entering or leaving certain parts of enemy state’s territorial waters. As access to open seas is totally prevented from a country’s coastline, this would not only be imposed on the enemy state, but also effects neutral or friendly states. According to international law, in order to be able to apply such a wartime blockade, it must be openly declared and effectively applied. Ships captured during an attempt to break the blockade could legally be impounded by the blockading state under such conditions.
Neutrality and Neutral States

Neutrality is the legal status arising from the abstention of a state from participation in a war between other states, the maintenance of an attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents, and the recognition by the belligerents of this abstention and impartiality. (Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/neutrality

Switzerland is one of the most famous neutral states in the world. Its neutrality was established by the 1815 Congress of Vienna and it is recognized as permanent neutral state since then by the other states. Japan, Liechtenstein, and Finland are some of the other examples of the neutral states.

Comment on the impacts and effectiveness of economic instruments of foreign policy in a globalized and interdependent world.

Further Reading

On Diplomacy:

On Propaganda:

On Economic Instruments:
There are various types of diplomacy such as bilateral, multilateral, summit, *ad hoc*, parliamentary, open/secret, quiet and coercive diplomacy. *Ad hoc* diplomacy is the oldest form of diplomacy involving a special or temporary envoy sent on a specific mission. It can be bilateral or multilateral. While bilateral diplomacy contains only two parties, multilateral diplomacy involves more than two parties. Conference diplomacy is the most common form of the multilateral diplomacy. Somewhat similar to conference diplomacy, summit diplomacy requires specific time and location of a meeting between the leaders of a state. Although diplomacy is normally conducted by diplomatic staff and occasionally by the heads of state or government, in some cases parliamentarians may also have duties in terms of diplomacy, which is then called parliamentary diplomacy.

Apart from the types of diplomacy based on the involved parties, it is also important to distinguish between different types of based on style, such as quiet diplomacy, open/secret diplomacy and coercive diplomacy. Quiet diplomacy is often used by international organizations to discuss a particular situation away from international and domestic pressures. However, this should not be confused with the secret diplomacy, which mainly refers to behind the doors actions of states to achieve certain agreements in secret. As the secret diplomacy was historically associated with wars and conflicts in international relations, the concept of open diplomacy emerged in order to prevent conflicts emerging as a result of unfair aspects of such secret arrangements. Finally, although the essence of diplomacy is solving problems with peaceful means, coercive diplomacy can sometimes be used to achieve objectives with the use or treat of use of military forces.

The main functions of any form of diplomacy are talks and negotiations. While the diplomatic talks mostly involve exchange of views and/or information between states, negotiations are structured talks to achieve an agreement by a process of give and take. These agreements can be bilateral or multilateral. As achieving consensus on every aspect of multilateral contracts are usually difficult, some states may choose to declare their reservations or objections to some aspects of the proposed arrangements but let it function with the agreement of the rest of the parties.

Although diplomacy is by definition involves more than one state, unilateral actions of a state may sometimes be considered as a form of diplomatic communication. For example, recall or expulsion of diplomats or suspension of diplomatic relations are unilateral actions with bilateral results.

Propaganda plays an important role in influencing other countries' opinions, actions, and/or policies in ways benefitting the country that initiated the propaganda actions. It plays an important role in foreign policy of states especially in crisis times, including the times of war and conflicts. In such cases, it could be transformed into psychological warfare with the inclusion of covert operatives and means to conduct propaganda actions. On the other side, the concept of public diplomacy has gained importance since the end of the Cold War. It is the usage of propaganda methods to explain a state's foreign policy actions to its own citizens rather than populations of other states.

In this sense, propaganda can target five different audiences: citizens of the state managing the propaganda, citizens of friendly nations, citizens of neutral or unrelated countries, citizens of the enemy states, and wider general international and domestic public.

One of the most important aspects of the international propaganda is its value of authenticity. Spreading disinformation on the other hand, especially with malicious intent, is considered more like a covert operation, and thus, the increasing use of fake news in the traditional media or on the Internet is not an acceptable form of propaganda.
Since economy is a vital lifeline for states, the usage of economic instruments in foreign policy to force, coerce, or persuade the other states to behave in certain ways has always been an important tool of states. However, it has gained more importance in modern times with the increasing interdependence of states. In this context, there are two major types of economic methods: foreign and development aid, and trade related economic instruments.

Although the foreign aid and economic assistance are usually perceived as the positive ways of persuasion, they can also be used coercively in a negative form such as refusing, withholding or ending the aid and/or economic assistance. Although developed countries had traditionally employed foreign aid and economic assistance as foreign policy instruments in order to maintain or expand their influence in international arena, developing countries, with the increasing interdependence of national economies, have also started to use them in conjunction with their foreign policy aims. Moreover, economic aid/assistance have recently become a tool used to improve the international reputation of states.

In addition to foreign aid and economic assistance, states can also employ such trade related instruments as quota, tariff, blacklist, boycott, embargo, and blockade either positively or coercively to influence targeted state’s behaviour in the international arena. While blacklist, boycott, embargo and blockade are exclusively coercive methods; quota and tariff can be used either coercively or positively. While most of these instruments can be used in peacetime to influence foreign policy actions of a specific state or group of states; blockade, when used in wartime, would result in legal consequences for both targeted state and also third parties.
1. The term “ambassador” stems from “ambactiare” means:
A. To govern
B. To travel
C. To go on a mission
D. To mediate
E. To guide

2. The Congress of Vienna held in 1815 was important due to .................
A. the development of the concept of state sovereignty.
B. the codification of the modern diplomatic practices.
C. the declining feudal system.
D. conducting ad hoc diplomacy.
E. ending the colonial period.

3. Woodrow Wilson declared the Fourteen Points in 1918 as a reaction to ..........
A. coercive diplomacy.
B. parliamentary diplomacy.
C. multilateral diplomacy.
D. summit diplomacy.
E. secret diplomacy.

4. The term “persona non grata” refers to..........  
A. a person who is internationally accepted and respected.
B. a person who is accredited as a diplomat in the host country.
C. a person who enjoys diplomatic immunity.
D. a person who is not wanted or welcome in a particular country.
E. a person who prepares the international agreements.

5. Dissemination of information to influence public opinion can be the definition of .................
A. propaganda.
B. public diplomacy.
C. psychological warfare.
D. fake news.
E. public relations.

6. States conduct propaganda activities for the citizens of the enemy states with the aim of .................
A. reinforcing already existing believes to create wider public consensus.
B. gaining their favour in the longer term.
C. weakening the resolve of the enemy population.
D. ensuring state-to-state friendship.
E. cultural influence.

7. Economic globalization refers to .................
A. The free movement of goods, capital, services, technology and information.
B. The transmission of ideas, meanings, values around the World.
C. The process which embodies the growing extensity and intensity of military relations among states.
D. The abolishment of the economic sanctions.
E. The establishment of cooperation and improving trade relations between states.

8. Marshall Plan can be described as .................
A. diplomatic manoeuvre for US to approach to the Soviet Bloc.
B. economic assistance for Europe to prevent its economic collapse after the Second World War.
C. charity done by the American business people in less developed countries.
D. UN programme for sustainable development.
E. the US embargo on Cuba.
9. Black list is .................
A. creating a quantitative restriction for a state’s exports or imports.
B. a tax or duty to be paid on a particular class of imports or exports.
C. a declaration by a country of a list of people and/or companies of other countries that trade relations would not be allowed with.
D. preventing to import certain goods.
E. preventing ships in a certain country’s ports or territorial waters from leaving or transporting that country’s goods.

10. The longest running embargo in history is .................
A. the US embargo on arms trade to Turkey.
B. the US embargo on Cuba.
C. the US arms embargo on Argentina.
D. the US embargo on Iran.
E. the international arms embargo on the South Africa.
Reflect and comment on the importance of protocol and etiquette in modern diplomacy.

Protocol and etiquette are sine qua non of modern diplomacy and relationship between states. As states are considered sovereign and equal in their international relations, they pay utmost attention to protocol as a way to ensure visibility of this equality. Without the rules of the protocol, which regulates the procedure of diplomatic occasions, the relationship between the representatives of states could easily descend into chaos, as it had often happened before the rules of diplomatic protocol had been developed, over the discussions/arguments on who would do what and when.

Although the beginning of protocol can be traced back before the institutionalization of diplomatic representation, it has gained more regulated and hierarchical form with the establishment of regular and widespread diplomatic missions. It contains many principles and rules regarding ceremony, etiquette, titles, correspondence, wardrobe, and dining. As a reflection of respect that sovereign states show to each other, elegance and diligence are essentials of diplomatic activities. Otherwise, when diplomatic protocols are violated, diplomatic crisis usually ensues and harms the relationship between states.
Propaganda is defined as the effort to influence other people’s belief, attitudes, or actions with words, banners, monuments, music, clothing, etc. In its organized form, it is effectively used by states to influence populations at home and abroad. International propaganda may sometimes employ one-sided and distorted messages to demoralize the population of the enemy country, which can then be named as **psychological warfare**. Thus, while propaganda aims to manipulate the populations at home and abroad, psychological warfare targets mostly the opponent country’s population to discourage them from resisting. On the other hand, **public diplomacy** differs from both propaganda and psychological warfare in terms of its intention. States use public diplomacy to establish an atmosphere for dialogue with their own citizens to inform them about developments on certain topics. Rather than one-sided manipulation activity by the state, it should be an interactive way to create mutual trust between states and their populations.

With the increase of the economic interdependence between states as a result of the globalization, the impact of economic methods as foreign policy instruments has increased when used in a positive way effort to persuade states to behave in certain ways. However, coercive value of economic instruments has declined with the increasing interdependence, as negative usage of different tools also harm initiator country, not only targeted state. On the other hand, while foreign aid as an economic instrument of foreign policy had been used mainly by the developed countries and more powerful states in the international affairs, with the increasing globalization and economic interdependence, less developed or less powerful countries have also been able to utilize these tools for their foreign policy. Moreover, taking into consideration the high level of integration in trade relations between states as a result of globalization, boycotts and other restrictive forms of trade have increasingly became difficult to be used as foreign policy instrument in an interdependent world.


Lenin, Vladimir I. (1902). *What is to be done?,* cited in https://www.britannica.com/topic/propaganda


Chapter 8

Foreign Policy Instruments of States: War and Conflict

After completing this chapter, you will be able to:

1. Grasp the meaning and the role of war and conflict as a foreign policy tool
2. Identify various types of war and conflict

Chapter Outline
Introduction
Defining the Concept of War
Types of War and Conflict
Causes of War
War as a Foreign Policy Instrument the Contemporary International System

Key Terms
War
Conflict
Military Instrument
Peace, Security
International Law
INTRODUCTION

Which is as old as human history. It can be said that human history evolved through wars. It was a means of foreign policy of that was the most commonly used, and thus, should be analyzed thoroughly. Although being accepted as a legal tool of foreign policy, the notion of “war” is legally prohibited in the current international system. That’s to say, nowadays war is no more a legal foreign policy tool, with one exception of self-defense. The international order which was established after the Second World War through the United Nations (UN) system prohibited the use of force for achieving foreign policy objectives. However, this does not mean that war, in fact, disappeared in international relations. The use of force among political entities based on political grounds still exists in the current international system. Therefore, an analysis of war, with all its old and new types as a means of foreign policy is useful to understand the current state of foreign affairs. In this regard, in the present chapter the notion of “war” will be analyzed in its all aspects, from its definition to its types, from its sources to its causes and from the international legal condition to the practical situation.

DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF WAR

Though war is a concept being familiar to everyone, it is not easy to make a scientific definition of war that is universally accepted. The term first evokes the condition of military conflict among states. In fact, in the Webster English dictionary war is defined as “a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict between states or nations”. However, in the academic literature the definition of war resembles the technical definition in terms of the use of force, but it also comprises armed conflicts among non-state actors. In this manner war can be defined as the use of force by groups with the aim of achieving their objectives. The famous definition given in the 19th century by a German strategist Carl Von Clausewitz at this point can add a new insight to facilitate our attempt for finding the correct definition. Clausewitz defines war as follows: “war is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means.” In other words, war is a continuation of politics by other means. In this context, war might be defined as “the systematic violence imposed by political entities in order to achieve their political goals”. While the above definition can be accepted as the broadest definition of war, this concept can be defined differently from various aspects. As a matter of fact, the definition of war viewed from the socio-political angle is totally different from the definition given according to the legal perspective.

*This figure shows the long-term trend in the rise of both the frequency and severity of war. Beginning in the year 1000, the number of wars in each century has usually increased. The death toll of the 20th century’s wars, which accounted for 75 % of the millennium’s total, is terrifying.


Figure 8.1 The long-term trend in the rise of both the frequency and severity of war.
Antiquity
- Sun-Tzu: The classical study of Sun-Tzu The Art of War begins with the definition of war. Accordingly “the art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected”.
- Thucydides: According to Thucydides war is result of power and the search for power. The search for power is inherent in human nature and when combined with the fear the weak side feels this results in war. Since the search for power and fear are inherent in human nature, war is inevitable in the view of Thucydides. This view will later be the ground of the realist international relations perspective.

The Renaissance
- Niccolo Machiavelli: Italian Renaissance political philosopher and historian Machiavelli suggests that “war is just when it is necessary; arms are permissible when there is no hope except in arms”. Accordingly, war is inevitable, and because the most important political objective for states is survival war is seen just as a means of foreign policy. This point of view also reflects the realist international understanding.

Enlightenment
- Thomas Hobbes: One of the most prominent founders of the realist thought Hobbes defines war as “an extension of the state of nature which is the condition of war of all against all”. The state of nature, the natural condition of mankind is also a condition of war of all against all in which human beings constantly seek to destroy each other in an incessant pursuit for power. To avoid this, free men contract with each other to establish political community (civil society) through a social contract in which they all gain security, in return for subjecting themselves to an absolute sovereign. This in the interstate system is not possible, because the anarchical structure of the interstate system or the state of nature is profitable, thus bearable.
- Jean Jacques Rosseau: Another Enlightenment philosopher Rousseau contrary to Hobbes does not base wars in human nature. According to Rousseau, war is a social institution, and thus, states the struggle between states not individuals. The root cause of war is the inequality between nations.

Modern Era The 19th Century
- Carl Von Clausewitz: War is merely an extension of diplomacy by other means. It is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will, directed by political motives and morality.
- John Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Another 19th century philosopher Hegel also sees war as inevitably, but beyond this he glorified war as a means of foreign policy. Because for Hegel successful wars consolidate the power of the state, and thus, preserves national pride.
Following the footsteps of Clausewitz, war is defined as an aspect of politics from the socio-political point of view. The general tendency of the socio-political perspective is to see war as a means for resolving differences among units of the highest order of political organization, namely, it is States. War is put in an international context; therefore, differences have been seen to involve directly State institutions, such as the foreign office and the armed forces. As a result the stakes of war is seen much more as the life and death of States, rather than individuals (Dennen, 1981: 130).

The quantitative view is an attempt to define war based on quantitative data which is possible to make a distinction between violent action and war. War can be defined as a threshold since the number deaths is over 1000. Accordingly, a specific criterion which is based on size, preparation and legitimation was formed to define such events as war. This definition excludes, unplanned, unorganized and non-legitimized conflicts, such as riots, but on the other hand it includes large-scale civil wars which are ignored in the political perspective. The mentioned criteria are as follows (Dennen, 1981: 133):

1. The event ought to result at least in 1000 battle deaths - Size
2. It ought to be prepared and planned by large-scale social organizations through recruitment, training and deployment of troops the acquisition, storage and distribution of arms - Preparation
3. It ought to being legitimized by an established governmental organization, so that large-scale killing is viewed not as a crime but as a duty - Legitimizing

At this point, with the aim of reaching a broader, inclusive definition of war we should mention the attempts for syntheses that combine the legal, sociological, military, and psychological views of war. One of the most influential attempts of this kind can be found in Quincy Wrights works. Wright defines war on an analytical ground as “the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a conflict by armed force” (Wright, 1942: 8). This conception, according to Wright, comprises all aspects from legal to political and from military to socio-psychological viewpoints. It is explained by Wright as follows; instead of violence there is reference to armed force implying a very specific type of violence and its conscious employment to achieve an end. The word “conflict” is used with the implication that war is a definite and mutually understood pattern of behavior. The expression “hostile groups” is used to confine the entities which may be at war to indicate that small class known as social groups and finally the warring entities are said to have equality under law which suggests that the entities are the members of a higher group besides their hostility (Wright, 1942: 8-9).

Differences in definition lie not only in the different points of view, but definitions have shifted over time along with changes that war underwent in practice. While wars have changed in their structure, scope, aim and technology a need for new definitions arose accordingly.

Since the ancient times the evolution of warfare and the political, economic and technological evolution of societies underwent hand in hand. As war drove the evolution of larger, richer, and more sophisticated political entities through the gains, these larger, richer, and more sophisticated entities in turn drove a series of revolutions in military affairs (Morris, 2012: 18). There are a number of turning points in the evolution of warfare which overlap with periods of great social, economic and political transformations in human history.

What made the birth of warfare possible was the emergence of societies with fully articulated social structures (Gabriel and Metz, 1992: 23). The evolution of sophisticated armies and the conduct of war in Sumer and Egypt represented the ultimate development of warfare in the ancient world. War, warriors, and weapons became a normal part of human existence. During the Iron Age almost every aspect of war was developed to modern scale. Armies were increased in size, and structure; in addition, the prototype of every weapon which would develop for the next three thousand years was produced. In the words of Gabriel, “Only with the introduction of gunpowder would a new age of weaponry and warfare begin.” (Gabriel and Mentz, 1992: 25).

The military organization of the Middle Ages was, like in the ancient time, a direct reflection of the political, social, and economic situation, here of feudalism. There were no centralized industries of arms, no permanent standing military forces, and no efforts to train armies, except the efforts that were made by local vassals.
With the dawning of the 14th century, and the decline of feudalism, the period of a new economic, social and thus political transition began. The Hundred Years’ War (1337-1457) raised the need for large military forces, including the mercenary contingents. This, in turn, required the development of a centralized governmental mechanism (Gabriel and Metz, 1992: 73). In the 15th century, Europeans began to make enormous improvements in both guns and ships, starting a new phase of war (Moses, 2012: 28). By the time of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) all the major elements of the modern army had been set into place, which, in turn, ended with the new era of the modern inter-state system.

By the early 19th century, the transition from the old feudal orders to the modern national era was complete insofar as weaponry, tactics, and military organization were concerned. In this era Napoleon introduced the mass citizen army based on conscription and revolutionized the conduct of war. While a number of industrial and agricultural innovations made it possible to extract ever larger numbers of manpower from the economic base without serious disruption, the size of Napoleonic armies was impossible to maintain unless the entire social and economic resources of the state were also mobilized for war. The age of modern war was beginning to dawn (Gabriel and Metz, 1992: 82).

The new technologies of the Industrial Revolution were directed to military use during the era. The railroad, the factory system, mass production, and the use of machines to make any number of military weapons and products were the most important innovations in terms of their impact on warfare. Machine guns arrived in the late 19th century and automatic rifles and light machine guns first arrived at the beginning of the 20th century. At the outset of the World Wars, various nations had developed weapons that surprised the other, and with the Second World War the nuclear age in warfare had begun.

This transformation of war especially since late 19th century leading to some changes with regard to the perspective and stance about wars was a factual detail. While wars have changed in their scope and advanced to the level of the mass destruction of populations, the international community took action in order to draw war out from the international scene. As a matter of fact, it can be observed that the development of international law in terms of limiting, structuring and later outlawing war coincides with the development of modern warfare.

In this manner, the first attempt was seen for the outlawing of war after the First World War with the establishment of the League of Nations on 10 January 1920 as a result of the Paris Peace Conference. Although this attempt remained limited, the next initiative came immediately after.
The Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928) the first international agreement upon which the parties committed that they would not use war to resolve disputes or conflicts that may arise among them. This was the first such a broad attempt, however, still limited since it covered only the signatories and did not outlaw war in the relations between party and non-party states. After these initial steps the universal prohibition of the use of force has been realized by the establishment of the United Nation (UN) after the Second World War. This process of the outlawing of war through the UN will be examined in following sections.

**TYPES OF WAR AND CONFLICT**

Wars are diverse. Wars arise from different situations, are conducted differently and play different roles in bargaining over conflicts. There are a number of attempts for classifying wars considering various criteria. Some classifications are based on criteria such as the size of the group that uses force, the type of means which are used or the extent of violence involved in the war. Correspondingly wars can also be classified according to their terrain and intensity as absolute war and limited war; according to the types of weapons used as conventional and unconventional; further according to the tactics as conventional warfare and guerilla warfare; according to the composition of the parties as international war and civil/asymmetric war or dyadic and complex war; according to the motives of the parties as religious war and ethnic war, and finally, hot war and cold war.

!!! Do not forget that these categories are not mutually exclusive, and they overlap considerably in practice. Each war can be categorized differently depending on the criteria that are used. For example, a war categorized as an ethnic war according to one criterion can also be classified under the civil war or guerilla war category.

**Absolute War - Limited War**

Absolute war is a type of warfare which is unrestricted in terms of the weapons used, the territory or combatants involved, the objectives pursued and resources that are allocated. In an absolute war the whole society is seen as combatant and the land of the country is seen as a battlefield as a whole. In other words, the differentiation between combatants and non-combatants become indistinct and sometimes it even vanishes entirely because nearly every human resource can be considered to be a part of the war in absolute wars. The aim in general is to conquer and occupy the adversary. Absolute war began with the Napoleonic Wars, which introduced large-scale conscription and geared the entire French national economy toward the war effort. The practice of absolute war evolved with industrialization, and this incident integrated the whole society and economy into the practice of war. The best and last example of absolute war was the Second World War (Goldstein, 2012:153).

Limited war, on the other hand is the quite opposite of absolute war; any war limited in space and involving restraint by belligerents is defined as a limited war. According to Clausewitz, limited war occurs when annihilation is impossible because of the political aims or because of inadequate military means to
accomplish annihilation. This approach of Clausewitz reflects actually the 19th century approach to war which was common until the Second World War. Prior to this approach, the only way to achieve victory was considered the total destruction of the enemy. Historically, the wars taking place in 18th century Europe are considered limited wars; however, after the last absolute war and with the beginning of the nuclear age in warfare the term limited war has been discussed widely, because while the wars of the post-Second World War era are limited in many aspects, it is quite impossible to limit wars in contemporary conditions where mankind is faced with the destructive power of modern weapons, especially of the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons. The Korean and the Vietnam Wars are considered the earliest examples of limited wars after the Second World War, because of their limited character in terms of space, means or ends.

**Conventional Warfare - Unconventional Warfare**

Conventional wars are the ones waged through the use of traditional/conventional means. It refers to a battle between states’ regular armed forces, using conventional weapons against each other which do not include biological, chemical or nuclear substances.

Unconventional warfare, on the other hand, uses unconventional weapons along with conventional ones, targets the civilian population as well as the armed forces, and specializes in unconventional tactics. The most distinctive feature of unconventional war is the means that are used, such as nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons were used in a war for the first time in history, in the Second World War. After the US used the atomic bomb against Japan in the Second World War, nuclear weapons entered the agenda of warfare. Although nuclear weapons are not used since then it made an impact so impressive that their existence has changed the military strategy as a whole. With the invention of nuclear weapons and the probability of their use states possessing nuclear weapons reached the capacity of mutual destruction by pressing just a button without conducting armed struggle. This fact has changed the military strategy of states from gaining victory over the opponent to the strategy of deterrence. Biological and chemical weapons are part of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) like nuclear weapons, and their use in a war transforms the war from conventional to unconventional. Their negative effects are not limited with time and space, and they can harm the whole society, human beings-made structure and also natural structure.

**Regular Warfare - Guerilla Warfare**

One aspect of unconventional warfare is related to the military tactic used is the guerilla war. It is warfare without frontlines (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2012: 166). The purpose is not to directly confront an enemy army, but rather to harass and punish it so as to gradually limit its operation and effectively liberate territory from its control. Rebels in most civil wars use such methods. One of the best examples of guerilla warfare can be found in the Vietnam War. The US army in the Vietnam War had fought against Vietcong guerillas (1964-1973) and it had dramatic consequences, because such warfare is the most painful for civilians. In a guerilla war, guerillas hide themselves in the midst of civilians and for a conventional army it is quite impossible to distinguish guerillas from civilians. As a result, conventional armies often prefer to punish both, to illustrate, this was experienced in the Vietnam War. In one famous case in Vietnam War, a U.S. officer who had ordered an entire village burned to deny its use as a sanctuary by the Vietcong commented “We had to destroy the village to save it.” (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2012: 166).
Civil War - International War

International war is the conventional definition of war taking place between sovereign states. Civil war on the other hand is a war between organized groups within the same country fighting with the aim of taking control of the country or a region, achieving independence for a region or changing government policies. However, wars between the government on the one side and an organized group on the other are also accepted as civil wars. Civil wars are not considered war under the provisions of International Law, in this context according to Geneva Conventions (1949) which are part of the law of war they are comprised (in article 3) under the heading of “non-international armed conflict”. Accordingly, civil wars are defined as wars in which one or more non-state armed groups are involved. Depending on the situation, hostilities may occur between governmental armed forces and non-state armed groups or between such groups only.

Two requirements are necessary for such situations to be classified as non-international armed conflicts according to the Geneva Conventions:

- The hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity.
- Non-governmental groups involved in the conflict must be considered as “parties to the conflict”, meaning that they possess organized armed forces.

Asymmetric Warfare - Conventional Warfare

Asymmetric warfare is one of unconventional warfares. The most prominent feature of asymmetric warfare lies in the military capabilities of belligerent powers. When the military capabilities of belligerents are not simply unequal, but they are so significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other. However, the difference between the tactics and means used by belligerent parties is much more important in characterizing asymmetric warfare. Because the weak side is mostly a non-state actor and since these non-state actors are not bound with the law of war, they may be open to using tactics and strategies that ignore universal moral principles. In that manner guerilla warfare is also a type of asymmetric war, however after the 9/11 attacks on US by the terrorist group El-Kaide the term is being used chiefly to refer to the international terrorism.

Cold War - Hot War

Finally, we should mention Cold War as the opposite of the things aforementioned in this chapter so far. It is important to mention cold war, up to a certain extent because it was the most prominent feature of the international system from the end of the Second World War until 1990s. The term is used to refer to intensive ideological and political struggles which do not reach the level of open armed warfare. The means of Cold Wars are political and economic activities, propaganda, espionage and proxy-wars. At this point, proxy-wars are worth mentioning in a more detailed way. A proxy war is an armed conflict between two states or non-state actors which act on behalf of other parties that are not directly involved in the hostilities. In other words, a proxy-war is the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome (Mumford, 2013a:40). Examples of proxy-wars are ample in Cold War
history because it was motivated by the fear that a conventional war between the two super powers, the US and the Soviet Union could result in a nuclear disaster. This type of proxy-wars can be understood as State A hiring proxies in State B to conduct ‘subversive operations’ on its behalf (Mumford, 2013a: 40). However, it is neither a new phenomenon occurred in the Cold War years nor an old one left over in the past after the Cold War. Proxies have been utilized throughout history as means of fulfilling the objectives of third parties, e.g. Catholic Spain and Protestant France during the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648) covertly involved themselves on the sides of their co-religionists within the Holy Roman Empire (Mumford, 2013b: 12). And on the other hand, it is still a quite prominent phenomenon in current international relations since the threat of nuclear disaster is still the main determinant of it. As Mumford evokes the US President Dwight D Eisenhower once called proxy wars ‘the cheapest insurance in the world’ and this might also be one of the reasons why proxy wars have been so prevalent in the contemporary international system (Mumford, 2013a: 40).

Dyadic War - Complex War

Wars with more than three participants are called complex wars, and they are longer and more uncertain than dyadic wars that are wars between two states. Dyadic wars are simpler in comparison to complex wars since there are only two foreign policies, sets of motives, and interactions. Dyadic wars are more prone to break out between neighbor states over territorial disputes while complex wars are more likely to exhibit complex power politics (Vasquez and Valeriano, 2010: 294-296). Because complex wars follow generally long term power politics, including arms races, these wars are more severe and longer than others. Dyadic wars, on the other hand, usually are not preceded by arms races, and thus, they are not severe as complex wars (Vasquez, 2009: 279). Vasquez’s research shows us that historically complex wars are rare; hence, dyadic wars are the typical war of the global system; from 1816 to 1997 64.6% of the wars are dyadic. In this vein, manner the two World Wars are the examples of complex wars, but the rarest in type, because most of the complex wars do not include more than four parties, rather they are mostly in a type of two parties versus one or three parties versus one.

Religious, Ethnic, Ideological Wars

Clash between conflicting principles, beliefs or ideologies are not new in history. The wars of religion in Europe before the Westphalian peace settlement, the French Revolution, and the Cold War are all events with ideational dimensions.

Ethnic conflict is quite possibly the most prevalent conflict in current international relations. Ethnic conflicts are the conflicts which the objectives of at least one party are defined in ethnic terms, and the conflict and possible solutions are perceived along ethnic lines (Goldstein, 2012: 162). Religious wars are conflicts, primarily caused or justified by differences in religion. They are somewhat related to ethnic conflicts because religion often serves as a cultural marker or ideological rationalization for deeper ethnic and cultural differences. For example, Thirty Years’ Wars (1618-1648) the best known religious wars of Europe, even though it was an eruption of religious divisions within Europe, included also motivations of territory and autonomy (Jackson and Morelli, 2011: 38). Ideological wars resemble religious conflicts, in that they serve as expressions of underlying differences between conflicting parties. In other words, ideology surfaces as the visible division between groups rather than being the cause of conflict.

CAUSES OF WAR

The “causes of war” is one of most studied subjects in social sciences, let alone the top one in the international relations. Nevertheless, the common result of all of these studies is that there is no such thing as the main cause of war, therefore it is impossible to reach a single grand theory of war. It is instead suggested that since every war is a unique event that has unique causes, the causes of war are as numerous as the number of wars (Garnett and Baylis, 2015: 70). However, some scholars did not give up their effort
to reach some generalizations from patterns and similarities between causes of one war and another. In such an effort Garnett suggests some categories which are not precise, but they will contribute to our overall understanding on the causes of war. According to Garnett, the causes of war can be categorized under three broad categories.

**Immediate Causes and Underlying Causes**

Immediate causes are proximate while underlying causes are more fundamental. Immediate causes can be defined as causes that trigger the outbreak of war. The most famous example used for explaining the immediate cause of a war is the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo by a Serbian nationalist in 1914. This is the immediate cause that triggered the outbreak of the First World War. However, when it comes to the underlying cause the scene changes because it is widely accepted that the war would have occurred sooner or later even if the Archduke had not being assassinated, since in 1914 in Garnett’s words the war was in the air. This argument then directs us to the underlying causes which are to be found in the structural level. The underlying causes of the First World War in this vein could be found in the structure of the international system of the time, which is mainly characterized by the colonial rivalry (Garnett, 2007: 24).

**Permissive Causes and Efficient Causes**

Efficient causes are related to particular circumstances, for example if state A claims something from state B the efficient cause is the claim of state A. However, a claim needs the permissive cause to lead to war. Permissive causes do not promote war actively, but they allow it to occur (Garnett, 2007: 24-25). At this point the anarchical structure of the international system is one of most argued permissive causes of war. As Kenneth Waltz has suggested in his *Man, The State and War* (Waltz, 1959) the structure of the international system, its lack of a superior authority creates the condition that permits and facilitates the occurrence of war.

**Necessary Causes and Sufficient Causes**

The sufficient cause is a condition that if it is present, it guarantees the occurrence of war. That state A and B hate each other so much is a sufficient cause because with this condition war between them becomes inevitable. While this example is a sufficient cause of war it is not a necessary cause. Sufficient causes can change through time. For example, dynastic relations were one of the sufficient causes of war in the past, but in the present time though dynasties and dynastic relations still exist they do not play the same role as causes of war. A necessary cause is a condition that must exist if war is to occur, without that condition war cannot breakout. The existence of armed forces is a necessary condition because without weapons wars cannot be declared. However on the other hand the existence of armed forces, while a necessary cause is not a sufficient cause for the outbreak of war. Finally, in the words of Garnett “a cause of war can be necessary without being sufficient while a sufficient cause can instigate war without being necessary” (Garnett, 2007: 27).

If you are interested in historical and quantitative data about wars you can visit the website of the “Correlates of War Project” at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. Discuss the causes of war.
WHAT CAUSES WAR

Garnett’s categorization of the causes of war is an attempt, as mentioned before for reaching some generalizations with the aim of analyzing the causes of war. However, the difference between the answers given to the question “what causes war” is mainly because of the different theoretical stand of the respondent. The causes of war can be deduced differently from various levels of analysis, and thus, the main reason of the difference lies in the levels of analysis upon which the approach is structured.

Arranging the causes of war through the levels of analysis in order to reach a typology is first introduced by Waltz’s “three images” categorization and he explained this classification in his book “Man, the State and War” (Waltz, 2001). This book according to Waltz is an inquiry to find an answer for “what really causes war?” and he suggests that research until that day was focused upon the first and second images (the individual and the state levels of analysis), but the answer to this question could only be found in the third image, namely the system level.

The first image finds the major cause of war in the first level of analysis, or the individual level. Different approaches in this level of analysis share their focal point with regard to man, but they differ in determining the main causes stemming from them. Rooting the causes of war in “human nature” is a very common approach, shared by a wide range of theories, ranging from the idea of “man is sinful from birth” of Christian philosophy to the realist theory of international relations. This view suggests that wars are caused by the egoistic, self-interested, power seeking and also offensive nature of human beings. One of the main figures grounding the causes of war and conflict on the aggressive motives of human nature is stated by Sigmund Freud, the founder of the field of Psychoanalytic. According to him, the human nature assumption was most widely used by the realist school of thought. The founder of the realist theory in international relations Hans J. Morgenthau based his theory on a distinctive conception of human nature. Man is possessed by a lust to power without limits, called animus dominandi that inclines him to dominate fellow Men (Schuett, 2010: 23). This view despite all its diversity can be assumed as the focal point for all classical realists such as George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, E. H. Carr, and Reinold Niebuhr. A similar aspect which is suggested mostly by research studies in the field of social psychology claims that human beings are prone to wage wars when they feel deprived. When people are restrained they feel disappointed, and in turn, this feeling causes anger and aggression. Accordingly, this type of deprivation when accompanied by relative poverty is the main cause of war.

The second viewpoint in the individual level bases its arguments on the rationality assumption, and thus addresses deviations from rationality in the foreign policy, decision making process. These approaches focus mainly on psychological processes that cause derivation from rationality, such as misperception. There is an ample literature on foreign policy decision makers’ belief systems, operational codes, misperception and biases (Levy, 1998: 157).

Another aspect in the individual level which ought to be mentioned is the group level. The causes of war at this level of analysis are found on group action. In Friedrich Nietzsche’s words, “madness is rare in the individual – but with groups, parties, peoples, and ages it is the rule” (Nietzsche, 2002: 70). The underlying reason for such an argumentation is the fact that groups provide preservation from individual responsibility by distributing it among group members. At this point it is worth mentioning Irving Janis’ “groupthink” approach of decision making theory (Janis, 1972). According to the groupthink view individuals as members of a group will act with the desire to keep, the harmony of the group, and thus, might be inclined to make a choice – like aggressive policies or war- which they would not choose as an individual.
The second image is the state or domestic level. At this level, theories focus mainly on the relationship between regime type and war, the type of the society and war, and the economy and war. It is asserted in this vein that certain political cultures, ideologies, or religions are more warlike than others, but this proposition finds little support from quantitative empirical literature (Levy, 1988: 657). In the Cold War years while Marxist analyses were claiming that capitalists are more prone to use force because of the unequal distribution of wealth; liberal analyses were asserting that communist states have a tendency to aggression due to their expansionist, ideological and totalitarian structure have a tendency to aggression. This argumentation has somewhat transformed into the democratic-authoritarian debate after the end of the Cold War and it has been claimed that the possibility of using force is higher for authoritarian states. At this point the “democratic peace theory” should be mentioned. According to this theory, democracies are less likely to declare war, especially with each other. Two strands within the democratic peace theory tradition suggest different explanations for the less likeliness of democracies in terms of warfare, but eventually reach the same conclusion. According to the structural strand, the institutions of representative government declare war a largely unattractive option for both the government and its citizens. Since there is the possibility of an electoral response against the costs and risks of a war decision overthrowing the leader and its government, leaders of democratic states will be hesitant to use force. On the other hand, the normative strand of the democratic peace theory argues that shared democratic and liberal values are the basis for peace, because democratic political culture encourages peaceful means of conflict resolution (Rasler and Thompson, 2005: 6). However, there is evidence that democratic states have been involved in war as much as non-democracies, and the only aspect that distinguishes democracies from non-democratic states is that: democratic states do not fight each other. This is at the same time the assumption lying at the heart of democratic peace theory.

The diversionary use of force is another aspect of state level analyses to be mentioned. It is claimed that political elites can use war to divert popular attention from internal social, economic and political problems. When faced with a threat from the external setting, individual members of a group tend to become more cohesive and supportive of their leader. Leaders know that the public is more likely to rally around them when faced with an external threat, they have incentives to draw attention to their enemies, and this might be through the use of force. Most of the studies focusing on the diversionary use of force share the same conclusion that a leader is more likely to use force when the state is experiencing domestic turmoil (Mitchell and Brandon, 2004:4).

The third image is the international system level. The key element of this level of analysis is “anarchy” defined as the structure of the international system. As mentioned in the previous section regarding the permissive cause, this level of analysis yields an explanation of the possibility of war, not of any particular war. The assertion is that “war is possible because there is nothing in the international system to prevent war” (Suganami, 1996: 24). Waltz summarizes this as follows, “With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire – conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to occur” (Waltz, 2001: 159).
One of the key themes in systemic level analysis in terms of the causes of war is the distribution of power among the members of the system. In this sense the number of poles of the system, their stability and relative power are analyzed as factors influencing the stability of the international system. Such neorealists as such rely heavily upon polarity as a key explanatory variable. It can be said that this is the most studied and/or debated area of research in terms of war, while for many years the primary debate was about the relative stability of bipolar and multipolar systems. While neorealists strongly suggested that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity, non-realists and some classical realists on the other hand attributed stability to multipolar systems. In the end, what the two different approaches attempt to answer is the same question “which system is more stable, and thus, peaceful?” Proponents of bipolarity suggest that it is easier to keep a stable system with two superpowers and lots of smaller states in one hand, and the other proponents of multipolarity think that it is easier when there are many states with equally strong capabilities. In Cashman’s words, in the final analysis of the proponents of both they are essentially making the same argument, that “peace is maintained through the balance of power” (Cashman, 2013: 394).

An important alternative to the balance of power assumption comes from the lines of theories of hegemony which incorporates Hegemonic Stability Theory and Power Transition Theory. According to hegemonic theories of international relations, the existence of a hegemonic power in the system serves as a regulatory power, and thus, decreases the effects of anarchy. This situation decreases the possibility of war, at least among medium powers of the system. The power transition theory which was formulated by A. F. K. Organski in his famous book *World Politics* (Organski, 1958) also emphasizes the existence of order within hierarchical systems. In this manner, power transition theory argues that in each historical era a single dominant state usually leads the international order by creating the rules and norms for the system. Peace in such system is maintained as long as the dominant state sustains its dominance which is achieved thanks to the inequality of power between the dominant state and its challenger. Then, the main cause of war according to this approach is the shift in the distribution of relative power, which is measured not by military capabilities but by economic wealth and power. If such power transition occurs, or in other words, if the challenger state catches the dominant state the possibility of war arises (Cashman, 2013: 411-413).

Finally, it should be mentioned that neither level of analysis is capable of giving a satisfying answer to all the questions regarding the causes of war. Each level of analysis questions through its own lenses, and therefore, it is somewhat limited in its approach since no one can confidently predict which disputes have the potential leading to war.
WAR AS A FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The United Nations (UN) and Use of Force

One of the most significant developments of the 20th century was the outlawing of war as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. It was realized with the establishment of the United Nations after the Second World War; however, there were also initial attempts for this. The first attempt for it came after the First World War with the establishment of the League of Nations. However, the League system did not prohibit war or the use of force, but it did set up a procedure designed to restrict it to tolerable levels. The Covenant of the League declared that members should submit disputes likely to lead to a rupture to arbitration or judicial settlement or inquiry by the Council of the League. In no circumstances were members to resort to war until three months after the arbitral award or judicial decision or report by the Council. This was intended to provide a cooling-off period, and league members agreed not to go to war with members complying with such an arbitral award or judicial decision or unanimous report by the Council (Shaw, 2008: 1121-1122).

The first real attempt for the prohibition of war was materialized with the initiation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1928. As one of the great milestones of world history the Pact counted only two substantive articles.

Article 1 contained a solemn declaration by the States to ‘condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and [to] renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another’. In Article 2, the signatories agreed that ‘the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means’.

The Pact did not contain sanctions against countries that might breach its provisions. Instead it was based on a hope that the being signed by most of the nations at that time would have a powerful impact in preventing aggression. As the outbreak of the Second World War has showed, it was not enough to outlaw war, but still important as a first step.

Picture 8.5 The signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, August, 27, 1928


Before these attempts war was a legal means of foreign policy, even the central way in resolving disputes between states. No one could be tried for waging a war because it was not a breakdown in the rule of law. The outlawing of war in this sense was realized with the establishment of the UN after the Second World War, in 24 October 1945. According to its Charter the main aim of the organization is “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”.
In this manner, article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN Charter stipulates that:

“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United Nations”

The Charter provides for few exceptions to the prohibition of use of force, and the most important one is self-defense stated in article 51:

“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

Self-defense is a lawful reaction of the state to armed attack. In order to exercise the right to self-defense lawfully a state must be able to demonstrate that it has been a victim of an armed attack. However, the meaning of an armed attack causes controversy in international law because not all attacks constitute an armed attack for the purposes of Article 51. It is rather necessary for a state to show that an armed attack is attributable to a state. The reason of this arrangement is that the law on the use of force was designed to be applied between states. However, in the contemporary international system states have been increasingly subject to being attacked by non-state actors and this raises questions about the traditional legal framework for the use of force. This issue came to the forefront of the international agenda especially after the 2001, 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US. After 9/11 attacks the Security Council issues a resolution (1373) which mandate states to take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. However, the legal framework is still based on relations between states, and there is no other decision, for example of the International Court of Justice that states has the right to use force against non-state actors.

![United Nations Security Council](un.org/en/sc/)

**Picture 8.6** Member of United Nations Security Council

*Source: un.org/en/sc/*
With the prohibition of war, except self-defense stated in article 51, the use of force is now a means which can only be used by the UN through a settled mechanism. At this point, the UN Security Council plays a major role. The Security Council is the main body which has the ability to decide whether force may be used against other states. When a situation that threatens international peace and security occur, it is the Security Council who ‘determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.’ (Article 39 of the UN Charter). Article 41 confers the UN Security Council the faculty of deciding the measures not involving the use of armed force that shall employ to give effect to its decisions, and article 42 on the other hand refers to military action as measures that can be taken by the Security Council in case measures of article 41 are inadequate or have proved to be inadequate. The use of force authorized by the Security Council can be in the manner of the use of force in collective self-defense; use of force for humanitarian intervention and the use of force with the consent of the state concerned.

Chapter VII - Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

Article 41

“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

Chapter VII - Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

Article 42

“Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.”
When the UN Charter was adopted, the intentions were that a UN military force should be established, and that this should fulfill the task whenever the Security Council authorized the use of force. According to Article 43 of the Charter, Member States of the United Nations should make special agreements with the organization to contribute to such armed forces. Yet, the provision in this article has never been brought into effect. Therefore, the use of force of the organization is going through the authorization of the Security Council. Peacekeeping missions are the most visible face of the United Nations’ use of force in terms of conflict-management work. The UN’s peacekeeping forces are borrowed from armies of member states but under the flag and command of the UN.

The Security Council has authorized fifty-one operations in the years since the Cold War, many responding to failing states, civil wars, or complex humanitarian emergencies and deploying to conflict zones in the absence of cease-fires or parties’ consent. Regional organizations have played an increasingly important role in peacekeeping and conflict resolution. For instance, the council authorized the use of force in Libya in 2011 which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) executed (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).

In the early 2000s, a new concept began to emerge in conjunction with the necessities of the new international conditions occurred after the end of the Cold War. The new norm, the responsibility to protect (R2P) actually was developed to overcome the failures that humanitarian intervention faced in the 1990s. In 2001 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) released “The Responsibility to Protect” report, commissioned by the Canadian government, to develop global political consensus about how and when the international community should respond to emerging crises involving the potential for large-scale loss of life and other widespread crimes against humanity. The report was adopted, with some changes by the UN General Assembly in 2005 at the World Summit. It stipulates that states have a responsibility to protect their populations from crimes against humanity; the international community has a responsibility to use peaceful means to protect threatened populations; and when a state “manifestly fails” to uphold its responsibilities, coercive measures should be collectively taken (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017). The first case the Security Council authorized a military intervention citing R2P was the Libya intervention of 2011.

Beginning with the implementation of the R2P some group of states leaded by the US argued that humanitarian intervention can legitimately be undertaken with the backing of regional organizations or coalitions of the willing. However, it is still widely accepted and even explicitly expressed by the Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon that “the responsibility to protect does not alter, indeed it reinforces, the legal obligations of Member States to refrain from the use of force except in conformity with the Charter” (Ki-Moon, 2009: 5).

**THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P)**
The responsibility to protect is a commitment to act in the face of atrocities. It has three pillars:

- **PILLAR ONE:** Every state has the responsibility to protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes; genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
- **PILLAR TWO:** The wider international community has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility.
- **PILLAR THREE:** If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter.

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**The Security Council has mentioned the R2P in several country-specific resolutions:**
- **Darfur:** Resolution 1706 in 2006.
- **Côte d’Ivoire:** Resolution 1975 in 2011
- **Yemen:** Resolution 2014 in 2011
- **Mali:** Resolution 2085 in 2012 and Resolution 2100 in 2013.
- **Sudan and South Sudan:** Resolution 1996 in 2011 and Resolution 2121 in 2013.
From a very broad point of view, war can be defined as the use of force by groups with the aim of achieving their objectives. Since these objectives can be political ones, war is also a continuation of politics. But, this kind of broad definition may lead to controversies because it would bring the question of whether or not to include acts of violence such as riots, revolutions, and civil wars. The issue gets more complicated as the nature of war has changed over time. The technological developments that took place throughout history have made war such a violent act that it became inevitable to regulate it through some rules in order to avoid the mass destruction of populations or even to rule war completely since it was considered a legal means of foreign policy, even the central way in resolving disputes between states. The first attempt in this sense was the establishment of the League of Nations, which soon proved to be ineffective in that sense. This necessitated another initiative which was formulated in 1928 with the signing of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which was the first international agreement that parties committed to not use war in the disputes or conflicts among each other. As the Pact was not binding for the states that had not participated, it became obvious that other measures were necessary. This measure came with the establishment of the United Nations after the Second World War, which was the most destructive war the humanity had witnessed. Thus, there were all the good reasons and the international conditions for the universal prohibition of the use of force, which United Nations did. According to the article 2 of the UN Charter, all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. The most significant exception to this would be being subject to an armed attack which gives a state the right of self-defense. Except for self-defense, the use of force for humanitarian intervention and the use of force with the consent of the state concerned are also authorized by the United Nations. However, certain problems arise due to the fact that UN Convention was formulated in 1945 and the nature of war and use of force, as it always had, has changed since then. The first issue in that sense is that although the UN Charter foresees armed attacks to and by the states in contemporary world it is not only states but also non-state actors that use force against the states. Another issue was the failures of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. In order to overcome this challenge, a new norm was formulated under the name of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). According to this norm, states have a responsibility to protect their populations from crimes against humanity; the international community has a responsibility to use peaceful means to protect threatened populations; and when a state “manifestly fails” to uphold its responsibilities, coercive measures should be collectively taken.
As there are many different definitions of war there are also many types of war due to the broad extent of the phenomenon. The first group of wars are absolute war and limited war. According to this, absolute war is a war where the whole society is seen as combatant and the whole country is seen as a battlefield and is restricted in terms of the weapons used, the territory or combatants involved, the objectives pursued and resources that are allocated, while limited war refers to wars that limited in space, means, and ends or those that involve restraint by belligerents. A second differentiation is made between conventional warfare and unconventional warfare. Conventional wars are those that take place between states’ regular armed forces, using conventional weapons against each other and do not include biological, chemical or nuclear substances. Unconventional warfare, on the other hand, uses unconventional weapons including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons along with conventional ones, targets the civilian population as well as the armed forces, and specialises in unconventional tactics. In terms of military tactics wars can be classified as regular wars fought between regular, official armies and guerrilla wars which have no frontline since the purpose is not to directly confront an enemy army but rather to harass and punish it in order to limit its operation and effectively liberate territory from its control. Another classification is between international war which is the conventional definition of war taking place between sovereign states and civil war taking place between organised groups within the same country fighting with the aim of taking control of the country or a region, achieving independence for a region or changing government policies or between the government on the one side and an organised group on the other. Warfare can also be asymmetric meaning the military capabilities of belligerents are not simply unequal, but are so significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other. Another type of war is cold war, which refers to intensive ideological and political struggles that do not reach the level of open armed warfare that is hot war. Cold war includes political and economic activities, propaganda, espionage and proxy-wars, which can be defined as an armed conflict between two states or non-state actors which act on behalf of other parties that are not directly involved in the hostilities. Wars can also be complex with more than three participants or dyadic wars that are wars between two states. Dyadic wars are simpler in terms of sets of motives, and interactions while complex wars are longer and more uncertain. Finally, there can be religious, ethnic and ideological wars.
1. How does Carl Von Clausewitz explain describe “war”?
A. [War is] “an extension of the state of nature which is the condition of war of all against all.”
B. “War is just when it is necessary; arms are permissible when there is no hope except in arms.”
C. “War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means.”
D. [War is] “the systematic violence imposed by political entities in order to achieve their political goals.”
E. War can be based on religious, ethnic and ideological issues.

2. What are the components of the criteria used to define war quantitatively?
A. Size - Method - Preparation
B. Method - Legitimization - Organization
C. Method - Size - Organization
D. Size - Preparation - Legitimization
E. Method - Goals - System

3. Which one was the first real attempt for the prohibition of wars?
A. Westphalia Treaty
B. Congress of Vienna
C. Briand-Kellog Pact
D. Paris Peace Treaty
E. Paris Peace Conference

4. Which ones are the samples of absolute wars?
A. Second World War - Napoleonic Wars
B. Hundreds Years War - Korean War
C. Vietnam War - Korean War
D. Second World War - Vietnam War
E. Iraq War - Gulf War

5. Which term is used to define the wars where the military capabilities of belligerents are not only unequal but also significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other?
A. Dyadic war
B. Asymmetric war
C. Hot war
D. Complex War
E. Cold War

6. The diversionary use of force refers to______.
A. wars caused by the egoistic, self-interested, power seeking and also offensive nature of human beings.
B. wars caused by political cultures, ideologies, or religions
C. wars aiming to divert popular attention from internal social, economic and political problems.
D. wars caused by the distribution of power among the members of the system
E. wars stipulate that states have a responsibility to protect their populations

7. Which theory suggests that cause of war is the shift in the distribution of relative power, which is measured not by military capabilities but by economic wealth and power?
A. Hegemonic Stability Theory
B. Democratic Peace Theory
C. Neo-realist Theory
D. Power Transition Theory
E. Constructivist Theory

8. Causes that allow war such as the structure of the international system are called; referred to as ________.
A. efficient causes
B. permissive causes
C. immediate causes
D. necessary causes
E. transition causes
Which of the following includes all exceptions of use of force according to UN Charter?

A. Religious conflicts, ethnic conflicts, ideological conflicts
B. Attacks by non-state actors
C. Self-defence, collective self-defense, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, consent of the state concerned
D. Humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping
E. Preemptive strike

The new norm developed to overcome the failures that humanitarian intervention is ______.

A. peace-building
B. responsibility to protect
C. peacekeeping
D. responsibility to rebuild
E. Mutual independency
Discuss the causes of war.

The “causes of war” is one of the most studied subjects in social sciences, let alone the top one in the international relations. Nevertheless, the common result of all these studies is that there is no such thing as the main cause of war: and that therefore, it is impossible to reach a single grand theory of war. It is instead suggested that since every war is a unique event that has unique causes, the causes of war are as numerous as the number of wars (Garnett and Baylis, 2015: 70). However, some scholars did not give up their effort to reach some generalizations from patterns and similarities between causes of one war and another. In such an effort Garnett suggests some categories which, however, are not precise but will contribute to our overall understanding on the causes of war. According to Garnett, the causes of war can be categorized under three broad categories. They are: Immediate Causes and Underlying Causes, Permissive Causes and Efficient Causes, and Necessary Causes and Sufficient Causes.

What is the main importance of the Briand Kellog Pact?

After the First World War, the first real attempt for the prohibition of war was materialized with the initiation of the Briand-Kellogg Pact in 1928. As one of the great milestones of world history, the Pact counted only two substantive articles. Article 1 contained a solemn declaration by the States to “condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and to renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another”. In Article 2, the signatories agreed that “the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means”.

The Pact did not contain sanctions against countries that might breach its provisions. Instead it was based on a hope that the being signed by most of the nations at that time would have a powerful impact in preventing aggression. As the outbreak of the Second World War has showed, it was not enough to outlaw war, but still important as a first step.
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